Nietzsche's physiological philosophy of history by Soderstrom, Lukas
 
Direction des bibliothèques 
 
 
 
AVIS 
 
Ce document a été numérisé par la Division de la gestion des documents et 
des archives de l’Université de Montréal. 
 
L’auteur a autorisé l’Université de Montréal à reproduire et diffuser, en totalité 
ou en partie, par quelque moyen que ce soit et sur quelque support que ce 
soit, et exclusivement à des fins non lucratives d’enseignement et de 
recherche, des copies de ce mémoire ou de cette thèse.  
 
L’auteur et les coauteurs le cas échéant conservent la propriété du droit 
d’auteur et des droits moraux qui protègent ce document. Ni la thèse ou le 
mémoire, ni des extraits substantiels de ce document, ne doivent être 
imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans l’autorisation de l’auteur.  
 
Afin de se conformer à la Loi canadienne sur la protection des 
renseignements personnels, quelques formulaires secondaires, coordonnées 
ou signatures intégrées au texte ont pu être enlevés de ce document. Bien 
que cela ait pu affecter la pagination, il n’y a aucun contenu manquant. 
 
NOTICE 
 
This document was digitized by the Records Management & Archives 
Division of Université de Montréal. 
 
The author of this thesis or dissertation has granted a nonexclusive license 
allowing Université de Montréal to reproduce and publish the document, in 
part or in whole, and in any format, solely for noncommercial educational and 
research purposes. 
 
The author and co-authors if applicable retain copyright ownership and moral 
rights in this document. Neither the whole thesis or dissertation, nor 
substantial extracts from it, may be printed or otherwise reproduced without 
the author’s permission. 
 
In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms, contact 
information or signatures may have been removed from the document. While 
this may affect the document page count, it does not represent any loss of 
content from the document.  
 
 
 
Université de Montréal 
Nietzsche's Physiological Philosophy ofHistory 
par 
Lukas Soderstrom 
Département de Philosophie 
Faculté des arts et sciences 
Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures 
en vue de l'obtention du grade de M.A. 
en philosophie 
option recherche 
décembre, 2007 
© Lukas Soderstrom, 2007 
RÉSUMÉ: Il existe une philosophie de l'histoire nietzschéenne qui décrit le 
phénomène historique. Cette philosophie de l'histoire s'articule en suivant le court de 
ses lectures en physiologie et en sciences évolutionnistes. Dès le début de sa carrière 
de philosophe, Nietzsche s'est penché sur la question de la nature de l'histoire et il a 
su adapter ses connaissances rudimentaires du darwinisme transmises par l'entremise 
de ses lectures. Cette philosophie se révèle initialement comme une réflexion sur la 
relation entre l'histoire, la vie et la culture. À la fm des années 1870, il se donne le 
projet d'une critique historique des valeurs métaphysiques et morales. Cependant, au 
début des années 1880, il s'affaire à des lectures qui eurent comme effet le rejet de 
ses espoirs précoces en les possibilités du Darwinisme. Malgré cette déception, il 
découvrit aussi une description originale des phénomènes physiologiques qui eut une 
conséquence importante pour sa philosophie de l 'histoire. En concevant l'histoire 
comme un corps, il rejeta l'idée que l'histoire est un être comme les autres en y 
opposant une conception de l 'histoire mettant l'accent sur les traits partagés avec le 
corps, ce qui eut comme effet de décrire l 'histoire comme un tout lié synthétiquement 
et constamment réinterprété. Par l'entremise de l'accumulation d'interprétations, 
l'histoire se développe comme un pré-texte à toute nouvelle interprétation qui 
pluralise le chaos du passé et oriente tout travail interprétatif Par contre, toute 
addition a cette structure occasionne une restructuration de celle-ci et invite à de 
nouvelles interprétations. 
Mots Clés: Nietzsche, Philosophie, Histoire, Physiologie, Darwinisme. 
ABSTRACT: Nietzsche developed an original understanding of history that was 
strongly influenced by his readings of the nascent evolutionary sciences. During his 
early period he integrated his rudimentary knowledge of Darwinian evolutionary 
science into his formaI discussion ofhistory. Initially he assimilated what knowledge 
he had of Darwinian sciences to his discussion of history's cultural significance. In 
the late 1870s he embarked on a project of tracing the origins of all moral and 
metaphysically conditioned values that paralleled his interest in Darwinism. But by 
the early 1880s, he read several works that had a profound effect of his thinking. 
These readings compelled him to abandon his earlier interest in the possibilities of 
Darwinian evolutionary history. However, he also discovered a novel understanding 
of physiological processes that fuelled his reworking of the ideas he had already 
developed. Nietzsche's philosophy of history is characterized by the rejection of the 
idea that history is a being. Accordingly, he asserted that history should be 
understood in the same way as the body, namely as an unstable synthetic whole 
constantly reinterpreted. Through the historical accumulation of historica1 
interpretations, history develops a pre-text that not only pluralizes the chaos of the 
past but also beckons future interpretation. However, historical interpretation does 
more than respond to the cali of history but also acts as a new element within history 
that restructures it and invites further interpretations. 
Keywords: Nietzsche, Philosophy, History, Physiology, Darwinism. 
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Note on Translations and Abbreviations 
When referring to Nietzsche's posthumous notes (Nachlass), 1 have relied on 
the original Gennan and the French translation edited by Giogio Colli and Mazzino 
Montinari. When quoting :from his Nachlass 1 have done so in English using my own 
translation based on the French and the Gennan, or, when applicable, 1 have used the 
translation of the notes :from 1885-1888 found in Writings from the Late Notebooks 
(tr. K. Sturge). 
Following the standard French manner of citing these notes 1 have used the 
following nomenclature: FP (Fragments Posthumes) THE YEAR, THE NOTEBOOK 
NUMBER[FRAGMENT NUMBER]. (ex. FP 1888, 14[173]) 1 have then identified 
the translation as either mine or :from the Writings from the Late Notebooks (WLN). 
Here is a list of all the standard abbreviations used. Full references are 
available in the bibliography. 
KGW: kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke (ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari) 
KGB: kritische Gesamtausgabe Briefwechsel (ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari) 
KSA: kritische Studienausgabe (ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari) 
FP: Fragments Posthumes (ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari) 
WLN: Writingsfrom the Late Notebooks. (tr. K. Sturge. Ed. R Bittner). 
TL: Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense. (tr. Daniel Breazeale). 
UM 1: First Untimely Meditation: David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer. (tr. 
RJ. Hollingdale). 
UM II: Second Untimely Meditation: On the Uses and Disadavantages of History for 
Life. (tr. RJ. Hollingdale). 
HH: Human, ail too Human. (tr. RJ. Hollingdale). 
HH II: MOM: Human, ail too Human: Assorted Opinions and Maxims. (tr. RJ. 
Hollingdale ). 
D: Daybreak. (tr. R J. Hollingdale). 
GS: The Gay Science. (tr. Walter Kaufinann). 
BGE: Beyond Good and Evil. (tr. W. Kaufinann). 
GM 1-11-111: On the Genealogy of Morais. (tr. W. Kaufmann). 
TI: Twilight of the Idols. (tr. R J. Hollingdale). 
EH: Ecce Homo. (tr. W. Kaufinann). 
AlI references to Wilhelm Roux's Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus are based on 
the translation 1 have produced with my thesis director Bettina Bergo. 
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Introduction 
The importance and audacity of Nietzsche's philosophical writings have 
overshadowed his talents as a philologist, but his numerous references to historical 
characters betray the importance of his training in classical philology. One may 
therefore ask whether there is a philosophy of history concealed beneath these 
references. Obviously, both at the beginning of his philosophica1 career, and at the 
end of it, he wrote about history: in 1874 he published On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life, and in 1887 he published On the Genealogy of 
Morais. But do these writings amount to a philosophy ofhistory? 
The expression 'philosophy of history' easily brings to mind the specter of 
Hegelianism. Although this is certainly true, the intention here is not to establish a 
filial connection between Nietzsche and Hegel because Nietzsche himself never used 
the term 'philosophy of history.' Yet, he did briefly argue a typology of history as 
Hegel did in his Philosophy of History, but he did not give a philosophical account of 
historical development akin to that found in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Again, 
Nietzsche's numerous uses of history indicate that he allotted a philosophical role to 
his historical knowledge. Thus, if there is a Nietzschean philosophy of history, it 
exists only in relation to rus philosophy proper and not as a particular philosophical 
specialty. In this sense, his philosophy ofhistory is closely related to his discussion of 
other subjects, such as culture, morality, and physiology. The frrst two are easily 
understandable; both culture and morality have a history and can therefore be 
interrogated historically, but more importantly, they also transmit their values through 
their narratives thus linking them to a particular form of historical expression. 
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Therefore, his philosophy of history pertains to the manner that history is used to 
express and define such identities and values But, as title of this thesis indicates, what 
is sought here is a physiological philosophy ofhistory. Now, what can that mean? 
To answer this question 1 will now compare physiology to sorne related terms. 
First, physiology can he understood in opposition to methodology. Physiology here 
signifies that Nietzsche's philosophy of history is unconcemed with developing a 
historical method. Although there are passages in his writings that can be interpreted 
in such a manner, these passages argue much more for history's methodological 
importance for philosophy, than for philosophy's importance for history. 1 will 
therefore not embark on any extensive discussion of his genealogical method. The 
importance of this opposition is the implication that history does not represent a being 
that must be approached in a determined manner, but is a state of a being that is 
historical. Furthermore, physiology can also be contrasted to psychology. Unlike 
psychology that is concemed with mental states, physiology is directed towards the 
understanding of corporeal states. Whereas psychology privileges a unique subject 
that is the cause of its mental states, physiology deals with a multiplicity of 
interrelated organs that exist only as astate through their interconnected activity in the 
body. Thus, in this sense, if Nietzsche's philosophy ofhistory is physiological it is not 
because it forms a unique phenomenon having a unique cause, but rather because it is 
a certain configuration of multiple elements. This physiological importance of the 
configuration of elements can then be further contrasted to anatomy. The difference 
here rests on the object of study. Anatomy studies the structure and shape of the 
organs that constitute the body, rather than the processes that interrelate these various 
organs. Anatomically construed, a philosophy of history would be primarily 
motivated by the identification and circumscription of the various elements intrinsic 
to history. In contrast to anatomy, however, physiology seeks to understand how the 
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various elements have come to exist in a distinct state. Thus, the primary meaning of 
a physiological philosophy of history is the ascertainment of the processes that have 
come to create a distinct state of the past. History, therefore, is a certain state or 
configuration of the past that may change. 
There is, however, another important element implied in the term physiology 
that must be discussed before going any further. Physiology is a science and it may 
accordingly be approached in relation to Nietzsche's knowledge of science. But more 
precisely, physiology is linked to biology, which itself is connected to history through 
the evolution of species. Thus, physiology put into relation with history also hints at a 
historical evolution. Philosophy of history can now be understood as the inquiry into 
to manner that the past cornes to exist as a distinct state manifested by a historical 
being: the human subject In the following three chapters, 1 will therefore examine 
this configuration of the past using Nietzsche's knowledge of contemporary 
evolutionary science as a narrative guide. 
In the context of nineteenth century biology, linking physiology with natural 
evolution easily invokes the figure of Charles Darwin. In Anglo-American history of 
science, Darwin often overshadows other important characters of nineteenth century 
biology that were just as important, if not more, for the development of modem 
biology. One need only think of Alfred Russell Wallace who humbly cooperated with 
Darwin, or Jean-Baptiste Lamarck who was probably the first to present a coherent 
theory of natural evolution. Darwin's importance is so greatly amplified in the 
Anglophone world that he is often mentioned in the same breath as Copernicus. 
Indeed, Walter Kaufrnann, in the preface to the first edition of seminal work on 
Nietzsche (Nietzsche, Philosopher, PsychologÎst), stated that Nietzsche was "aroused 
from his dogmatic slumber by Darwin, much as Kant was a century earlier by 
5 
Hume [.]"1 Kant's "Copemican revolution" is thus implicitly linked to a supposed 
"Darwinian revolution" in Nietzsche's thought. Aside for such rhetorical flourishes, 
there are good reasons to believe that Nietzsche was influenced to sorne degree by 
Darwin's theory of the evolution of species through natural selection. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, this link between Nietzsche and Darwin was much 
discussed.2 FoHowing Heidegger's monumental study, however, the Darwinian 
reading was largely abandoned and feH out of style.3 It was not until Walter 
Kaufinann's rehabilitation of Nietzsche after the Second World War that Darwinism 
became important for English commentators. In the last decades, this reading has 
gained tremendous importance.4 More often than not, though, this Anglo-American 
reading has attempted to identify a biology in Nietzsche's works with varying degrees 
of success.5 However, there is a second group of readings that also touches upon 
Nietzsche's relation to Darwin but does not have its source in Kaufinann's work. 
Heidegger's comments have led to a French reading of Nietzsche and Darwin that 
attempts to overcome the idea there is a biology in Nietzsche's writings.6 These 
readings owe much to Heidegger's comments because they adopt his opposition to a 
biological reduction of Nietzsche's ideas and integrate them into a framework that 
1 Walter Kaufmann, "Preface to the First Edition (1950)" in Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist 
Antichrist. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. xiii. 
2 For an example, see Claire Richter, Nietzsche et les théories biologiques contemporaines. (Paris: 
Mercure de France, 1911). 
3 See Martin Heidegger, "Nietzsche's Alleged Biologism" in Nietzsche vol. III. tr. David Farell Krell 
(San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1979), pp. 39-47. See also vol. 1, p. 60. 
4 See for example John Richardson, Nietzsche's New Darwinism. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004) and Gregory Moore, Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002). This is not exclusive to philosophy; see Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin 's Dangerous Idea: 
Evolution and the Meanings of Life. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp. 461-466. 
5 This has led Gregory Moore to de scribe Nietzsche's ''physiology of power," and John Richardson to 
argue for a "power biology." 
6 See for example, Barbara Stiegler, Nietzsche et la Biologie. (paris: PUF, 2001); Barbara Stiegler, 
"Nietzsche lecteur de Darwin" in Revue philosophique de France et de l'étranger, vol. 123, no. 2 
(1998), pp. 377-395; Patrick Wotling, "La morale sans métaphysique. «Vitalisme» et psychologie de la 
morale chez Darwin, Spencer et Nietzsche," in Lectures de Nietzsche eds. J-F Balaudé et P. Wotling 
(Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 2000), pp. 351-396. 
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emphasizes bis radical critique of science and modemity. Although they do not 
always agree with Heidegger's reading, he remains, more often than not, as the 
instigator and source of their reflections. 
It is therefore at the intersection of these two different readings that my thesis 
will develop. 1 have chosen to speak of a physiological pbilosophy, rather than a 
Darwinian pbilosophy for two reasons. First, Nietzsche did not consider bimself 
Darwinian. The efforts that have been made to prove or disprove bis allegiance to this 
scientific theory obscure the radical propositions contained within his writings and fly 
in the face of Nietzsche's own comments about himself.7 Second, Nietzsche never 
read Darwin, wbich is very important. Any attempt to portray Nietzsche as a 
Darwinist must always work around this important fact. Nevertheless, he did read the 
English social-Darwinist Herbert Spencer who is generally regarded as the instigator 
for bis criticism of Darwinism. Thus, any discussion of Nietzsche's Darwinism must 
invariably take into account the fact that other writers mediated bis appraisal of 
Darwin. 1 therefore take bis use of the terms 'Darwin' and 'Darwinism' as a 
shorthand designation for the English inspired sources that transmitted Darwinian 
ideas to him.8 Although he did not read Darwin, he did read many contemporary 
German biologists. 1 have chosen to discuss Wilhelm Roux who was a young and not 
well-known biologist at the time but later entered the bistory ofbiology as the founder 
of developmental mechanics. It was Roux, through bis book Der Kampf der Theile im 
Organismus,9 who probably had the greatest influence on Nietzsche's understanding 
of physiology. 
7 See for example Nietzsche's disdainful comment in Ecce Homo: "scholarly oxen have suspected me 
ofDarwinism[.]" Ecce Homo (EH), "Why 1 write such Good Books" §l. 
8 For a chronologicallist ofNiettscbe's texts on Darwinism see Pieter Moster, "Nietzsche's Reception 
ofDarwinism" in Bijdragen tot de Dierkunde, vol. 49, no. 2 (1979), p. 246. 
9 Wilhelm Roux. Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus: ein Beitrag zur Vervollstandigung der 
Mechanischen Zweckmassigkeitslehre. (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1881). Ali discussion ofthis book will he 
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Discussing bis philosophy of bistory in the context of the developing 
evolutionary sciences adds important layer of meaning to physiology. The reason for 
this thesis's focus on the evolutionary sciences, rather than traditional human bistory, 
aside its regained prominence in the literature, is that bis pbilosophy ofbistory, or bis 
pbilosopbical discussion of history, is related to bis readings in the life sciences. The 
Darwinian theory of evolution through natural selection stripped of any reference to 
metaphysics from natural bistory. Since Darwin had removed aIl evolutionary agency 
aside the organismic struggle for resources, natural history no longer needed any 
outside agent to explain its content. IO This agonistic understanding of natural 
selection is the unique element of Darwin's theory that Nietzsche preserved 
throughout bis writings. ll History, therefore, was liberated from any explanation of its 
relation to an outside agent, conceived theologically or metaphysically. Thus, 
understood in relation to Darwinism, bistory became imbued with a value that it did 
not have before, especially because it could now pretend to explain phenomena that 
had previously been relegated to religion and metaphysics. Moreover, the importance 
of evolutionary theory for Nietzsche's pbilosophy of history is not limited to natural 
bistory itself. By liberating natural history from previous metaphysical and theological 
interpretations, Darwin also removed the barrier that had divided natural from human 
bistory. Darwin bimself had done more than imply this new perspective and wrote 
impressively on human origins in The Descent of Man. Nietzsche, although he did not 
done with using the translation 1 prepared ..vith the aid of Prof. Bettina Bergo, see bibliography for 
details, 
10 Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure ofEvolutionary Theory. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), pp. 59-60. 
Il One should note that the f\Tst German translation of The Origin ofSpecies translated the famous 
"survival of the fittest" as Kampfum's Dasein (struggle for existence). Many readers ofpopular 
science, a genre that gained great importance in the second half of the nineteenth century, understood 
this expression as meaning "Life is war". This caused considerable worry for Darwin who eventually 
pushed for a new German translation. (Alfred, Kelly The Descent of Darwin: the popularization of 
Darwinism in Germany, 1860-1914. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), pp.3O-
31. 
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read Darwin's second important work, willingly utilized this new historical. History 
became associated not only with the written word, but as he deepened his knowledge 
of evolution by reading Herbert Spencer, he extended its scope to include both forms 
of history that had previously been discussed separately. 
Now, before explicating the structure of the following thesis, 1 wish to make 
one methodological comment. The following thesis will not describe and interpret 
important Nietzschean expressions such as 'will to power,' 'etemal recurrence,' 
'genealogy' and the 'Uebermensch. ' Although all four of these important 
Nietzschean terms can he related to his discussion of history, they exceed the scope of 
this thesis. These terms would also overshadow the contents of my argumentation by 
virtue of being easily recognizable expressions heavily laden with numerous 
interpretations. Furthermore, the endeavor here is not to produce a systematic 
interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy and the space required to thread all of the 
expression together with his discussion of history would far exceed the room allotted 
here. That said, 1 recognize their importance and when 1 am imperiously constrained 
in mentioning them 1 will do so, although not to the full extent they deserve. In a 
more spacious text and at a more propitious time, 1 hope to discuss at greater lengths 
how his physiological philosophy of history relates to these four important 
expressions. 
This now brings me to the structure of my argumentation. 1 have chosen to 
divide my thesis into three chapters. The reason for this is simple: there are three 
main elements to Nietzsche's philosophy of history. First, his philosophy of history 
proper linking history with life and the human subject; second, his reading and 
discussion of Darwinian thinkers that influenced his understandîng of the distinction 
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between human and animal history; and third, the development of the physiological 
metaphor that translated his understanding of the body to history. 
The first chapter deals exc1usively with his early period (1868-1874) and will 
serve as the premise of my argumentation. 1 will argue that Nietzsche initially 
understood history as a creative and retrospective interpretation of the past. In so 
doing, this chapter will develop two important points. First, in discussing the concept 
of teleology through his unfinished Ph.D. thesis (1868) and the posthumous essay On 
Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense (1873), 1 will show that any discussion of 
historical purposes pertains much more to the evolution of the human subject tha{\to 
the object itself. This will then be further developed in his only book completely 
devoted to history: Second Untimely Meditation: On the Uses and Disadvantages of 
History for Life (1874). In it, Nietzsche argued against certain historians' scientific 
pretensions and elaborated his tripartite typology ofhistory (monumental, antiquarian 
and critical). He also identified three powers (Macht) that are present in all forms 
history, both authentic and inauthentic; these are the historical, unhistorical and 
suprahistorical powers, which are usually overshadowed by his historical typology. 
This chapter will allow me to show that Nietzsche initially understood history as a 
state of the past that depends on the beings that assimilate it, rather than being a 
objective account of past events, peoples and places. 
The second chapter discusses Nietzsche's exposure to, and reading of, English 
moral historians starting with Human, ail too Human (1878-1880); then Daybreak 
(1881), and The Gay Science (1882), and fmishing with Beyond Good and Evil (1886) 
and On the Genealogy of Morais (1887). These moral historians are what he called 
varyingly Darwinists as 1 have already stated, but also English Utilitarians12 and 
12 Beyond Good and Evil, tr. W. Kaufinann, §228. Henceforth referred to as BGE 
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English psychologists. 13 1 will focus my attention on two of these: Paul Rée and 
Herbert Spencer. The reason for this is simple: they are the recognized source for 
Nietzsche's knowledge of Darwinian ideas, a fact he makes himself in On the 
Genealogy of Morais. 14 Moreover, they are narrative1y important because they mark 
two distinct phases in Nietzsche's appraisal of Darwinism. Paul Rée is 
contemporaneous to Nietzsche's "positive" period of the late 1870s, during which 
Nietzsche expressed his interest for English styled moral history that was, at the very 
least, partIy responsible for his project for a historicai philosophy begun in 1878. By 
the early 1880s, however, Nietzsche moved away from Rée and read Herbert 
Spencer's The Data of Ethics. In it he found a moral evolution, rather than a 
evolutionary history of morality, which led hinÎ"renounce the value he had previously 
given to Darwinism, and assert the importance of interpretation for history. This 
second chapter, therefore, follows the progression of Nietzsche's knowledge of 
Darwinism and shows how his criticism of this influential movement was the 
precondition for a physiological philosophy ofhistory. 
The third chapter deve10ps Nietzsche's arguments for the importance of 
physiology and applies them to history. This chapter will extensively use his Nachlass 
where much of his discussion of physiology was tirst stated, but it will also 
supplement his arguments found in his posthumous fragments with passages from 
Beyond Good and Evi/ and On the Genealogy of MoraIs. These sources will allow a 
thorough explanation of his reading of Wilhelm Roux, which explains why Nietzsche 
argued that evolutionary history was not only the product of the milieu, but also of 
inner processes that purposively structure the body. Following this insight, 1 show 
how Nietzsche used Roux's ideas to understand the complicated relation between the 
13 On the Genealogy of Morais, tr. W. Kaufmann, Ficst Essay, §l. Henceforth referred to a OM. 
14 GM I, §3-4. 
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body and the intellect, soul, mind, consciousness, etc. His interpretation of the body 
and consciousness is then extended to include history. The end result of this is an 
understanding of history that neither affirms the active creation of the past nor the 
passive reception of it. Through Nietzsche's understanding of the body, history 
becomes the active reception and assimilation of the past that implicitly conditions its 
future interpretations. More importantly, this means that history is an unstable state 
never equal to itselfthat must continuously be re-interpreted and re-actualized. 
Chapter One: Nietzsche and History 
Part 1: Purposes 
1.1.1 Dysteleology 
One of the most important intellectual currents of the middle of the nineteenth 
century springs from the work of Charles Darwin. The effect of his theory of the 
evolution of species by natural selection was felt throughout Germany where it 
influenced both popular culture and, to a lesser extent, philosophy.15 It was in this 
context that, in the late 1860s, Nietzsche developed an interest for this new scientific 
paradigm. Darwinism's attraction was its denial of any inherent purpose to nature and 
its implication that human history was irrevocably intertwined with its physiological 
development. In this fust chapter, 1 will endeavor to discem both the role played by 
Darwinian ideas in his writings preceding Human, ail tao Human and understand how 
they conditioned Nietzsche's treatment ofhistory in his Untimely Meditations. 
Nietzsche became interested in Darwinism through the latter's dysteleological 
and de-deified description of the evolution of species. His knowledge of Darwinian 
ideas in the late 1860s and early l870s was not extensive however. He read the neo-
Kantian Friedrich-Albert Lange, who devoted a whole chapter of his 1866 opus, 
History of Materialism (Geschichte der Materialismus), to the subject of Darwin and 
15 Many different groups in Imperial Gennany and not only in the scientific establishment adopted 
Darwinian evolution as their own. In the political arena, both progressive and conservative movements 
used Darwin's ideas extensively. See Alfred, Kelly. The Descent of Darwin: the popu/arization of 
Darwinism in Germany, 1860-1914, p. 5-7; Paul Weindling. "Theories of the Cell State in Imperial 
Gennany" in Bi%gy, Medicine and Society 1840-1940. ed. C. Webster (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), pp. 99-155. 
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Teleology.16 He was also exposed to certain Darwinian ideas through his friendship 
with bis Basle colleague, Ludwig Rutimeyer.J7 This meant that these and other 
commentators invariably mediated what knowledge he did have at the time. Like 
many of bis German contemporaries, Nietzsche understood natural selection as the 
product of a competition between individuals for resources and not as the effect of a 
transcendental purpose.18 
Such a competition would have been discernible in both natural and human 
bistory, thus linking human existence with biological life as a whole. 19 Essentially, 
the relation between natural history and human history rests on the mode of 
explanation used by both types of historian. Both may appeal to a chronological 
description and to efficient causes in their explanations, but these are usually 
insufficient. Fundamentally, what is sought in both cases is the explanation for the 
purpose or meaning expressed by the historical agent. In evolutionary science, the 
organ is explained by its adaptive purpose, which expresses its meaning.20 In human 
bistory, the bistorian must explain the purposive and meaningful actions of human 
16 Friedrich-Albert Lange, "Chap. IV: Darwinism et la Teleology" in Histoire du Matérialisme vol. II, 
part. 2. 2nd ed. tr. B. Pommerol (paris: Coda, 2004), pp. 579-622. 
17 Rütimeyer was a professor of zoology and comparative anatomy. He was not Darwinian, but rather a 
follower of Karl von Baer, who did not dispute Natural Selection and Adaptation but limited their 
scope. Baer rejected the idea that distinct classes of animaIs (Fish, Reptiles, Birds, and Mammals) were 
related. For more on Darwin and von Baer see Timothy Lenoir, "Chap. VI: Teleomechanism and 
Darwin's Theory" in The Strategy of Lite: Te/e%gy and Mechanics in nineteenth century German 
Bi%gy. (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing co. 1982), pp. 246-275; Thomas Brobjer, "Nietzsche's Reading 
and Knowledge ofNatural Science: an Overview" in Nietzsche and Science. G. Moore and T. Brobjer 
ed. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), p. 31; Charles Andler, Nietzsche, sa vie et sa pensée vol. 1 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1958), pp. 469-470; Claire Richter, Nietzsche et les théories biologiques 
contemporaines. (paris: Mercure de France, 1911), p. 14. 
18 First Untimely Meditation: David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer. tr. R.J. Hollingdale, §7, pp. 
30-31. Henceforth referred to as UM 1. 
19 Dirk Robert Johnson, "Nietzsche's Early Darwinism: the David Strauss Essay of 1873" in 
Nietzsche-Studien. vol. 30 (2001), p. 68. 
20 On should note that Natural Selection does display a degree of purposefulness. Inasmuch as 
Adaptation is a corollary ofNatural Selection, species may be described etiologically as displaying 
purpose through their adaptation. Robert N. Brandon, "Biological Teleology: Questions and 
Explanations" in Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. vol. 12 no. 2 (1981) pp. 91-105; see 
also Francisco J. Ayala, "Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology" in Philosophy of 
Science. March 1970, pp. 1-15. 
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agents both collectively and individua1ly. Thus, both types ofhistorians are faced with 
the problem of teleology inasmuch as an appeal to the concept of purpose is necessary 
for any discussion ofhistory. 
The complex relationship between natural and human history will be the 
guiding thread of this chapter, which will trace the origins of Nietzsche's exposure to 
the Darwinian movement. In so doing, the chapter will be divided into two parts. In 
the first part 1 will discuss two unpublished projects. First, his aborted doctoral 
dissertation of 1868 where he explicitly, albeit summarily, discusses teleology. This 
will he followed by the unpublished essay On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense 
(1873), which will introduce the evolutionary and physiological aspects of language 
and concepts, and frame Nietzsche's discussion of history. The purpose of this 
discussion is not only to situate the young Nietzsche's ideas on evolution, but more 
importantly to illustrate how he used his scarce knowledge of evolution to promote a 
philosophy of history that was unconcerned with purposes and final causes. In the 
second part of the chapter, 1 will move on to examine his Untimely Meditations. My 
reading will be centered on the second of these entitled On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life (1874), which expands sorne of Nietzsche's 
discussion of Darwin already sketched in the First Untimely Meditation, David 
Strauss: Apostle and Author (1873). This second part will serve to explicate how 
Nietzsche's philosophy of history was not so much concerned with describing and 
analyzing the past, as it was in nurturing the historian's creative retrospective gaze. 
Now, these two parts aim to show how Nietzsche understood Darwin as dissolving 
the pertinence of circumscribing and identifying any purpose inherent to history, 
which enabled him to argue against the scientific and teleological treatment prevalent 
in his contemporaries' writings. 
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1.1.2 "Teleology since Kant" 
Describing the early Nietzsche as a young scholar interested in the new 
scientific theories is neither apocryphal nor artificial. In 1884, as he was looking back 
on the development of his thought, Nietzsche identified himself with a tradition that 
was partially sympathetic to the new Darwinian ideas. In a note from this period, he 
wrote that the anti-teleological movement had influenced his philosophical 
development.21 This early interest in teleology is clearly shown by his aborted 
doctoral dissertation. Throughout the spring of 1868, Nietzsche worked on plans that 
would have been the foundation of a dissertation on the concept of teleology. 
Although this project was never completed, traces of it are left in the notebooks from 
that spring.22 The dissertation would have been entitled either "Teleology since 
Kant"23 or "The concept of the organic since Kant."24 He described this project in a 
letter to Paul Deussen as "half-way between philosophy and the natural sciences. "25 
This project marks the beginning of his serious interest in biology and dysteleological 
materialism.26 Within these notes he presents what is the beginning of his 
philosophical position marked by a renunciation of traditional metaphysics and 
teleology, as weIl as the affirmation of the creative nature of our knowledge. These 
21 FP 1884,26 [432]. 
22 KGW 1/4, 62 [3-58]. These notes have yet to be translated into English or French and are not found 
in the KSA. 1 have relied mainly on the discussion in the literature. See Christian Emden, Nietzsche on 
Language, Consciousness, and the Body. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2005), p. 38, p. 138. 
Kevin R. Hill, Nietzsche's Critiques: the Kantian Foundation ofhis Thought. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2003), pp. 84-94; Jean-Luc Nancy, "La thèse de Nietzsche sur la téléologie" in Nietzsche 
Aujourd'hui? vol. 1 : Intensités. (Paris: Union Générale d'éditions, 1973), pp. 57-89; Paul Swift, 
"Nietzsche on Teleology and the Concept of the Organic" in International Studies in Philosophy, vol. 
31, no. 3, pp. 29-41. 
23 KGW 1/4, 62[6]. 
24 Correspondance vol. 1: Juin 1850- Avril 1869. eds. Gorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, tr. H-A 
Baatsch, J Bréjoux et M de Gandillac. (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), §568, p. 556. Henceforth referred to as 
Correspondance. 
25 Correspondance, §568, p. 556. 
26 Nietzsche, in the series of notes pertaining to this project, gives several reading lists. The longest one 
(KGW 1/4, 62[48]) lists several contemporary biologists such as Rudolph Virchow, GotthelfReinbold 
Treviranus, and Xavier Bichat. 
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characteristics are the direct result of bis reading of the neo-Kantian Friedrich-Albert 
Lange's History of Materialism that had offered a naturalized version of Kant's 
influential position on teleology. 
The importance of Nietzsche's reference to Kant in the tentative titles for bis 
projected dissertation lay in the latter's refonnulation of teleology. Kant had been 
unable to remove teleology from the study of nature and bis discussion of this 
question influenced much of the pre-Darwinian nineteenth century Gennan biological 
debates.27 In his first two critiques, Kant had discussed the detenninate type of 
judgment that encompasses both theoretical and moral judgments. In the third 
Critique (Kritik der Urteilskrajt, 1790), Kant discussed the reflective type of 
judgment, which inc1udes both aesthetic and teleological judgments. Kant had 
conc1uded that, unlike the theoretical and moral judgments, aesthetic and teleological 
judgments could not be grounded a priori. In a detenninate judgment, the particular 
may be subsumed under the universal (law, principle, or mIe) that is given a priori. In 
the reflective judgment however, the universal is never given a priori.28 This is the 
case for aesthetic and teleological judgments where the universal is only given a 
posteriori in the subject (aesthetic judgment) or in the object (teleological 
judgment).29 The importance of Kant's discussion lies therefore in the removal of the 
27 Timothy Lenoir (The Strategy of Life: Teleology and Mechanics in nineteenth century German 
Biology, p. 22) argues that Kant was only responsible for c1early circumscribing this problem, which 
had aIready entered the biological community. Although the reigning Naturphilosophie most often 
characterizes pre-Darwinian nineteenth century biology, there was another significant intellectual 
cureent that animated the academic biology community called Teleomechanism (The Strategy of Life, 
p. 12.). This movement developed from Johann Friedrich Blumenbach to Karl Ernst von Baer, and 
subsequently affected the development of ceU theory through the figures of Rudolph Virchow and Carl 
Vogt (The Strategy of Life, p. 14). Lenoir points to Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, who developed the 
theory of the Bildungstrieb, as one of the main influences on Kant's arguments. 
28 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment. tr. P. Guyer and E. Matthews (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), lntro, § IV. Henceforth referred to as CJ. 
29 CJ, Intro, § VIII 
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a priori concept of purpose in nature and its transfer to the realm of the Kantian 
subject as creator of concepts. 
The reason why teleology could not be grounded a priori in the theoretical 
laws of nature was that the laws of causality alone could not explain the development 
of organisms, and their parts. Causality can only de scribe the interrelation of the 
organism's various organic parts without explaining its seemingly purposive behavior. 
This is important for understanding both the development and growth of the 
organism, but also the organs' functions once the organism has reached maturity. 
According to Kant, an organism is both the cause and the effect of its actions and 
therefore has no useless parts because, inasmuch as it organizes itself as a living 
whole, it is composed of parts that are all functions of this whole.30 Kant gave the 
example of the morphological structure of birds, which is particularly well suited for 
flight.31 Although this structure could have arisen independently of any final cause, 
says Kant, it neverthelèss suggests that birds are made for flight. But this supposed 
purpose is not contained in any laws of nature known a priori. Rather, birds' 
purposefulness is caused by the subject's concept of bird. Because birds are flying 
animals, any understanding of their physiology is mediated by this concept. 
Fundamentally, the subject seeks the accord between its concepts and particular 
experiences.32 The parts of an organism have their end not in sorne law given a priori, 
but as purposeful agents in the organism given a posteriori. Thus, although it is 
impossible to ground the existence of an organic purpose in an a priori concept, 
teleology can be said to exist heuristically because it describes a situation where the 
parts of an organism seem to act "as-if' they were imbued with purpose.33 A purpose 
30 CJ, §65-66. 
31 CJ, §61. 
32 CJ, Intro, §IIL 
33 This is still the standard manner ofunderstanding the organic. Although teleology has been largely 
removed from modern biological explanation, in the case of adaptation through Natural Selection 
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can only be deduced ftom the observation of the organism rather than ftom the laws 
of nature. 
However, this is not only a problem in biology, it is also important for other 
fonns of knowledge pertaining to life. In history there exists an opposition between 
the individual who acts purposively, and the historian's tendency to ascribe an 
individual's actions to the mediation of external causes (economics, culture, etc.).34 In 
both biology and history there exists an opposition between the demonstration of the 
causal chain that has resulted in the development of the organism, or custom, and the 
explanation of its purposeful existence. This stimulated the young Nietzsche to 
investigate the existence of organic teleology. But, because he began to endorse the 
perspective that conditioned the perception of a whole on the evolution of physiology, 
he gradually broke with the intluential Kantian position. 
Although Kant was explicitly present in the tentative titles for his dissertation, 
the most important influence that marked Nietzsche's 1868 doctoral dissertation was 
the Gennan neo-Kantian Friedrich-Albert Lange. Nietzsche encountered Lange's 
imposing book The History of Materialism in 1866 the same year that he discovered 
Schopenhauer's The Wor/d as Will and as Representation.35 Nietzsche referred to 
Lange's book in a letter ftom the end of 1866 to Hennann Mushacke as the "most 
significant phi/osophica/ work to have appeared in the fast ten years. "36 He wrote of 
teleologicaljudgments very similar to Kant's are still necessary. See Robert N. Brandon, "Biological 
Teleology: Questions and Explanations" in Studies in the History and Phi/osophy of Science. vol. 12 
no. 2 (1981), pp. 91-105; Francisco J. Ayala, "Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology" in 
Phi/osophy of Science. March 1970, pp. 1-15. 
34 Catherine Zuckert, "Nature, History and the Self: Friedrich Nietzsche's Untimely Considerations" in 
Nietzsche-Studien. voL 5 (1976), p. 70-7 L 
35 George Stade, Nietzsche and Lange. (New York: DeGruyter, (983), p. 10. 
36 Correspondance, §526, p. 480-481. Stack's translation and it should be noted that he says the most 
important in the last "hundred years" whereas in the Colli and Montinari Correspondance it is 
translated as "ces dernières dizaines d'années". 
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it again in a letter to Carl von Gersdorff in the spring of 1868 where he called it a 
"treasure house" of infonnation about Darwinism and English materialism. 37 
Lange's importance for Nietzsche's dissertation lies primarily in the fonner's 
biological rendering of the Kantian subject and in the parallels he drew between 
ancient and modem materialism. Lange argued that the physiological organization of 
the human subject is the basis for all experience.38 While this might not seem 
philosophically sophisticated, a letter Nietzsche wrote to Carl von Gersdorff 
summarizes Nietzsche's reading of Lange.39 In it, Nietzsche described Lange's 
position to Gersdorff with the following three propositions.4o First, the "sensible 
world is the product of our organism." Second, "our visible (bodily) organs are, li/œ 
ail other parts of the phenomenal world, only images of an unknown object." Third, 
"our real organization is, therefore, as much unknown to us as are real external 
things. We continually have before us nothing but the product of both." Nietzsche 
drew the following conclusion. The thing-in-itself and its concept are the product of 
an opposition conditioned by our organism. From this he made an opaque conclusion: 
"art is free, even in the domain of concepts. "41 Because the sensible world, along with 
our organs, is the product of our organism, there is no empirical ground for justifying 
any particular concept. The concepts that are used to understand the world, both 
causally and teleologicaly, are not empirically justified and can therefore be 
artistically produced by the subject. These comments are significant because they sum 
up Nietzsche's recognition and philosophical reworking of the conditioned nature of 
37 Correspondance, §562, p. 545. 
38 Lange, Histoire du Matérialisme, p. 372-373. However, as Barbara Stiegler argues, Lange always 
maintained the a priori nature of causality. See Barbara Stiegler, Nietzsche et la Biologie. (Paris: PUF, 
2001), p. 11. 
39 Co"espondance, §517 p. 459. 
40 The translation is from Stack (Nietzsche and Lange, p. 10 02). He uses this passage as an 
introduction to Nietzsche's exposure to Darwinism through Lange's book. 
41 My translation from the French. 
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our empirical experience, and introduced a connection between human physiology 
and art. 
In a note from 1867-68,42 Nietzsche equated Empedoc1es' thought with the 
Darwinian arguments found in Lange's book. Essentially their correspondence rests 
on three points.43 There is an absence of te1eology, nothing is created or destroyed, 
and aH beings come into existence through chance combinations. This triad of themes 
is consistent with the three propositions that he had enthusiastically described in his 
letter to Gersdorff in 1866. In the absence of any immediate1y known natural 
te1eology, the purported existence of organic purposefulness can orny be explained by 
the subject's introduction ofthis concept into its perception of nature. Later, Nietzsche 
explicitly linked Empedoc1es with Darwin in his lectures on the Presocratics given in 
1872.44 Although the comment is a minor moment in the lecture, it is significant 
because it ties his work as a philologist together with his reading of Lange and 
demonstrates how his initial understanding of Darwinism was mediated by his 
knowledge of early Greek materialism. Thus, the dyste1eological view of nature 
associated with Darwin that Nietzsche encountered in Lange's book was initially 
understood by him as a modem version of a perspective he had already espoused 
through his philological exploration ofPresocratic philosophy. 
In the preparatory notes for his dissertation, Nietzsche rejected outright the 
idea that there might be finality or a purpose in nature. Yet, as Jean-Luc Nancy has 
pointed out, this does not so much stem from his reading of Kant, as from the 
influence of Kuno Fischer, who interpreted Kant as having defended an "objective" 
42 KGW 1/4, 57[26]. 
43 Stack, Nietzsche and Lange, p. 165. 
44 Les philosophes pré platoniciens. ed. Paolo D'lorio, tr. Nathalie Ferrand (Paris: Éditions de L'éclat, 
1994), p. 210. Understanding Empedocles as a precursor of Darwin was not particular to Nietzsche or 
to Lange. It was quite common at the time see for example Wilhelm Roux. Der Kampf der Theile im 
Organismus: ein Beitrag zur Vervollstiindigung der Mechanischen Zweckmiissigkeitslehre. (Leipzig: 
Engelmann, 1881), pp. 2-3. Roux will he discussed in the third chapter. 
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finality to experience.45 But he also rejected the idea that finality might be found 
outside of nature because of the metaphysical and theological implications of such a 
position.46 Instead, Nietzsche adopted an Empedoclean position mediated, and up-
dated by his reading of Lange. lbis position rests on the central claim that what we 
calI purposefulness is inferred from our organism's organization.47 Although similar 
to Kant's conclusion, it rendered biologically the transcendental Kantian subject. 
Under the influence of Lange and Empedocles, Nietzsche argued that apparent 
purposefulness is nothing but a reflection of our organism's physiology.48 However, it 
is not only the appearance of a purpose or end that Nietzsche ascribed to our 
organization. As Kant had pointed out, judgment is nothing other than the subsuming 
of the particular under the universal. The idea that there is an end presupposes parts 
and a whole under which they are subsumed. According to Nietzsche, the existence of 
a purpose, deduced through the relation of parts to the who le, is the result of an 
aesthetic judgment inserted by the subject, rather than a property of the object itself.49 
The judgment as to the existence of a purpose does not result from the subsumption 
of the observed part under the objectified who le, but rather from its subsumption 
under the perception of a whole. Because the concept of the whole is the condition for 
an end, and because Nietzsche rejected the idea that there is an immanent or 
transcendent purpose in the object itself, he also rejected the idea that there are 
objective things that necessarily constitute wholes. Instead, the parts act "as-if' they 
were directed by sorne purpose contained within a conglomerate that likewise acts 
45 Jean-Luc Nancy, "La thèse de Nietzsche sur la téléologie," p. 75. 
46 KGW 1/4,62[4]. 
47 It is interesting to note that both Jean-Luc Nancy ("La thèse de Nietzsche sur la téléologie," p. 67) 
and Kevin Hill (Nietzsche's Critiques, p. 87) read this passage as a reference to Darwin despite there 
being no direct reference to Darwin in any of the notes pertaining to bis dissertation. The link between 
the Ernpedoclean and the Darwinian positions rnay be deduced, as we have seen, frorn his reading of 
Lange. 
48 KGW 1/4, 62[28]. See Kevin Hill, Nietzsche's Critiques, p. 89. 
49 Paul Swift, ''Nietzsche on Teleology and the Concept of the Organic," p. 34. 
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"as-if' it were a whole. This "as-if' responds simply to a physiological requirement, 
namely conservation and survival, which have made the idea of a relation between 
parts and who les necessary to our understanding of nature. 
The planned dissertation was never brought to fruition because he was 
uncertain of the intrinsic value of his arguments. In a letter to Edwin Rohde in early 
May 1868, he said that despite the work that he had done, he feared that he could only 
produce something superficial, which would not accord with the importance of the 
themes.50 Nancy argues that the project failed because it was marked by his 
realization of the limits of the project caught between philosophical discourse and 
scientific method.51 Both philosophy and science share a common form of conceptual 
representation, but science is caught in an empirical snare from which it cannot free 
itself. As his project was "half-way between philosophy and the natural sciences, "52 
he was able to utilize philosophical language, but he struggled to express his ideas' 
scientific content. Nancy believes this was the result of his general lack of scientific 
knowledge. This not only limited his understanding of the natural world, but also 
limited the philosophical uses that Nietzsche could make of the natural sciences of his 
time. Certainly his ignorance created limits but it was also a powerful impetus for 
Nietzsche's later reading and reflections on biology and cosmology. Although the 
dissertation was aborted, he maintained his interest in the question, an interest that he 
had to put on hold until the mid-1870s. 53 
We have now seen that there are two significant elements that characterize his 
early thought as it pertains to his philosophy of history. First and most obviously, it 
50 Correspondance, §569, p. 56l. 
51 Jean-Luc Nancy, "La thèse de Nietzsche sur la téléologie," p.74. 
52 Correspondance, §568, p. 556. 
53 Thomas Brobjer argues that these readings were put offbecause ofhis teaching requirements, but by 
the mid 1870's he had enough time to return to them. See Thomas Brobjer, "Nietzsche's Reading of the 
Natural Sciences," p. 34. 
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shows a Nietzsche not only narrowly concemed with philological and artistic 
questions, but one who had a profound interest in science as weIl. This interest, 
mediated by his reading of Lange and c1assical philosophy, evidences Nietzsche's 
early appraisal of sorne Darwinian ideas, namely the presence of evolving complexity, 
adaptation, and the absence of any natural purpose. Secondly, and more importantly, 
Nietzsche's notes are evidence that in this period, he began to understand our 
knowledge of nature as conditioned by human physiology itself. 1 will now show that 
the importance of human physiology for the philosophy of science was re-worked and 
combined with social factors in an unpublished essay written in 1873 (On Truth and 
Lies in an Extramoral Sense), one year after the publication of The Birth ofTragedy, 
which will be the basis for his philosophy of history developed in his Untimely 
Meditations. 
1.1.3 "On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral sense" 
Although Nietzsche never wrote his dissertation, he never abandoned the 
prospect of better understanding the relationship between our knowledge of the 
natural world and physiology. In 1873 he wrote an essay, On Truth and Lies in an 
Extramoral Sense, which, although never published in his lifetime, described how our 
organization, both social and biological, accounts for our knowledge of nature. In it, 
his heuristic understanding of purposefulness became a metaphoric one. 
According to Nietzsche's views at this time, the concepts with which we 
de scribe nature stem from the tropic nature of language. Language does not contain 
essences, but rather is composed of conventions that contain "nothing but metaphors 
for things."54 The stimuli that we receive through our senses do not produce 
representations of the essence of things. "Truth" originates in the metaphorical 
54 On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense. tr. Daniel Breazeale, p. 83. Henceforth referenced as TL. 
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transfer of the stimulus into an image, and this image into sound. The translation of 
stimuli into language is a response to the stimuli that excite the sensory organ and 
compe1 it to respond. It is therefore only on the basis of it being excited by a stimulus 
that the eye can "see."55 Excitation is only then "metaphorically" translated into 
images, sounds and speech. 56 This physiological basis of language implies much more 
than nominalism: it argues that language is more than a rhetorical matter because it 
ascribes an important role to physiology, which has the capacity of being affected by 
its environmentY By extension, our physiological requirements contribute to shaping 
language inasmuch as language is the response and metaphorical translation of neural 
stimuli. From this, Nietzsche reasoned that had our neurology and sense perception 
been different, our knowledge of the world would have been likewise dissimilar.58 It 
is not only the organs themselves that condition the formation of language, but it is 
also their ability to be affected and respond to excitations that marks physiology as 
having a foundational importance. Indispensable to the study of nature and history, 
language is conditioned by human physiology. 
Physiology does not determine the content or structure of language however. 
This is evidenced, wrote Nietzsche,59 by the fact that there exists a multiplicity of 
languages. Had languages been sole1y determined by the physiology shared by all 
members of the species, there should not have arisen different languages. Yet, as there 
are many languages, aH of which are able to represent the same objects, Nietzsche 
argued that there is no essential equation between a language and its objects. But 
55 FP 1872-1873, 19[209]. 
56 FP 1872-1873, 19[227]. 
57 TL, p. 82. According to Christian Emden: "What is at stake here is not only a rhetorical issue but a 
more fundamental physiological problem that had a lasting impact on Nietzsche's philosophical 
project." (Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body, p. 57). For more on physiological 
excitation and Nietzsche, see Barbara Stiegler. Nietzsche et la biologie, pp. 30-36. 
58 TL, p. 87. 
59 TL, p. 82. 
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language is neither fully reducible to physiology, nor should it daim to represent the 
essence of an object. The word and the concept, with which the object is designated, 
are creative constructions that result from not only physiological influences, but from 
social influences as weil. 
Although language is conditioned by physiology, it is also the product of 
human social interaction. Language is shared by several individuals and is evolved as 
a means for the self-preservation in the bellum omni contra omnes.60 Weaker 
individuals, faced with the dangers of stronger individuals, invent language to enable 
their cooperation and self-preservation. Social conventions are established to further 
regulate this cooperation.61 What we call truth reflects this conventional construction 
of language and is defined by Nietzsche as "the duty to lie according to fzxed 
conventions. "62 Language is therefore not only the metaphorical transfer of stimuli 
into sound; it is also the product of a utilitarian need to seek safety and the 
preservation of individuals through dissimulation. That said, language does not 
preserve its metaphorical character. Over time, the metaphors that had inaugurated 
language are gradually forgotten as metaphors. Moreover, truths' conventional origins 
are forgotten and endowed with progressively greater value. "Truths are illusions 
which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out 
and have been drained ofsensuousforce[.]"63 The constant use of language distances 
it from its origins in metaphor. The artistic nature of these tropes is lost through their 
frequent use and universalization. The force of the original metaphorical expression 
fades away, and an equation with the object is established through sedimented habit. 
60 TL, p. 8I. 
61 TL, p. 81 
62 TL, p. 84. 
63 TL, p. 84 
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This ultimately constrains the human subject to a world fully detennined by the 
contents of language. 
The transfer from metaphoric construction to rigid fonns of expression can be 
seen, says Nietzsche, when the old metaphors have lost their luster and a "rigid new 
world is constructed as [their] prison from [their] own ephemeral products, the 
concepts."64 In this sense the concepts of whole and part indispensable to any human 
knowledge of organic phenomena, gradually become the proper way of expressing the 
seemingly purposeful nature of the organic. Yet the constraint of language is not 
pennanent. According to Nietzsche, "the formation of metaphors is the fondamental 
human drive" and cannot be dispensed with.65 When the power of the metaphor no 
longer allows for adequate expression, but only states what is aIready known and 
obvious, there deve10ps again a need to overcome what has already been understood 
and to create a new understanding, a new world, with the aid of new metaphors.66 
However important the needs of expression may be, the primary e1ement in this 
account of the origin of language is its response to the excitation of external stimuli. 
This led Nietzsche to a third conclusion. Although the metaphorical reflection of 
physiology and social interactions fonn the functional basis of language and truth, 
64 TL, p. 89. 
65 TL, p. 88. One of the main undercurrents ofnineteenth century German biology was the postulating 
of a vitalistic force that acted like an artistic drive that created new forms. This force was called 
Kunsttrieb. This was related to Blumenbach's Bildungstrieb (see note above). According to Nietzsche, 
in both the formation of the organic world, and in the human creation ofa world ofmeaning, forms and 
meanings are fundamentally artistic (see FP 1872-1873, 19[50] and FP 1872-1873, 19[52] 
respectively). This implies a connection between physiology and philosophy. In both cases the 
organization of the world is the result of an artistic forces. In biology the formation oflife-forms, both 
animal and vegetal, are the result of a primordial Kunsttrieb. In philosophy the formation of concepts is 
the result ofa Metaphertrieb. In this sense, an aesthetic conception of the world always underlies the 
scientific understanding ofhistorical purposes. See Gregory Moore, Nietzsche, Bi%gy and Metaphor. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 90ff. 
66 This, argues Christian Emden (Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body, p. 63), is a 
reflection of the linguistic paradigm of the nineteenth century. He gives the example of Herder who in 
the On the New German Literature (Über die neue deutsche Literatur) schematizes the lifespan of 
languages as follows 1) emotive expression; 2) poetic and musical expression; 3) prose; and 4) 
culminates in a logical set ofrules. Although it is unclear whether Nietzsche gave any importance to 
this pattern, it seems nonetheless to fit the description he gave in this essay. 
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these are not the ultimate source from wbich language springs. Language is the 
product of a desire, or will, to express the world in new liberating ways. When 
language is unable to act as a stimulus for intellectual activities, it loses its power to 
affect individuals and it is in such cases that a new language is developed. 
Had Nietzsche simply stated that language was the result of externaI pressures 
on individuals, he would not have been formulating an original thesis. Eadier thinkers 
such as Hobbes and Rousseau had given similar accounts of the origin of language. 
What distinguishes Nietzsche from this earHer tradition is the fact that the formation 
of metaphors does not only explain the origin of language. Nietzsche's account of the 
origin of language is not simply a linear one whereby the dangers of the "state of 
nature" led to the development of language. Although he did not dispute this 
evolution, he significantIy implied a necessary and continuo us reinvention of 
language through the formation of metaphors. The bistory of language does not 
culminate in the production of modem grarnmar. Eventually, as a language becomes 
cumbersome, it will be transformed or discarded in favor of some other convention 
that will itself also eventually become old and unsatisfactory. Thus Nietzsche, in 
1873, was already rejecting the idea of linear structure to bistory because he favored 
neither a determinate origin nor an ultimate end. 
We have now seen that prior to bis overt discussion ofbistory and evolution in 
bis Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche had already developed an interest in this subject 
in light of the mechanism of self-overcoming in language. Under Lange's influence, 
he had naturalized Kant's position by arguing that teleological judgments could only 
be the product of our perception of our world conditioned by our physiology. This 
transformed the teleological judgment into an aesthetic judgment by making empirical 
knowledge conditional on physiological evolution and thereby bringing the creation 
of concepts c10ser to artistic creation. The importance of physiology was then further 
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affinned in On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense where language was described 
as the metaphorical transfer of physiological stimuli into words. And, as we saw, the 
importance of physiology was conditioned by both the utilitarian need for 
preservation of the individual and, more fundamentally, by the creative impulse to 
create new metaphors. Now, through my reading of his Untimely Meditations, 1 will 
show that Nietzsche extended the physiological condition to historical knowledge but 
allotted it a distinctly secondary role behind that of creative drives, which returned 
under the guise of a suprahistorical power. AlI of these ideas were then applied to a 
Darwinian dysteleological nature, which, because it removed ultimate meaning from 
nature, justified a philosophy of history unconcemed with establishing historical 
truths or a priori laws. 
Part 2: "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life" 
1.2.1 The Historieal Disease 
Nietzsche wrote the Second Untimely Meditation: On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life in reaction both to the scientific pretensions of 
. sorne historians and to the historical pretensions of sorne scientists of his time. He 
c1aimed that the rise of scientific methodologies and the celebrated "historical sense" 
were causing the hypertrophism of history.67 The horizons of historical knowledge 
had outgrown the confines of tradition and had extended their scope to inc1ude not 
only all human phenomena, but also those ofnatural history. Nietzsche never disputed 
the validity of this widened scope, but he was cautious not to ascribe too great a value 
to it. He was wary of both the rationalist current, which attempted to subsume 
67 Second Untime/y Meditation: On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. in Untime/y 
Meditations. tr. R.J. Hollingdale, "Preface," p. 60. Henceforth referenced as UM II. 
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particular historical events and peoples under historical laws modeled on those of 
science, and the realist current, which strove to de scribe historical periods exactly "as 
they were." Nietzsche's objection was that history is a retrospective construction that 
does not necessarily imply any empirical methodology.68 In what follows, 1 will show 
that Nietzsche's interest in organic te1eology led him to a philosophy of history that 
was primarily aesthetic, and orny secondarily scientific. 
Nietzsche never overtly disputed the validity of history's widened scope 
because he presumed that the new scientific theories, notably Darwinism, asserted a 
form of radical becoming. 
"[T]he doctrines of sovereign becoming, of the fluidity of ail concepts, 
types, and species, of the lack of the cardinal distinction between man 
and animal -- doctrines that 1 consider true but deadly ... "69 (my 
emphasis). 
At the very least, this illustrates Nietzsche's endorsement of the fluidity of the natural 
world. But it also indicates his tacit endorsement of the value of Darwinism, which he 
perceived as naturalizing lifeJo To be sure, it does not refer directly to Darwin or to 
his supporters, so one can orny infer that Darwin lay behind this commentJl The 
fundamental insight that Nietzsche thought he could draw from Darwin's theory was 
the "complete overhaul of traditional metaphysics and ethics" using "Darwin's 
naturalist-materialist paradigm. "72 As such, Darwinism became a weapon in his 
untimely attacks against his contemporaries.73 
68 Robert Doran, "Nietzsche: Utility, Aesthetics, History" in Comparative Literature Studies. vol. 37, 
no. 3 (2000), p. 326. 
69 . UM II, §9, p. 112. 
70 John Richardson, "Nietzsche contra Darwin" in Philosophical and Phenomenological Research. 
vol. 65, no. 3 (nov. 2002), p. 539. 
71 In a note from the period, Nietzsche makes a similar comment, but refers explicitly to Darwin. See 
FP 1872-1873, 19[132]. 
72 Dirk Robert Johnson, "Nietzsche's Early Darwinism," p. 68. 
73 "in the hopes of finding a hermeneutical theory of development and change that would be free from 
the kind of historical prejudices and perspectival distortions of human self-interest he deplored [.]" 
30 
What Nietzsche criticized in his contemporaries' discussion of history was 
their attempts to develop a realistic representation of history by amassing a great 
amount of information from which they would extrapolate causal laws with which to 
explain historical development. This realism became a goal in itself. To Nietzsche 
these historians were ''pure thinkers that only looked on at life. "74 These were 
spectators of history who sought only the accumulation of information, regardless of 
its value and disassociated themselves from their subject in an attempt to preserve 
their objectivity. This amassing of information made everything seem worthy of the 
historian's attention and is "set before the tired palates of the history-hungry as the 
latest delicacy. "75 This resulted in a great appetite for historical "facts," which 
permitted a reconstruction of the past. Moreover, this curious gourmandise 
transformed frivolous trivialities into important information only to be fed to the 
avidly awaiting reader. Ardent collecting and excessive consumption of historical 
information thus overburdened memory,76 and led to what Nietzsche called the 
"historical disease. "77 
The "historical disease" is the result of an excessive accumulation of "cold, 
ineffectuaf'78 historical knowledge. The precondition for this pathos IS a 
hypertrophied memory heavily solicited by myriad bits of information. Since 
emphasis is placed on the quantity of information, memory attempts to let everything 
through.79 This flood of information cannot be assimilated properly and it transforms 
(Margot Norris, "Darwin, Nietzsche, Kafka, and the Problem of Mimesis" in Comparative Literature. 
vol. 95, no. 5 (Dec. 1980) p. 1234. 
74 UM II, §4, p. 77. 
75 UM II, §5, p. 83. 
76 UM II, §4, p. 78. 
77 UM II, §10, p. 120. 
78 UM II, §5, p. 83; §6, p. 88. 
79 UM II, §4, p. 78. 
31 
both historian and student into "walking encyc/opedias. "80 Since historical events, 
peoples and places have been transfonned into a series of equally prized facts, they 
are equally valued as parts of a chronological and causal chain that has led to the 
present. 
The excessive accumulation of the past implies the problem of organizing aIl 
tbis diverse infonnation. If historical research is not conditioned or subordinated to 
sorne principle, it must seek the justification and explanation for its knowledge within 
the knowledge itself. Meaning is therefore induced from the available material. 
Nietzsche objected to this tendency on the grounds that it did not necessarily provide 
a better understanding of nature or history.81 This is demonstrated by the historian's 
tendency to infer meaning through the description of a causal or chronological 
chain.82 This fosters the impression that the present is the "(rue meaning and goal of 
aIl previous events[.]"83 
"[AJndjustifies the course ofhistory, indeed the entire evolution of the 
world, in a manner especially adapted to the use ofmodern man [ ... J 
80 UM II, §4, p. 79. See Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, his philosophy of Contradictions and the 
Contradiction ofhis Philosophy. tr. David J. Parent (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), pp. 
24~25. 
81 ln this passage (§6, pp. 92-93) Nietzsche refers to Friedrich ZôlIner, a German physicist who refused 
this inductionist approach to science. ZôlIner entered in a very public debate with Hermann von 
Helmholtz over the epistemological foundation of German science. He disputed the fact that factual 
experience could necessarily constitute objective knowledge. Nietzsche intervened publicly in defense 
of ZôlIner and wrote a piece in his defense in the Musikalisches Wochenblatt. See FP 1873,29[24]; 
Christian Emden, Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body, pp. 85-86; Robin Small, 
"What Nietzsche did during the Science Wars" in Nietzsche and Science. eds. G. Moore and T. Brobjer 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), pp. 157-158. 
82 Elizabeth Grosz, The Nick ofTime: PoUlies, Evolution and the Untimely. (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2004), p. 114; Müller-Lauter, Wolfgang. Nietzsche: his philosophy of contradictions and the 
contradictions of his philosophy, p.26. 
83 UM II, §8, p. 104. Hegelian philosophy ofhistory is one ofthese. Nietzsche characteristically 
described the Hegel's attitude as thinking that "the climax and terminus of the world-process coincided 
with his own existence in Berlin." (§8, pp. 146-147) For more on Nietzsche's appraisal and interaction 
with Hegelianism on this point see Pierre Chassard, Nietzsche: finalisme et Histoire. (Paris: Editions 
Copernic, 1977), pp. 22-30; Deleuze, Gilles. Nietzsche et la philosophie. (paris: PUF Quadrige, 1962), 
pp. 180-183; Daniel Breazeale, "The Hegel-Nietzsche Problem" in Nietzsche-Studien. vol. 4 (1975), 
pp. 146-164. 
as things are they had to be, as men now are they were bound to 
become, none may resist this inevitability. "84 
He did not, however, limit this comment to human history. 
"[T]he history of mankind is only the continuation of the history of 
animais and plants; even in the profoundest depths of the sea the 
universal historian still finds traces of himself as living slime [ ... ] He 
stands high and proud upon the pyramid of the world-process[.] "85 
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Although Nietzsche did not overtly dispute the validity of relating human history to 
natural history, what he found noxious was the subordination of natural history to 
human history, which implied that humans are the meaning behind the evolution of 
the natural world. 
It was in this perspective that he had attacked David Strauss's book The Old 
and the New Faith (Der alte und der neue Glaube, 1872) in his First Untimely 
Meditation. Strauss's aim had been to develop an ethic on Darwinian groundS.86 
Whereas Strauss attempted to deduce a moral code from the process of biological 
evolution, he was unable, according to Nietzsche, to abandon traditional moral 
beliefs. What Strauss produced was a justification of actual morality derived from the 
new Darwinian scientific paradigm. Nietzsche, for his part, thought that this the ory 
should have justified a completely new perspective on morality. 
"[H]is task was much rather to take the phenomena of human 
goodness, compassion, love and self-abnegation, which do in fact 
exist, and derive and explain themfrom his Darwinist presuppositions: 
while he preforred by a leap into the imperative to flee from the task of 
explanation In making this leap he is even able to elude, with an easy 
and frivolous hop, Darwin's fundamental proposition. "87 
84 UM II, §9, p. 107. 
85 UM II, §9, pp. 107-108. 
86 Richard Weikart, "The Origins of Social Darwinism in Germany, 1859-1895" in Journal of the 
History ofldeas. vol. 54, no. 3 (1993), p.483. 
87 UM I, §7, p. 30. 
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By stressing the importance of "the phenomena of human goodness, compassion, love 
and self-abnegation," aIl of which are traditional Christian values, Strauss, or so 
Nietzsche read him, neglected the importance of the differences between Christianity 
and Darwinism. How, asked Nietzsche, underlining the incongruity of Strauss's 
position, can one presume to deduce the prÎncÎples of Christian morality from a 
process that is the result of conflict and distinction between individuals? Yet, 
Nietzsche did not endorse an ethic based on his understanding of Darwinian 
competition. He simply stated that although he endorsed the doctrine of sovereign 
becoming he believed it to he "true but deadly[.]"88 If Darwin's ideas were to be 
adopted as an ethic, said Nietzsche, there would appear "systems of individualist 
egoism [ ... ] and similar creations of utilitarian vulgarity[.]"89 Rather than 
understanding Darwinism ethically, he saw it as liberating moral concepts from the 
fetiers of tradition, thus allowing art to freely ascribe meaning to a meaningless 
nature. A Darwinian inspired ethic was a grave danger, to Nietzsche's mind, which 
compounded his contemporaries' tendency to accumulate and disseminate knowledge 
with no regard to the consequences.90 This led him to oppose his contemporaries with 
his own views on the uses ofhistory, which stressed the propaedeutical importance of 
the study ofhistory.91 
1.2.2 The Uses of History 
We have now seen that the "historical disease" was a diagnosis of his 
contemporaries' inapt assimilation of the pasto Because memory cannot properly 
88 UM II, §9, p. 112. 
89 UM II, §9, p. 113. 
90 UM II, §9, p. 113. 
91 UM II, §5, p. 83. However, Nietzsche was not alone in thinking this. Jacob Burckhardt wrote 
approvingly ofNietzsche's position: "j'ai enseigné l'histoire non pour l'amour de ce que l'on appelle 
pathétiquement Histoire universelle, mais essentiellement comme une branche de la propédeutique[.]" 
Qtd. in Karl Schlechta, Le Cas Nietzshe. (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), p. 68. 
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assimilate the past, it acts as a weight and overburdens the present.92 From this I will 
now show that according to Nietzsche, history should be "dominated and directed by 
a higher force [that it] does not itself dominate and direct. "93 The past must be 
understood and treated as something useful to the present. 
"If you are to venture to interpret the past you can do so only out of 
the fullest exertion of the vigor of the present. [ ... ] When the past 
speaks it always speaks as an oracle: only if you are the architect of 
the future and know the present will you understand it. "94 
Because history is an assessment of the past, it should be produced not as an 
intellectual curiosity, but as an impetus for growth and development. Its only value is 
the use that the present can make of it and not its justification for the status quo. 
"[W]hen the study of history serves the life of the past in such a way 
that it undermines continuing and especially higher life, when the 
historical sense no longer conserves life but mummifies it, then the 
tree gradually dies unnaturally from the top downwards to the 
roots[. ]"95 
If the present is dominated by a thirst for vestiges of its past, it cannot properly make 
use of its past. The avid collection of historical information that treats everything 
equally does not distinguish between what is beneficial and what is not. Nietzsche 
argued that history should be subordinated to be advantageous. As the title of the 
Second Untimely Meditation indicates (On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Life), history may either be useful or disadvantageous. His discussion of the proper 
treatment of history was therefore intended to return history's affective strength lost in 
the scientific pretensions to historical truth. 
Thus, the difficulties pertaining to the study of history lie neither in assessing 
the proper methodological treatment of the past, nor in the resolution of distinct 
92 UM II, §1, p. 61. 
93 UM II, §1, p. 67. 
94 UM II, §6, p. 94. 
95 UM II, §3, p. 75. 
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epistemological problems, but rather in its subordination to the needs of life, which 
allows the past to be affective. This subordination can be accomplished in three ways, 
which collectively constitute the temporality of life.96 Life also needs history 
inasmuch as life "acts and strives."97 This is what Nietzsche calls monumental 
history. History can act as a repository for myths and ideals that can be drawn upon to 
inspire greatness. Life also needs history because it ''preserves and reveres, ''98 which 
is the antiquarian type of history. Life needs to piously conserve its treasures, as well 
as venerate and conserve its past to remind it from whence it has come. Finally, life 
needs history because it "suffers and seeks deliverance. "99 This is critical history. 
Life, because it is turned towards the possibilities of the future, needs to be able to 
reinvent itselfby liberating itselffrom the constraints of the past. Accordingly, history 
can be subordinated to life in three ways. History serves life in the present tense 
through the development of inspiring myths; it serves life in the past tense by 
venerating and collecting the objects and ideas that carry the past with them; and it 
also serves life in the future tense as a critical reevaluation of itself and of the goals, 
ideals, and principles that form the basis of its temporality. 
1.2.3 The Historical and the Unhistorical 
Having argued that history must be subordinated to the needs of life, 1 will 
now exp Iain the process that makes this possible. In so doing, the relation between 
Nietzsche's earlier work and his views developed in his Second Untimely Meditation 
will gradually begin to emerge. Following his comments about the need to adequately 
96 Heidegger, in discussing Nietzsche's views on history in Being and Time, described the proper uses 
ofhistory as authentic historicality. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. tr. John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Collins, 1962), p. 448. 
97 UM II, §2, p. 67. 
98 UM II, §2, p. 67. 
99 UM Il, §2, p.67. 
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assimilate the past, he stated that history is the production of the past and not its 
reproduction. It is "an attempt to give oneself, as it were a posteriori, a past in which 
one would like to originate[.]"100 History is a creative act that contributes to the 
development and culture of an individual or a people. Such a creative act entails the 
ability to transform the past, and oneself, to better assimilate it. This requires what 
Nietzsche called a plastic power (plastische kraft).101 Such a power allows one to be 
affected by the past, by permitting one to "transform and incorporate into oneself 
what is past andforeign[.]"102 The inheritance that the past has bequeathed to us must 
be transformed and incorporated into ourselves. The past must be actualized in the 
present through which it acquires meaning. 103 However, since this assimilation is 
predicated on the plasticity of the subject, it implies that this plasticity must be shaped 
by something. 
According to Nietzsche, three powers shape this plasticity. These powers are 
the historical power (memory), the non-historical (forgetting), and the suprahistorical 
power (Überhistorische Macht). Both memory and forgetting are the most obvious 
and most prevalent uses of history. 1 will now review their importance and keep the 
third for later. 
It is evident that history requires memory. History, inasmuch as it pertains to 
the past, requires the ability to preserve and remember it. But, as we have seen, the 
essence of the "historical disease" is an over-reliance on memory. His introduction of 
the three proper uses of history resolved this problem by identifying the proper ways 
that memory should be employed. Monumental and antiquarian history are dependent 
on memory inasmuch as they are respectively concemed with inspiring future 
100 UM II, §3, p. 76. 
101 UM II, §1, p. 62. 
102 UM II, §1, p. 62 
103 Gianni Vattimo, Dialogue with Nietzsche. tr. William McGraig (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2006), p. 22. 
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greatness through the memory of past greatness, and conserving the inheritance of the 
pasto Critical history is related to memory insofar as its liberating function implies the 
existence of a memory from which one wishes to be emancipated. The three uses of 
history were thus three different manifestations ofhistorical memory. 
Nonetheless, historical memory implies a choice between what parts of the 
past should be preserved and allowed to affect us, and what parts should be discarded 
or ignored. A historian must therefore perpetua te the memory of some things and 
forget others. It is because of this that "the unhistorical and the historical are 
necessary in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people and of a 
culture. "104 A balance must be established between memory and forgetting. A 
historian must be historical because he must sustain a memory, and because of this 
historicality, the historian must paradoxically act non-historically as weIl. The act of 
remembering presupposes its opposite insofar as memory ascribes a higher value to 
some things that are remembered, and devalues others that are forgotten. This 
forgetting is the non-historical power. Nietzsche is here arguing for the importance of 
clearly circumscribing a horizon,105 which distinguishes between what is to be 
remembered and kept within the horizon -what is visible and allowed to affect us-
and what has a lesser value and should be excluded from the horizon -what is 
obscured and rendered ineffectual. It is only within such a horizon that history can 
exist in subordination to life in the form of the three uses already enumerated. Thus 
history requires memory, but it also implies creative forgetting. 
However, forgetting is not only the negative implication of memory; it also 
has its own singular importance. In fact, as Nietzsche argued, forgetting has a 
primordial importance over memory. 
104 UM II, §1, p. 63. 
105 UM II, §1, p. 63. See Daniel Gold, "The Horizon ofHistory and the Production of the 'Strong 
Personality'" in International Studies in Philosophy. vol. 31, no. 3, p. 140. 
"[I]t is possible to live almost without memory, and to live happily 
moreover, as the animal demonstrates; but it is altogether impossible 
to live at ail withoutforgetting."J06 
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Life as Nietzsche understood it requires the ability to forget. Forgetting does not only 
mean ignoring and discarding past events and peoples in favor of others. It can also 
mean disregarding differences allowing abstractions and general statements. 107 The 
differences that distinguish separate entities and objects are discarded to allow for a 
general concept. Similarly, when something is given historical importance, the 
differences that separate it from the present are discarded. This allows the inclusion of 
a diversity of foreign elements in a history. The plasticity that characterizes the 
subject's assimilation of the past must be able to draw into itself a disparate set of 
elements that are reshaped and given meaning as to defme its temporality. 
1.2.4 The Suprahistorical 
We now have a better understanding of the process by which history is 
assimilated. The circumscription of a historical horizon is the result of a combination 
of memory and forgetting that operate through the three types of history. Events, 
places, and peoples are integrated into the horizon by memory, and displaced and 
assimilated into the horizon by forgetting. It also implies an initial similarity with his 
earlier comments on teleology and physiology. The existence of a historical horizon 
populated by memory and forgetting signifies that history is essentially produced by 
the subject's perception of its past, rather than a scientific task directed towards 
106 UM II, §1, p. 62. A good example ofthis can be found in Jorge Luis Borges' short story Funes, the 
Memorious. See Jorge Luis Borges, "Funes, the Memorious" in Ficciones. tr. Emecé Editiones (New 
York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1962), pp. 107-115. 
107 Alexander Nehamas, "The Genealogy of Genealogy: interpretation in Nietzsche's Second Untimely 
Meditation and in On the Genealogy of Morais" in Richard Schacht ed. Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
Morality: essays on Nietzsche Genealogy of Morais. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 
p.271. 
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discerning a truth about the pasto There is a third important element, however, to 
which 1 will now turn, that will ultimately allow me to relate Nietzsche's philosophy 
of history with his early interest in the consequences of the nascent evolutionary 
SCIences. 
The uses of history shaped by memory and forgetting, are imbued with 
meaning by the suprahistorical power. History's purpose is "disclosing in the original 
theme a whole world of profundity, power and beauty. "108 This suprahistorical power 
is not based on any particular temporality itself, but rather assigns value to the 
elements contained within the historical horizon. 
"[T]he past and the present are one, that is to say, with ail their 
diversity identical in ail that is typical and, as the omnipresence of 
imperishable types, a motionless structure of a value that cannot alter 
and a significance that is always the same. "109 
"1 cali 'suprahistorical' the powers which lead the eye away from the 
becoming towards that which bestows upon existence the character of 
the eternal and stable [.]"llO 
Although humans are constrained by their physiology to infer the existence of distinct 
successive moments, Nietzsche did not think this sufficient reason to infer the 
existence of temporality in itself. There is a perspective that can escape this 
constraint, to which Nietzsche imputes wisdom. lll Shaped by the suprahistorical 
power, this wisdom turns away, out of disgust, from the succession of events in favor 
of a timeless perspective.112 Despite the obvious dynamic structure of nature and 
existence, Nietzsche here still c1ung to the belief that there could exist, within this 
apparent flux, a meaning and purpose that was neither associated to any distinct 
temporality nor intrinsic to any object. This is the opposition between becoming and 
108 UM II, § 6, p. 93. 
109 UM II, §1, p. 66. 
110 UM II, §1O, p. 120 
III UM II, §1, pp. 66. 
112 UM II, §1, pp. 66. 
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being. 113 Although history is fundamentally characterized by a succession of states 
and events, it is given purpose or explanation independently from any succession of 
events or any distinct temporal perspective. History as a becoming is transformed into 
a being. 
Although he did not reject the contingent nature of events that could be 
described mechanistically by science, Nietzsche predicated this knowledge on 
something stable and etemal that finds its truth in religion and art. 114 
"[T]he significance of history will not be thought to lie in its general 
propositions [ ... ] but that its value will be seen to consist in its taking a 
familiar theme [ ... ] and composing inspired variations on it[.]" 1I5 
The study of history does not have its purpose in the subsumption of a particular 
event under history conceived as a who le, but in the meaning the history has for life. 
Yet, neither memory nor forgetting can explain why something is retained within the 
historical horizon. Obviously, forgetting does have a role to play insofar as it discards 
differences and allows for the creation of general concepts, but this does not amount 
to giving objects meaning. It is the suprahistorical that gives meaning to history. With 
the suprahistorical, Nietzsche underlined a very important fact about the past, namely 
that it does not exist separately from its use by an individual subject, or culture. In 
discussing critical history, he made the comment that the critical reevaluation of 
history, which results in a new rendering of the past, must be undertaken with the 
caveat that this new construction will itself eventually become old and used. 116 That is 
the meaning of "composing a inspired variation[.]" History, as a function of life, 
113 Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, his philosophy of contradictions and the contradictions of his 
philosophy, p. 27, 30. As Giusseppe Tassone argues the supra-historical force is the "metaphysical 
description of the ontological corifiguration of the universe." This ontological interpretation may 
explain why, unlike memory and forgetting, the suprahistorical is absent from his later discussion of 
history. Giusseppe Tassone, A Study on the Idea of Progress in Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Critical 
Theory. (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), p. 74. 
114 UM II, §10, p. 120. 
115 UM II, §6, p. 92-93. 
116 UM II, §3, p. 77. 
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changes as life grows and varies with time. The purpose that can be ascribed to 
history cannot reflect history taken as a who le, nor can it be derived from a unique 
temporal perspective. Historical purposes always accompany the life to which they 
are subordinated. History can only culminate in an "exalted spirit-dialogue."!!7 These 
higher types l !8 are the purpose of history and are produced by the pedagogical and 
propaedeutical function of historical education. Therefore, history inasmuch as it is a 
judgment on the past, is not a teleological judgment that has its reason in the subject's 
observation of the past, but an aesthetic judgment, because the subsumption of the 
particular under the whole is not objective but subjective. The whole lies in the 
subject's historical horizon populated by memory and forgetting and given meaning 
independently from its temporality. Therefore, the past does not act "as-if' it had a 
purpose; but because it is creatively created and determined by the requirements of 
life, history necessarily has a purpose expressed through the three types ofhistory. 
1.2.5 Conclusion 
We can now better understand the pertinence of beginning this chapter with 
Nietzsche's discussion of organic teleology and his evolutionary account of the 
formation of language. 1 have argued that under the influence of his reading of Lange, 
and his knowledge of Empedocles, through whom he understood Darwinism, 
Nietzsche argued that a purpose could only be the result of our organization both 
social and physiological. In the case of his aborted dissertation, this expressed the 
human physiological organization that made purposes necessary for any 
understanding of the natural world. 1 returned to this theme in my discussion of On 
Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense, where truths were described as pertaining to 
117 UM II, §9, p. 111. 
118 UM II, §9, p. 111. 
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the aesthetic realm by virtue of being metaphoric translations of stimuli that had lost 
their original tropic nature. Moreover, Nietzsche's discussion there also argued that 
such tropes were not oruy the result of a utilitarian need for preservation, but also the 
product of the human drive to the formation of metaphors. Thus, in both the se texts, 
meaning was always instantiated from a perspective that was not linked to any 
objective viewpoint. 
1 revisited these arguments in On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Life, where Nietzsche argued for the important relation of history to life. This was 
argued in opposition to the then prevalent perspective that attempted to incorporate 
the features of the natural sciences into history. Nietzsche diagnosed this attitude as 
the result of the incapacity to properly assimilate the past. And, in response to his 
contemporaries, 1 read Nietzsche as asserting that history is not discovered in the 
traditional sense. The writing of history involves the artistic interpretation of the past 
that follows the delimitation of a historical horizon by memory and forgetting. This 
horizon is then conditioned by a suprahistorical power that ascribes a meaning 
independently of any temporality. History is therefore an artistic creation that finds its 
meaning not in the description of a process contained in the object of study, but in the 
subject's creative ability to interpret and give meaning to the past. 
More importantly, the creative importance that Nietzsche ascribed to the 
subject integrates it into the world. Whereas Kant had understood the subject 
transcendenta1ly, Nietzsche's comments from this period described it as immersed in 
the world. Despite the importance of physiology, however, this immersion is not a 
biological reduction of the subject. Through his discussions of te1eology, truth and 
history, 1 have shown how Nietzsche expressed the world as the construction of the 
subject. Such a view could hardly be a biological reduction in the usual sense, 
because this horizon is not oruy the result of the physiology of the senses, but also of 
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the interpretation and creative use of the se organs. Just as in On Truth and Lying in 
an Extramoral Sense, and in the notes from the same year, where the sense's 
interpretation of extemal stimuli was conditioned on the manner that these stimuli 
could affect the organ, historical interpretation is conditioned by the subject being 
able to create a historical world that can affect it by inspiring growth. One must note, 
as you may have already done, that Nietzsche did not explicitly reject the hypothesis 
that there might exist a world existing in-itselfindependently of the subject. Although 
the creation of meaning is active, the reception of extemal stimuli, both historical and 
physiological, remained uniquely passive. Therefore his discussion implied the 
existence of an unconditioned world that has the capacity to affect the subject. 
This important consideration willlead us into his later discussion of history. 
The existence of an unconditioned world that remains empirically unknown spurred 
Nietzsche to continue his work on history and led him to embark on a critical and 
historical search for the intellectual origin of this hypothetical world. In the next 
chapter l will therefore undertake an explication of this project. This critical approach 
to the history of values characterizes much ofhis later reflections on the subject.1l9 It 
was this historical endeavor that brought him away from his earlier interests in art and 
philology and spurred him to resume his earlier desire to develop a greater knowledge 
of evolutionary science. 120 This aliiends credence to both Wolfgang Müller-Lauter 
and Karl Schlecta, 121 who have both argued that Nietzsche's earlier reluctance to give 
philosophical importance to history was replaced after the Untimely Meditations by a 
119 Daniel Breazeale argues that Critical History was a late addition to the text and that Nietzsche was 
a practitioner ofthis type ofhistory throughout his career. Daniel Breazeale, "Nietzsche, Critical 
History, and 'Das Pathos der Richtertum'" in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 1, no. 211 
(2000), pp. 57-76; p. 59 n4. 
120 Thomas Brobjer, "Nietzsche's View of the Value ofHistorical Studies and Methods" in Journal of 
the History of Ideas, vol. 65, no. 2 (2004), p. 304. 
121 Karl Schlechta, Le Cas Nietzsche, p. 67 and Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, his philosophy of 
contradictions and the contradictions ofhis philosophy, p. 39 n73. 
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desire to integrate bistory to pbilosopbical inquiry. This new attitude did not spare any 
unconditioned perspective including the suprahistorical one we have just examined. 
The new project began with the writing of Human, ail (00 Human where he described 
bis intention of undennining all rnetaphysical and artistic values by interrogating their 
origin. This willlead us to Nietzsche's overt and bighly critical discussion of English 
rnoralists who he labeled Darwinists and will culminate in bis renunciation of 
Darwinisrn. Ultirnately, however, 1 will show in the third and final chapter that if 
Nietzsche here tacitly endorsed an unconditional world, by the end of bis Career this 
understanding of bistory was replaced with a physiological pbilosophy of bistory that 
repudiated bis earlier acceptance of Kantian thernes. 
Chapter IWo: Nietzsche and Evolutionary History 
Part 1: "Réealism" 
2.1.1. Historical Philosophy 
In the first chapter, we saw Nietzsche argue the historical importance of 
creative retrospection. I will now argue that beginning with Human, ail too Human 
(1878-80) his discussion of history became mainly concemed with its critical 
possibilities. Already, in his Second Untimely Meditation: On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Lift (1874), he had described the critical importance of 
historically exposing how every "first nature was once a second nature and that every 
victorious second nature will become a first. "122 Critical history offered the 
possibility of transforming philosophical inquiry by exposing the conditional nature 
of all evaluations thus dispelling any pretension to absolute truth. 123 
Now, the similarity between the critical project discussed in the previous 
chapter and the one begun in Human, ail too Human is valid only up to a certain 
extent. Previously, Nietzsche had described history as dependent on the 
suprahistorical power that determined the meaning of the elements contained within 
the historical horizon. His use of this power had tacitly recognized the existence of a 
super-sensible reality. Yet, with Human, ail too Human, his critical inquiry was 
broadened to inc1ude all unconditioned forces, which were now considered suspect 
and subject to historical criticism. At the most, therefore, the critical type of history 
adumbrated the project he undertook in Human, ail too Human. 
122 UM II, §3, p. 77. 
123 Karl Schlechta, "Les rapports de Nietzsche à l'histoire" in Le Cas Nietzsche. (Paris: Gallimard, 
]960) p. 67. 
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Whereas his opposition to the then-prevalent 'scientific' approach to history 
had dominated Nietzsche's early discussion of history in his Untimely Meditations, 
starting with Human, ail too Human (1878-1880) his comments were largely directed 
towards the metaphysical tradition. History was opposed to this tradition, which 
emphasized "a miraculous source in the very Iœrnel and being of the 'thing-in-
itself. "124 He here understood the philosophical tradition's affirmation of the timeless 
character of its concepts as the result of its rather short history .125 Because philosophy 
had existed for a limited amount of time and human phenomena had changed very 
little during this time, philosophy had been unable to perceive the extent and the 
importance of its debt to evolutionary history. Philosophy had yet to realize that 
"there are no etemal facts, just as there are no absolute truths. "126 He described the 
process that gave birth to philosophical concepts as akin to painting where the 
"human intellect [ ... ] transported its erroneous basic conceptions into things" 
themselves.127 The reality of sense experience is nothing less than "the world spun out 
of intellectual errors we have inherited," rather than an apparent world conditional on 
super-sensible essences. I2S Consequently, to expose this creation, Nietzsche proposed 
a historical philosophy he called a "chemistry of concepts," which purported to 
explicate the combinations of baser elements that had combined to create higher 
ones.129 Inasmuch as it is the result of combinations of elements, knowledge has a 
124 Human, ail too Human. tr. R.J. Hollingdale, § 1 (henceforth referred to as HH 1). 
125 HH l, §2. 
126 HIll, §2. 
127 HH I, § 16. 
12S HIl l, § 16. See also FP 1877, 23 [125]. Nietzsche's rejection of a conditional world stems in part 
from his reading of Afrikan Spir. For more on Nietzsche and Spir see Robin Smalt, "Chap. 1: Spir and 
Time" in Nietzsche in Context. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2(01), pp. 1-20; see also Paolo D'Iorio, 
"La superstition des philosophes critiques: Nietzsche et Afrikan Spir" in Nietzsche-Studien, vol. 22 
(1993), pp. 270-276. 
129 HH l, § 1. For more on this idea and the presence of chemistry in Nietzsche's readings and writings 
see Duncan Large, "Nietzsche's Conceptual Chemistry" in Nietzsche and Science. eds. Gregory Moore 
and Thomas Brobjer (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2(04), pp. 189-196. 
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history and may invariably be interrogated historically.l30 It is for this reason that 
Nietzsche came to daim that "the whole of philosophy is henceforth forfeit to 
history. "l3l Philosophical inquiry thus became necessarily linked to history. 
2.1.2. English Moral History 
As 1 will now argue, Nietzsche's inquiry into the historical origins of 
knowledge ran paraUel to his reading and discussion of moral history, which was the 
context in which he became dosely acquainted with evolution. In the 1870s and 
1880s, human and moral evolution was associated with the publication of Darwin's 
The Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man (1871) because they traced the 
origins of morality and human physiology to our prehistoric 'animality.' But there is 
very little evidence that Nietzsche read any of Darwin's books and none that justified 
the daim that he read either of the two works just mentioned. 132 Nonetheless. in a 
letter written in the summer of 1877 (August 3/4 1877) he wrote enthusiastically 
130 This marks a change in Nietzsche's thought Whereas the supra-historical power had dominated 
histoIy in his early period, the recognition and affinnation of the historical character ofknowledge, 
liberates history from an atemporal perspective. See Gregory Moore, "Nietzsche, Spencer, and the 
Ethics of Evolution" in Journa/ of Nietzsche Studies, 23 (2002), p. 3; Gregory Moore, Nietzsche, 
Bi%gy and Metaphor. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 59; Thomas Brobjer, 
"Nietzsche's View of the Value ofHistoricai Studies and Methods" in Journal of the History of Ideas, 
vol. 65, no. 2 (2004), p. 304. 
131 Human, ail too Human: Assorted Opinions and Maxüns. tr. RJ. Hollingdale. §10 (Henceforth 
referred to as RH II: MOM). 
132 Claire Richter argued that Nietzsche had read Darwin during bis friendship with Ludwig Rütimeyer 
during his Basel years. However she do es not give any textual evidence for this, which makes such a 
claim problematic. See Claire Richter, Nietzsche et les théories biologiques contemporaines. (Paris: 
Mercure de France, 1911), pp. 8, 14, 195. Nietzsche did, however, read Darwin's essay A Biographical 
Sketch of an Infant presented to him by George Croom Robertson, the editor of the prestigious English 
periodical Mind, during the summer of 1877 ("A Biographical Sketch of an Infant". Mind, vol. 2, no. 7 
[July 1877], pp. 285-294). However it is unclear whether Nietzsche actually read the article. Robin 
Small (Robin SmalI, Nietzsche and Rée: a Star Friendship. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005}, 
p. 88-89) argues that Robertson's German was better than Nietzsche's English and concludes from this 
that Robertson probably summarized the article for Nietzsche. Jean Gayon ("Nietzsche and Darwin" in 
Biology and the Foundation ofEthics. eds. J. Maienschein and M. Ruse [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999], p. 160), on the other hand, assumes that Nietzsche actually read the article. 
This is relativelyunimportant because the article contains very little information pertaining to Oarwin's 
theory of evolution through Natural Selection. 
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about English evolutionism. 133 In this letter, he described this school ofthought as the 
only intellectual CUITent that was then worth pondering. 134 Nietzsche's initial interest 
in English evolutionary thought in Human, ail too Human deve10ped not only from an 
appreciation of its eschewal of traditional te1eologies, which had dominated his early 
period, but also from that of its rejection of metaphysics in general. However, and 
more importantly, this rejection of metaphysics was accomplished through the use of 
utility as its core explanatory principle. 135 His early enthusiasm for the Darwinian use 
of utility did not last until the end of his career because it was from this concept that 
he derived his criticism of Darwinism. 
lbis chapter will therefore follow the transformation of Nietzsche's appraisal 
of the concept of utility as he read English moral historians. But here it suffices to say 
that through his reading of English moralists, Nietzsche progressively discarded 
utility as the origin of moral evaluations. Because he did not accept the premise of a 
purposeful history, the postulate of an original utility that gave meaning to moral 
evaluations was unmasked as the English evolutionists' moral interpretation of 
evolutionary history. It was precise1y Nietzsche's reading of Herbert Spencer's The 
Data of Ethics in 1880 and 1881 that convinced him of the weakness of the English 
conception of evolutionary history. It is his graduaI rejection of the explanatory use of 
utility that eventually led him to also reject the search for historical origins altogether 
and replace it with an interpretive understanding ofhistory. 
133 Letter to Paul Rée, August 3/4 1877. KGB W5, pp.264-265. Translated in Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Paul Rée, Lou von Salome Correspondance. ed. E. Pfeiffer, tr. O. Hansen-Love and J. Lacoste (Paris: 
PUF, 1979), p. 34. 
134 Dirk Robert Johnson argues that Darwinism was enticing for Nietzsche because it offered "a denial 
of a transcendent moral universe and the relativity of values [and an] emphasis on scientific 
naturalism and historical origins." "On the Way to the 'Anti-Darwin'; Nietzsche's Darwinian 
Meditations in the Middle Period" in Tijdschrift voor filosofie. 65: 4 (2003), p. 666. 
135 Patrick Wotling, "La morale sans métaphysique. «Vitalisme» et psychologie de la morale chez 
Darwin, Spencer et Nietzsche" in Lectures de Nietzsche. eds. J-F Balaudé et P. Wotling (paris: 
Librairie Générale Française, 2000) p. 374. 
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In this chapter 1 will therefore follow the change in his reception of the 
English type of moral history, using the concept of utility as my guide. This will be 
done in two parts. The first part will detail Nietzsche's friendship with Paul Rée, 
which led him to embark on a specifically historical criticism of the origin of 
morality. This ended with him refuting Rée's daim that morality necessarily 
developed out of the utility of altruism. The second part begins by discussing Spencer 
and his evolutionary history of morality. This will lead me to describe how 
Nietzsche's progressive grasp of the problems Ïnherent to English evolutionary theory 
brought him to argue against the Spencerian emphasis on the expediency of morality. 
This ultimately resulted in his assertion that history is fundamentally an interpretive 
activity, and that the evolutionary importance of utility was simply the result of 
Spencer's moral interpretation of evolutionary history. 1 will then close this chapter 
by showing how his reading of Spencer and Rée led him to renounce the 
philosophical significance he previously gave to Darwinism. 
2.1.3. Nietzsche and "Réealism" 
Nietzsche's interest for the English type of moral history coincided with the 
beginning of his friendship with Paul Rée. In 1878, Nietzsche wrote to Rée that 
Human, ail too Human "belongs to you -- to others it is only given. "136 The actual 
extent of Rée's influence is uncertain however. 137 Nonetheless, it is Rée who is 
generally identified as the source of Nietzsche's knowledge of English evolutionary 
ideas during this period.138 Rée may have introduced Nietzsche to English 
l36 Letter of24 April 1878, KGB II/S, p. 324. Translated in Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Rée, Lou von 
Salome Correspondance. ed. E. Pfeiffer, tr. O. Hansen-Love and J. Lacoste (Paris: PUF, 1979), p. 42. 
137 For example, Karl Jaspers claims that "Nietzsche learned hardly anythingfrom Rée." qtd. in Small, 
Basic Writings Paul Rée, p. xxxiv. 
138 Robin Small, Nietzsche and Rée: a Star Friendship, pp. 72, 83-84; Brendan Donnellan, "Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Pau] Rée: Cooperation and Conflict" in Journal of the History of ldeas. vol. 43 (1982) 
pp. 597-598; Patrick Wotling "Moral sans métaphysique" p. 35]; Charles Andler Nietzsche, sa vie et sa 
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evolutionary thought through his two published works: Psychological Observations 
(Psychologische Beobachtungen, 1875) and The Origin of Moral Sensations (Der 
Ursprung der moralische Empfindungen, 1877).139 Certainly these books had an 
influence on the historical perspective of Human, ail too Human, but Nietzsche never 
expressly equated his ideas with those of Rée.l40 It may therefore be more judicious to 
speak: of Nietzsche's "Réealism"141 as an intellectual dalliance that he quickly 
overcame, but which had a lasting effect on his reading and writings. 
Nietzsche's "Réealism" deve10ped from his reappraisal of the relationship 
between history and philosophy, introduced in the first part of volume lof Human, ail 
too Human. However, unlike his previous arguments about history, Nietzsche here 
explicitly acknowledged the importance of the natural sciences for history. If the 
philosophical tradition had long been ignorant of the historical contingency of its 
concepts, then the traditional temporal horizons of concem to philosophy must he 
broadened. 
"[E]verything essential in the development of mankind took place in 
prime val times, long before the four thousand years we more or less 
know about; during these years mankind may weil not have altered 
very much. "142 
This c1aim shows clearly that Nietzsche's understanding of history had already 
surpassed his earlier conceptions of it as the object of written accounts and debates. It 
also implies an extension of the scope of what he caUs history. Thus construed, 
pensée, tome Il. (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), p. 305. On the relation between Nietzsche, Rée and English 
thought see Dirk Robert Johnson, "On the Way to the <Anti-Darwin,'" pp. 662-666. Claire Richter 
argued that Rée introduced Nietzsche to Spencerianism (Nietzsche et les théories biologiques 
contemporaines, p. 28). 
139 Nietzsche recognized the importance ofRée's Or/gin of Moral Sensation in the preface of On the 
Genealogy of Moral (GM, Preface, §4). 
140 Nietzsche Iater defended himself against accusations that Human, ail too Human was a 
continuation of Rée's work (EH, "Human, aIl too Human" §5). 
141 This is the word Nietzsche uses to describe Rée's thought in Ecce Homo «<Human, ail too Human", 
§6). 
142 HH l, §2. 
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history "cannot be separated from natural science[.]"143 Science's newfound 
importance led Nietzsche to relinquish the question of origins and beginnings to "the 
physiology and history of the evolution of organisms and concepts. "144 Now, while 
that does not necessarily mean that Nietzsche supplanted metaphysics with science, 145 
both history and science had to inform philosophy and any understanding of the 
combinations that led to the successive metaphysical divisions of knowledge had to 
be understood through the historical conditions for such combinations. 146 Thus, his 
"chemistry of concepts" had to identifY the original elements that combined to 
pro duce the concepts of metaphysics, but it also had to elucidate the pro cess by which 
such combinations came about. 
Paul Rée's influence can be perceived in Nietzsche's critical history of 
morality. An essential starting point that both men shared was the c1aim that "[m]oral 
man [ ... ] stands no closer to the intelligible (metaphysical) world than does physical 
man."147 Just as the species human has evolved, so has the concept ofhuman. Just as 
there is no unconditioned reality, there is no unconditioned morality. 'Man', as 
philosophical concept, came into existence just as 'Man' the species had, and, as 
such, it can no longer be understood as the stable notion to which previous moralists 
had subscribed. 148 The history of the concepts man, soul etc. is the history of an error 
that was once useful, but whose original utility has been gradually forgotten and 
transformed into a metaphysical concept. With this, Nietzsche sought to undertake the 
"always avoided investigation of the origin and history of moral sensations. "149 
143 HH I, §l. 
144 HH I, §lO. 
145 Steven Galt Crowell, "Nietzsche among the Neo-Kantians; or, the Relation between Science and 
Philosophy" in Nietzsche and the Sciences vo/. 1. ed. Babette Babich (Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1999), p. 79. 
146 HH I, §20. 
147 HH I, §37. 
148 HH I, §2. 
149 RH I, §37. 
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Although Rée may not have been the primary instigator of Nietzsche's project, the 
two certainly agreed on the value and proper method of such an investigation. 150 1bis 
is demonstrated by the transformation in the role played by utility in Nietzsche's 
work. Starting in the late 1870s, it was crucial to Nietzsche who adapted to his own 
uses. By the early 1880s, however, it led him away from his own "Réealism," because 
he broke with Rée's analysis of the evolutionary utility of altruistic actions. 
Now, Rée had read Darwin and he accordingly stressed the importance of the 
utility of evolved customs for an understanding oftheir origin. 151 Rée argued that the 
fundamental moral concept of "good" could be traced back to sorne time where 
"good" meant the same as "good-for" something. 152 Eventually, according to Rée,153 
this original utility became custom and habit, and its primeval utility was forgotten. 
Finally, through the work ofmoralists such as those Rée praised, this habit, which had 
been elevated to a metaphysical princip le (The Good), could be demonstrated to be an 
error based on an initial utilitarian evaluation. 
Similarly, Human, ail too Human identified the utility of moral evaluations as 
their evolutionary raison d'être. Fundamentally, utility is the ability of an act or an 
object to secure pleasure and eschew displeasure. 154 "[O]ne calls individual actions 
good or bad [ ... ] solely on account of their usefol or harmfol consequences."155 
Something is said to be good only insofar as it is "good for something, as useful 
[.]"156 Thus, something is valued as good because its consequences secure pleasure or 
prevent displeasure. Moral evaluations are simply appraisals of consequences 
ISO For example, Rée claimed that "the nature of any [moral] sensation is c/ear only to the extent that 
the history of its origin is also c/ear." (Rée, Paul. The Origins of Morais Sensations in Basic Writings 
Paul Rée, p. 92). 
151 Rée, The Origin of Moral Sensations, p. 87. 
152 Rée, The Origin of Moral Sensations, p. 121. 
153 Rée, The Origin of Moral Sensations, p. 98. 
154 HH l, §34. 
155 HH l, §39. 
156 HH l, §96. 
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conditioned by the desire to secure pleasure and avoid displeasure, which, to 
Nietzsche, was nothing other than drive to self-preservation.l 57 Thus in this period, 
Nietzsche ascribed to utility the same moral and evolutionary significance as Rée. 
2.1.4. Morality as Constraint 
We have now seen that Rée and Nietzsche shared a common interest in the 
origins of moral evaluations assayed through their utility. 1 will now show that 
Nietzsche did not agree that there was a strict equation between the drive to self-
preservation and the origin of morality. Although morality may be associated to this 
drive, it is not originally synonymous with individual preservation because it does not 
confer any immediate evolutionary advantage. According to Nietzsche, morality is the 
consequence of organized societies and states prior to which there are no specifically 
moral evaluations.l 58 The development of morality is characterized by the transition 
from astate, marked by the momentary search for sustenance and security, to astate 
marked by the "col/ective-individuar' that seeks the most general and enduring weIl 
being. 159 In such a state, the primitive utility determined by immediate pleasurable 
and harmful consequences is replaced, through a graduai forgetting of its origin, by a 
consideration of the motives and the nature of man. 160 It is only when individuaIs 
have moved away from the consideration of the immediate consequences of their 
actions that the ground is prepared for morality. 
The transition from a state of 'natural' competition to the collective-individual 
is thus marked by the transformation of utility from an immediate and personal use to 
a general and collective one. However, according to Nietzsche, this implies that the 
157 HH l, §99. 
158 HH l, §99. 
159 HH l, §94. 
160 HH l, §39. 
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individual is henceforth sacrificed to the collective inasmuch as "the enduring 
advantage of the community is to talœ precedence over the advantage of the 
individual [ ... ] even over his survival. "161 But this also suggests that morality did not 
develop out of altruistic drives that conferred an evolutionary advantage. 162 Although 
he conceded that the formation of groups promoted personal or filial safety, he did not 
derive morality from such alliances. 163 Morality then developed only when these 
groups took the form of a collective-individuality or, were dominated by sorne more 
powerful person, and exerted a constraint or compulsion over particular 
individuals. l64 
"Morality is preceded by compulsion, indeed it is for a time itself still 
compulsion, to which one accommodates oneself for the avoidance of 
what one regards as unpleasurable. Later it becomes custom, later 
still voluntary obedience, finally almost instinct: then lilœ ail that has 
for a long time been habituai and natural, it is associated with 
pleasure[.]"165 
Morality thus emerges out of the compulsion that orders individuals within a 
collective. Through its subsumption by an organized society, the moral value of an 
individual is determined by its conformity with the moral code. That moral code is 
directed towards the preservation of the community, however, and not toward the 
preservation of the individual. I66 Consequently, morality is conformity with "a law 
or tradition established /rom of old [ ... ] a long inheritance [.]"167 The predicates 
161 HH II: MOM, §89. 
162 Rée argued for the individual evolutionary advantage of the social-instincts (altruism) (see Rée The 
Origin of Moral Sensations, p. 92-93). This was not particular to Rée, Darwin himselfhad defended 
the utility ofmorality conceived as the "general good or welfare of the community" (The Descent of 
Man and Selection in to Relation to Sex. [New York: Modem Library, 1871], p. 490). Morality in this 
case is an individual evolutionary advantage in the competition with other communities inasmuch as 
the safety of the community implies the safety of the individual (Descent, p. 498). 
163 HH I, §98. 
164 HH I, §99. 
165 HH I, §99. 
166 HH I, §96. 
167 HH l, §96. 
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"good" and "ev il" reflect the needs of the group as sanctified over time. Utility is 
moral, then, only when there is an established tradition to which it can relate. 
Therefore, unlike Rée, Nietzsche did not predicate the development of morality on an 
individual evolutionary advantage, but rather on the compulsion and constraint of 
something greater, which transfonns individuals into collective-individuals. 
The importance of compulsion and constraint for morality is the fundamental 
characteristic ofNietzsche's elucidation ofmorality. It was later discussed and refined 
in Daybreak (1881), where he famously described what he called the morality of 
custom.168 "[M]orality is nothing other (therefore no more!) than obedience to 
customs [ which are] the traditional way of behaving and evaluating. "169 The meaning 
of a moral act lies in obedience to the tradition and not in rational calculation. 
Confonnity with the tradition is paramount. Although "custom represents the 
experiences of men of earlier times as to what they supposed useful and harmful "170 
it is not these experiences that render confonnity necessary. "[T]he sense of custom 
(morality) applies, not to these experiences as such, but to the age, the sanctity, the 
indiscussability of the custom. "171 Even the act that confonns to tradition but is 
perfonned for its personal usefulness, or motives similar to those that founded the 
tradition, is immoral to Nietzsche. Morality, inasmuch as it is custom, is the same 
thing as tradition, that "higher authority which one obeys, not because il commands 
what is useful to us, but because il commands. "172 As the regulator of conduct within 
societies, morality is linked to no utility other than that of the group, even if this is to 
the detriment of the individual. 
168 Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality. tr. RJ. Hollingdale, §9. Henceforth referred to 
asD. 
169 D, § 9. 
170 D, §19. 
171D,§19. 
172D,§9. 
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Moreover, the constraint of morality is not always experienced as such. 
Adherence and conformity to custom is the animal need for safety transferred to 
human societies. "[I]t is not improper to describe the entire phenomenon of morality 
as animal."173 Obviously, the behavior demanded by custom is not the same as that 
required for survival in nature, but adherence to tradition is, according to Nietzsche, 
functionally analogous to seeking safety in nature. In nature danger tends to come 
from outside the group; in an evolved community, the greatest danger cornes from 
within. 
"Thus the individual hides himself in the general concept 'man', or in 
society, or adapts himself to princes, classes, parties, opinions of his 
time and place: and ail the subtle ways we have of appearing 
fortunate, grateful, powerful, enamored have their easily discoverable 
parallels in the animal world." 1 74 
It is in adhering to custom that an individual finds safety. Just as animal adaptation is 
the result of the need to "elude one's pursuers and be favored in the pursuit of one's 
prey,"175 the human individual seeks safety in conformity and adapts to society.176 
Nietzsche's description of the origins of morality is, in this respect, sirnilar to Rée's 
position. However, the similarity extends to the sole consideration of utility. Morality 
is useful to the individual inasmuch as it offers safety from danger. But Nietzsche 
refused to infer from this that morality and membership in a community constituted 
an evolutionary advantage. Since the moral irnperative, as Nietzsche reconceived it, 
is fundamentally that of obedience to custom, the greatest danger lies in the deviation 
from the norm and not in any threat posed by outside forces. Individuals initially 
experienced morality, and its concomitant valuing of altruism, as a constraint and not 
173 D, §26. 
174 D, §26. 
175 D, §26. 
176 This was reformulated in BOE §198, §201, where Nietzsche described the importance offear for 
morality. 
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as an advantage whether social or 'evolutionary.' Furthermore, rather than describe 
morality as advantageous for adapting to external conditions, Nietzsche preferred to 
conceive morality as forcing the adaptation of the individual to the group. 
2.1.5. The "Strong" and the "Weak" 
We can now see how Nietzsche disagreed with Rée as to the origin of 
morality's utility. 1 will now briefly return to Human, ail too Human and use the 
constraint of morality embedded in tradition to explain how it becomes the means by 
which instincts and evaluations are reinforced and perpetuated, which will grant me 
the right to claim that Nietzsche broke with Rée as to evolutionary importance of 
altruism. At first glance it may appear that Nietzsche remained close to Rée, who 
argued for the importance of habit in the evolution of behaviors. 177 The use of an 
organ, or an evaluation, is strengthened by habituation over several generations. 
However, in one passage from Human, ail too Human Nietzsche differed with Rée: 
"the celebrated struggle for existence does not seem to me to be the only theory by 
which the progress or strengthening of a man or race can be explained."178 This is in 
opposition to Darwin inspired perspectives that held that the strongest and best 
adapted individuals transmit the best traits. Nietzsche undermined this idea by 
arguing that the survival of the fittest in no way guarantees evolutionary progress. The 
177 Paul Rée, PsychologicalObservations. in Basic Writings, p. 76. See also The Origin of Moral 
Sensations in Basic Writings, p. 132. The importance of habituation does not originate with Rée, but he 
probably influenced Nietzsche in this regard. See Gregory Moore, Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor, p. 
62-63. 
178 RH l, §224, see also FP 1875, 12 [22]. This passage is generally considered as the beginning of 
Nietzsche's "Anti-Darwinism" because it downplays the importance ofnatural selection. On this see 
Jean Gayon, ''Nietzsche and Darwin" pp. 162-163; John Richardson, "Nietzsche Contra Darwin" in 
Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, vol. 65, no. 3 (2002), p. 540 n12; Pieter Mostert, 
''Nietzsche's Reception ofDarwinism" in Bijdragen tot de Dierkunde. vol. 49, no. 2 (1979), pp. 240-
241; Barbara Stiegler, ''Nietzsche lecteur de Darwin" in Revue philosophique de France et de 
l'étranger, vol. 123, no. 2 (1998), p. 386, 389; Barbara Stiegler, Nietzsche et la biologie (paris: PUF, 
2001), p. 100. 
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strong types, which are the best adapted individuals and therefore superior in the 
struggle for resources, simply maintain the customs already present in the group 
because they are also the best adapted to the constraint of tradition. Therefore, for 
Nietzsche, morality was "a hindrance to the creation of new and better customs[.]"179 
Morality is conservative, maintains values and does not willingly accept change. The 
strengthening of these traits is but the affirmation of already established evaluations 
and consequently, it is not conducive to evolutionary change. 
On the other hand, weaker individuals can well be the source of change and 
even progress. "The strongest natures preserve the type, the weaker help it to 
evolve. "180 Whereas the "strong" affirm the hereditary selected evaluations, the 
"weak" bring new traits to the community.181 The strong individuals are a stabilizing 
force, but it is the ability to incorporate the newer and weaker individuals that marks a 
group as being able to change. It is therefore the potential weakening of the whole 
that simultaneously denotes an evolutionary potential. 
"A people that becomes somewhere weak and fragile but is as a whole 
still strong and healthy is capable of absorbing the infection of the 
new and incorporating if to ifs advantage. "182 
It was the capacity to assimilate the "infection" of novelty that Nietzsche understood 
as the most important evolutionary quality, and not the continual affirmation of 
already-selected traits. Moreover, this curious passage aftirms the idea that change is 
not necessarily produced by outside factors. Change is not an adaptation to external 
forces, but an adaptation to internaI ones that leads to dec1ine or to evolutionary 
change. 
179 D, §I9. 
180 RH l, §224. One should note that by the mid-I880s he inverted this vocabulary. 
181 RH l, §224. 
182 RH l, §224. 
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It should now be clear that Nietzsche was progressively moving away from 
Rée's evolutionary hypothesis. First, he denied Rée's claim that morality was 
predicated on altruistic drives that, through the formation of social groups, conferred 
an evolutionary advantage. This was because he did not believe that altruism led to 
morality; rather it was morality that led to altruism. Second, Nietzsche disputed Rée's 
claim that morality was useful to the individual because he understood morality as a 
constraint, frequently detrimental to individuals. It was only in relation to the 
constraint of tradition that Nietzsche thought morality could be considered useful. 
Third, Nietzsche moved past Rée and the English evolutionists by claiming that the 
graduaI assertion of selected traits neither manifested nor was conducive to 
evolutionary change. 
Although Nietzsche did not yet reject the importance of utility for 
understanding the history of the origin of morality, he could not accept Rée's 
explanation of such an origin. Rée's account of the origin of morality was circular: it 
demonstrated its utility viewed from the perspective of modernity, but did not explain 
its inception. The demonstration of morality's utility, does not necessarily explain its 
origin because it does not make its existence necessary.183 Morality, like many other 
things is useful, but that hardly explain why it exists. Nietzsche used the example of 
the eye to illustrate this point. The eye is a useful organ for the body, but does that 
imply that its origin lies in its utility? Hardly, the eye appeared only "after chance had 
put the apparatus together."I84 The utility of the eye did not precede, butfollowed its 
origination. It is in this context that Nietzsche turned to Herbert Spencer's The Data of 
Ethics. In On the Genealogy of Morais, Spencer's position is contrasted to Rée's 
historically untenable and absurd use of utility, and ms explanation is described as 
183 D, §37. 
184 D, §122. 
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"reasonable and psychologically tenable. "185 Nietzsche did not, however, adopt 
Spencer's evolutionary explanation for the importance of altruism as his own. 1 will 
now turn to his reading of Spencer and use it in the remainder of the chapter to 
explain Nietzsche's ultimate rejection of Darwinism. 
Part 2: "Against the English" 
2.2.1. Herbert Spencer's The Data of Ethics 
As 1 have already remarked, there is little evidence to suggest that Nietzsche 
ever read any of Darwin's major works. He did, however, read Spencer's The Data of 
Ethicsl86 in 1880 and 1881, which is probably the c10sest he ever got to English 
evolutionism.187 Spencer is therefore generally regarded as the source of much of his 
criticisms of Darwin and Darwinism.188 This reading is important because it is in The 
Data of Ethics that he discovered a moralization of evolution that led him to reject 
Darwinism and its evolutionary history. 
Herbert Spencer rivaled Hegel in British 19th century philosophical debates, 
yet he is today most often remembered as coining Darwin's infamous dictum 
185 GM I, §3 
186 Herbert Spencer, Data of Ethics in Principles of Ethics vol. 1. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 
1978). 
187 This is testified by the fact that the tirst reference to Spencer can be found in the notebook from the 
winter of 1879-1880 (NV I; KSA 9, 1). Nietzsche reread Spencer in the Summer and Fall of 1881 (M 
III; KSA 9, Il). One should note, however, that the French translation of the notes from 1881, found in 
vol. 5 of G. Colli and M. Montinari's Oeuvres philosophique completes (tr. P. Klossowski [Paris: 
Gallimard, 1967]), do not have the same entry numbers as in the KSA. Furthermore, numerous notes 
found in the KSA are absent from the French translation (most notably KSA 9, Il [343] "Gegen 
Spencer"). I will the concordance between the Fragments Posthumes and the KSA where applicable. 
188 Barbara Stiegler describes Darwin and Spencer as part of "le mêmefronf' (Nietzsche et la Biologie, 
p. 95). See also Robin Small, Nietzsche and Rée, p. 169; Jean Gayon, ''Nietzsche and Darwin," p. 160; 
John Richardson, Nietzsche's New Darwinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 139; John 
Richardson "Nietzsche contra Darwin" in Philosophical and Phenomenological Research. vol. 65, no. 
3 (2002), p. 542; Gregory Moore Nietzsche Biology and Metaphor, p. 61; Gregory Moore, "Nietzsche, 
Spencer, and the Ethics of Evolution," pp. 3-4, 19; Thomas Brobjer ''Nietzsche's Reading ofNatural 
Science," p. 36; Patrick Wotling, "La morale sans métaphysique," p. 352. 
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"survival of the filtest. "189 However, unlike Darwin, Spencer's account of the 
evolution of species was not predicated on natural selection as much as it was on neo-
Lamarckian adaptation. According to Spencer, evolutionary change unfolds through 
adaptation to the changing external conditions. In The Data of Ethics, Spencer 
presented ethical conduct precisely as the product of evolutionary adaptation.I90 
"[T]he leading contrasts of character between the savage and civilized, are just to be 
expected from the process of adaptation. "191 Spencer's argument was that if 
everything in the world evolved from low and "simple organisms" (unicellular), to 
high and "complex organisms" (civilized humans), then mental phenomena, which 
include ethics and morality, must have evolved in like manner.192 Therein lay 
Nietzsche's interest in Spencerianism. Spencerianism attempted to demonstrate the 
link between animal and human behavior and Nietzsche could then explain morality, 
ethics and evaluations in general, independently of any metaphysical principle by 
exploiting the new discoveries of the evolutionary sciences. In this context, morality 
became a product of evolutionary adaptation like any physiological organ. 
In construing ethical conduct in relation to adaptation, Spencer distinguished 
good from bad conduct by the degree to which it was adjusted to the ends oflife.I93 
Something is considered good because it is good for sorne finality. This finalist good 
189 Charles Darwin, The Origin ofSpecies by Means ofNatural Selection of the Preservation of 
Favored Races in the Strugglefor Life. (New York: Signet Classic, 1958), p. 75.1t should be noted 
that it is inaccurate to identify Spencer as Darwinian. Spencer's ideas were probably closer to 
Lamarck's functional adaptation than to Darwin's Natural Selection (see Peter Bowler, Evolutionism: 
the History of an Idea [Berkeley: University ofCalifomia Press, 1983], pp. 149,253.) Whereas Darwin 
stressed the anonymous action of Natural Selection, Spencer was much closer to a form ofvitalism that 
owed much to Lamarck's functional adaptation and the to English Utilitarian moral theory (see Patrick 
Wotling, "La morale sans métaphysique," p. 361). This led many early commentators to describe 
Nietzsche's position as Lamarckian. See, for example, Charles Andler. Nietzsche, sa vie et sa pensée, 
tome 111. pp.lB, 193, 449; Claire Richter, Nietzsche et les théories biologiques contemporaines, pp. 8, 
9,43,233. 
190 Herbert Spencer, Data of Ethics, pp. 37-335. Henceforth referred to as DE. 
191 DE, p. 214. 
192 DE, p. 96-97. 
193 DE, p. 58. 
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is defmed by the ''processes of life as carried on under established conditions of 
existence. "194 Good conduct is therefore the adequation of acts to ends determined by 
the conditions of existence. The sensations of pleasure and pain evince the degree of 
adaptation to the conditions of existence insofar as pleasure accompanies well-
adapted conduct, and pain accompanies i11 adapted conduct, which threatens 
extinction if it is irremediably deficient. 195 Thus, pleasure is related to adaptation and 
pain to misadaptation. 
According to Spencer, happiness is another e1ement of the evolution of 
conduct. By way of explaining this happiness, Spencer distinguished three types of 
conduct, each of which reflect variations in the conditions of existence. 196 The fIfst is 
conduct that is adapted to the requirements of individual life. This described most 
forms of animal conduct. The second is conduct adapted to life in family groups such 
as is the case for sorne greater primates and "primitive" humans. Finally, the third 
form of conduct was adapted to life in society. The conduct of simple organisms, 
which exist independently of family or social groups, was considered good if it was 
well adapted to the requirements of their singular existence, notably their ability to 
secure nourishment and safety. Organisms that live in family groups were judged in a 
like manner, but the evaluation of their conduct was extended to inc1ude the safety 
and nourishment of the filial group. Civil conduct was judged good or bad in function 
of how effectively it meets the requirements of life in societies. It is these 
requirements that determined the content of morality. Ethics and morality, which 
characterize civilized life and are absent from the "savage," are the forms "which 
universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolution. "197 This reflects the 
194 DE, p. 94. 
195 DE, p. l33. 
196 DE, p. 3. 
197 DE, p. 54. 
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conditions of existence in societies that "do not necessitate mutual injury and 
hindrance" but require "cooperation and mutual aid. "198 Moral and ethical conduct 
secure greater degrees of happiness than misery inasmuch as they promote 
"cooperation and mutual aid." Thus morality, which according to Spencer is present 
only in bona fide social groups, was a product of adaptation to life in society; it also 
implied a degree of purposefulness. 
The purposefulness of moral conduct can he deduced from Spencer's 
utilitarianism. Spencer's account of moral conduct is utilitarian because conduct is 
always determined by what is useful or detrimental to the individual. However, he 
explicitly differentiated himself from previous Utilitarians by deducing his ethical 
principles from evolution itself. 199 Moral faculties are adaptations to life and 
societies. This established an equation between the good, the evolved, and the 
adapted.200 As creatures become increasingly complex they develop correspondingly 
more evolved conduct, which is increasingly described as good as it reaches an ever-
higher level of adaptation with the established conditions of existence. "[S]ince 
evolution has been, and is still, working towards the highest life, it follows that 
conforming to those principles by which the highest life is achieved, is jùrthering that 
aim. "201 This is reached through the perfect adjustment of acts to ends displayed by 
virtue, which Spencer called "happiness."202 Thus "conduciveness to happiness is the 
ultimate test of perfection in a man 's nature. ''203 Spencer therefore introduced 
198 DE, p. 55. 
199 DE, p. 94. He is quoted by Darwin as saying that "1 believe that the experiences ofutility organized 
and consolidated through ail past generations [ ... ] have become in us certainfaculties ofmoral 
intuitions [ ... ] which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences ofutility." ("Letter to Mr. 
Mill in Bain's 'Mental and Moral Science'" qtd. in Charles Darwin The Descent of Man and Selection 
in to Relation to Sex, p. 492). 
200 Patrick Wotling, "La morale sans métaphysique," p. 361. 
201 DE, p. 203. 
202 DE, p. 69. 
203 DE, p. 69. 
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progress into evolution inasmuch as moral development parallels the biological 
development of humans. Progressively human evolution will reach a state of 
equilibrium, which will be characterized by "permanently peaceJuI societies,"204 
where "happiness special [of the individual] and general [of the group ]''205 can 
coexist. This coexistence is the ultimate form that ethical conduct can espouse 
because it is able to assimilate both the egoism of the individual and the altruism 
required for a good life in society. Spencerianism thus necessarily implied a goal: the 
reconciliation of these egoistic and altruistic drives normally at odds in social groups, 
which is embodied in the happiness of the virtuous man. The adaptations that 
constitute morality are progressive steps that will eventually lead to the ultimate goal 
of evolution: happy humans perfectly adapted to life in society. Thus, according to 
Spencer, there is a goal to evolution, namely human happiness, which is 
incrementally reached through an asymptomatic series of adaptations that have a 
purpose only in relation to this goal. Actual morality, therefore, is the culmination of 
this adaptive process, and constitutes the most evolved, best adapted and most 
estimable and beneficial form of conduct. 
2.2.2. Moral Evolution 
Having explicated Spencer's account of the evolution of morality and shown 
that it implied that moral conduct is purposeful; 1 will now turn to Nietzsche's 
discussion and ultimate rejection of Spencerianism. Prior to his reading of Spencer 
the possibilities of English evolutionary history were alluring in his efforts at 
undermining the foundations of metaphysics and established morality. In The Gay 
204 DE, p. 53. 
205 DE, p. 204. 
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Science (1882),206 Nietzsche reiterated his commitment to a dysteleological and 
meaningless world, which had initially been the basis for his appreciation of 
Darwinism.207 What did change, however, was his opinion of Darwinian evolutionary 
history. The reason for this reappraisal can be linked to Spencer. In his reading of The 
Data of Ethics, Nietzsche found, to his dismay, a moral evolution. His reaction to this 
moral evolution exploited arguments he had previously developed. Indeed, his 
discussion of Rée's theses prefigured his criticism of Spencer insofar as he again 
argued against the original utility of altruism and the expeditiousness of already 
selected traits. However, and this is important, through his criticism of Spencer, 
Nietzsche developed a significant conclusion, which reduced all moral phenomena to 
moral interpretations of phenomena. 
Nietzsche clearly stated his opposition to Spencer in the beginning of The Gay 
Science. The following passage is much more than an introduction to his criticism of 
Spencer, it also contains the very essence of Nietzsche's position, as 1 will show. 
"Nowadays there is a profoundly erroneous moral doctrine that is 
celebrated especially in England: this ho/ds that judgments of "good" 
and "evil" sum up experiences of what is "expedient" and 
"inexpedient." One ho/ds that what is called good preserves the 
species, while what is called evil harms the species. "208 
A close examination of this passage will reveal its importance in the development of 
Nietzsche's philosophy of history. This passage is significant because it is the earliest 
published instance of Nietzsche describing English moral theory as "erroneous," and 
therefore marks a transition in his relation to this theory. The passage was written 
following his reading of The Data of Ethics, and the erroneous quality identified here 
206 Gay Science tr. Walter Kaufinann. Henceforth referred to as GS. 
207 GS, § 109. 
208 GS, §4. 
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was the expediency of moral evaluations; both these e1ements point to Spencer.209 It 
was Spencer, and not Rée, that explained the evolution of conduct by appealing to the 
purposefulness of moral evaluations predicated on an evolutionary goal. Therefore, 
Nietzsche's criticism of the English moralists, begun here, can be imputed to his 
reading of The Data of Ethics, which amalgamated utility, morality and evolutionary 
expediency. It also implied that the world, rather than being bereft of any intrinsic 
qualities and purposes, was fully determined by a moral evolution. 
As the passage indicates, Nietzsche here opposed Spencer's use of the moral 
attribute "good" to describe evolutionary expedient processes; this connects Spencer 
with his previous discussion of Rée. As we have already seen, Nietzsche did not think 
that "good" and "evil" are inherently moral. As 1 have shown in my discussion of 
Human, ail to Human, "good," although useful, is determined by its conformity with 
tradition, which made it unconducive to evolutionary progress. Nietzsche restated this 
point in the same aphorism as the passage quoted above albeit in different terms. 
"[T]he evi/ instincts are expedient, species-preserving, and indispensable to as high a 
degree as the good ones; their action is merely different.''2l0 "Evil" does not represent 
what truly harms the species.211 The opposition between "good" and "evil" is not 
determined by their supposed evolutionary purposefulness,212 but rather by their age. 
"What is new [ ... ] is always evi/ [ ... ] and only what is old is good."213 Values, such as 
those discussed here, gain importance over time; "[u]sually by force of arms [ ... ] but 
also by means of new religions and moralities. "214 "Good" and "Evil" are moral, and 
209 Spencer is not named in the quoted passage, but Nietzsche makes a similar comment in a 
preparatory note unambiguously addressed to Spencer. "The apologists of utilitarian selection (such as 
Spencer) think they know what are the favorable circumstances for evolution, but they do not 
acknowledge the importance of Evilf' (FP 1881, Il [67] = KSA 9, 11[43]. [Author's translation]). 
210 GS, §4. 
211 GS, §l. 
212 FP 1881,6[456]. 
213 GS, §4. 
214 GS, §4. 
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should therefore be treated in a like manner. As 1 have already demonstrated, in 
Nietzsche's view, the creation of new values, which are not originally determined to 
be "good," is most often accompanied by harmful behavior required to instill new 
habits and evaluations though compulsion and constraint. Consequently, the present 
value of altruism does not necessarily imply that it was originally useful and it is 
probable that it was not first experienced as useful and expedient, but rather as 
harmful and inexpedient.215 Spencer's moral doctrine was "erroneous" because 
through his ideas' one-sided affirmation of tradition displayed in his preference for 
altruistic conduct, he had confused morality's present utility with its origin.216 
Nietzsche had been discussing the role and value of altruism since Human, ail too 
Human, and as 1 have shown, he was unable to equate altruism with any original 
utility. Here, in reading Spencer, he further entrenched his position. However, he did 
not limit his criticism to the moral predicates themselves as he had previously, he 
now extended it to encompass aIl the evolutionary edifice Spencer had built and, in so 
doing, started to distance himself from Darwinism. 
The extension of Nietzsche's criticism beyond the scope of morality is 
testified to by his reappraisal of the importance of pleasure and displeasure. As we 
have seen, he had previously endorsed the idea that the opposition between pleasure 
and displeasure was of cardinal importance for evolution. Now, after reading The 
Data of Ethics, he makes the argument that the appearance of something new, 
interpreted as "evil," has its equivalent in the feeling of displeasure. Novelty is first 
experienced as an impediment to pleasure before becoming pleasurable.217 This 
displeasure, says Nietzsche as he was further distancing himself from Spencer, does 
215 A point that Nietzsche made in Human, ail too human. See section 2.1.5. above .. 
216 FP 1879-1880, 1[106]. 
217 FP 1881, 12[158]. 
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not necessarily indicate a misadaptation.2 \8 Although the emergence of something 
new is initially interpreted as displeasurable, over time it may become pleasurable.2\9 
Consequently, one may either seek "as /ittle displeasure as possible [ ... ] or as mueh 
displeasure as possible as the priee for the growth of an abundanee of subt/e 
pleasures and joys that have rarely been re/ished. "220 Since pain and displeasure are 
not necessarily a danger for the species, they may become beneficial over time.221 A 
new stimulus may be interpreted either as pleasure or displeasure because these 
attributes are not inherent to the object itself but depend solely on their 
interpretation.222 These sensations are therefore no longer the brute datum of 
evolution. Evolution is no longer understood as a unique scientific theory but, in 
Spencer's wake, has now become moral. By refusing the expediency of pleasurable 
experiences, Nietzsche undermined Spencer's account of moral evolution, and led him 
to understand the latter's evolutionary adaptation as a historical interpretation 
conditioned by a moral perspective. 
2.2.3. Utility as a Moral Interpretation 
We are now in a position to better understand Spencer's importance for 
Nietzsche's philosophy ofhistory. His discussion of the origin ofmorality, influenced 
by Rée, had led him to read The Data of Ethies, and in it he found an explanation for 
moral evolution that ran contrary to the position he had already developed in Human, 
ail too Human and Daybreak. Spencer's arguments for the expediency of altruism 
woke Nietzsche from his slumber and until the end of his career he unceasingly 
218 GS, §318. 
219 GS, §334. 
220 GS, §12. 
22\ GS, §318. 
222 GS, §127. 
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underlined the moral presuppositions implied in the English type of moral history. 
Spencer's importance for the development of Nietzsche's philosophy lay therefore in 
his disavowal of the Darwinian understanding of natural history. The history of 
evolution, as Nietzsche found itin The Data of Ethics, was not its explanation but a 
moral distortion of nature.223 The adequation hetween the good, the evolved and the 
adapted implied that the natural world was teleologically determined by traditional 
moral values. Because of Spencer's evolutionary goal of "permanently peaceful 
societies," the expediency of altruistic hehavior exemplified the "shadow of God"224 
lingering in nature after it had heen removed by science and justified the madman's 
cry: "'1 have come too early. "225 Moreover, it was not only moral phenomena that 
Spencer had descrihed as expedient and te1eological, but all organic life determined 
by the sensations of pleasure and displeasure also implied that the entire organic 
world was once again moraL This amalgamated morality and epistemology. "Ali 
experiences are moral experiences, even in the realm of sense perception.''226 
Tradition trains humans to behave in a determined manner and to perceive the world 
within the confines of an imposed perspective. Spencer, therefore, had simply 
reformulated the traditional understanding of humanity's relation to nature, and 
whereas Nietzsche had previously endorsed the Darwinian naturalization of life, his 
223 Nietzsche's equation between the English evolutionists and traditional morality is one of the most 
commonly cited arguments explaining Nietzsche's rejection of Spencer. See for example Jean Gayon, 
"Nietzsche and Darwin," p. 165; Dirk Robert Johnson "On the way to the 'Anti-Darwin'," p. 667-669; 
Lewis CalI "Anti-Darwin, Anti-Spencer: Friedrich Nietzsche's Critique of Darwin and 'Darwinism'" in 
History of Science. vol. 36 (1998), pp. 15-17; Barbara Stiegler. "Nietzsche lecteur de Darwin" p. 389; 
Paul J. M. van Tongeren "Nietzsche's Naturalism" in Nietzsche and the German Tradition. Nicholas 
Martin ed. (Peter Lang: New York, 2003), p. 209; Christoph Cox, Nietzshe, Naturalism and 
Interpretation (Berkeley: University ofCalifomai Press, 1999), pp. 223-229; Gregory Moore, 
"Nietzsche, Spencer, and the Ethics of Evolution," pp. 3-4. Patrick Wotling adds that Spencer and 
Darwin's apology for traditional Christian values was in part the result of the latters' minimal 
knowledge of non-Christian moralities ("La morale sans métaphysique," pp. 384-386). 
224 GS, §108. 
225 GS, §125. 
226 GS, §114. 
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reading of Spencer led him to reject any significance he had previously given to 
Darwinism. 
Following this reading, Nietzsche understood evolutionary utilitarianism as 
the affirmation of "herd" morality that was already prevalent throughout Europe.227 
"These historians of morality (mostly Englishmen) do not amount to much. Usually 
they themselves are quite unusually obedient to one particular morality [.]''228 As 
apologists of traditional morality, English moral historians defended the meek and 
average individuals that incorporate their evolutionary "ideal" of altruism.229 In this 
respect, Darwinism, as Nietzsche understood it, could not profess that evolution 
worked towards the advancement and progress of humanity because the herd does not 
contribute to the advancement of the species but to the preservation of a1ready 
established values.230 AIready in Human, al! too Human, he had argued that the 
affirmation of existing values was not conducive to evolution. The progressive 
development of a species passes through its weakest elements, a point he found 
important to restate in On the Genealogy of MoralsPI Therefore, what Nietzsche 
found in English evolutionary history was a reflection of the power of established 
morality and "certainly the very opposite of an examination, analysis, questioning, 
and vivisection of this faith.''232 The English use of utility as an explanatory principle 
for their origin of morality exemplifies how history is always revealed within the 
227 BGE, §201-202. 
228 GS, §345. See also FP 1887, 1O[7J: "'Darwinism' [ ... J is still the Christian presupposition and 
interpretation, living out ils afterlife." (WLN) 
229 Note the change in vocabuJary. In HH §224, these meek individuals weIl adapted to societies were 
labeled as strong. 
230 FP 1886-1887, 7[25J; 1888, 14[133J; 1888, 14[123]; Twilight of the !dols. tr. R.J. Hollingdale. 
''Expeditions of an Untimely Man" § 14. (Henceforth referred to as TI). See also the discussion of RH 
I, § 224, section 2.1.5. 
231 GMIT, §12. 
232 BGE, § 186. 
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confines of an already existing interpretation. Spencer had read Christian morality 
into evolution because that was the context ofhis knowledge ofmorality and history. 
We have now seen Nietzsche's hopes dashed by Spencer's moral evolution, 
and 1 can presently turn to his final comments about utility. His final rejection of 
moral utility was stated in On the Genealogy of MoraIs, where he warned against the 
temptation of developing a history of morality after the English fashion.233 He 
c1aimed that the "English type" of evolutionary history was "upside-down and 
perverse''234 because both Spencer and Rée had used utility to "seek out some 
'purpose' [ ... ] then guilelessly place[d] this purpose at the beginning as causa 
fiendi."235 Their explanatory inversion had little to do with the historical origin of 
morality. 
"However weil one has understood the utility of any physiological 
organ (or of a legal institution, a social custom, a political usage, a 
form in art or in a religious cult), this means nothing regarding its 
origin [.]"236 
Instead of being the explanation for morality's origin, their treatment of utility reflects 
their use and manipulation of the concept. "[W]hatever exists, having somehow come 
into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends[.]"237 The ascription of a use 
is not related to any historical goal or purpose and it may change independently of the 
object. Since utility was now merely purposive, rather than purposeful, Nietzsche 
could assert that "the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility [ ... ] lie 
worlds apart [.]"238 There is no necessary relation between something's utility and its 
origin. The opposition described here between origin and purpose had already been 
233 GM, Preface, §7. 
234 GM, Preface, §4. 
235 GM II, §12. 
236 GM II, §12; FP 1886-87,7[25]. 
237 GM II, §12. 
238 GM II, §12; FP 1886-1887,7[25]. 
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adumbrated in bis comments about the origin of altruism discussed in the first part of 
this chapter. As we saw there, altruism was described as the consequence of the 
formation of social groups, rather than their origin. Here, Nietzsche's opposition to 
the explanatory use ofutility exceeded the bounds of moral bistory. Spencer had gone 
one step further than Rée and drawn this idea to its logical consequence by deriving 
ail of evolution from it. 
Therefore, the identification of an evolutionary moral purpose does not 
describe anything about the object itself; it is a symptom of a particular morality. 
"There are no moral phenomena at ail, but only a moral interpretation of 
phenomena. ''239 As such, moral history does not expose the origins of morality as 
much as it assigns moral value to bistorical phenomena. The possibility of 
establishing a factual moral history is therefore doubtful. If Nietzsche is right, then all 
attempts to develop a bistory, no matter the subject, are doomed to reveal more about 
the author than the subject. Yet, this is not necessarily original. Already in bis Second 
Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche had rejected the idea of developing a bistory 
methodologically similar to any other science because bistory was there related to life 
rather than truth. What is significant here is bis complete rejection of the existence of 
bistorical facts. These had previously existed in bis Second Untime/y Meditation. His 
interrelation of bistorical and unhistorical forces did not create facts, but determined 
what should be included in the bistorical horizon and what should be discarded. This 
implicitly recognized the existence of bistorical phenomena. Here, in the late 1880s, 
Nietzsche clearly made the point that all phenomena are interpretations. The 
assimilation of the past, therefore, does not necessitate any falsification. The absence 
of any necessary causal or chronological relation implies that there is nothing to be 
239 BGE, § 108. 
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falsified.240 History is here an even greater creative construction than previously 
because even the material for the construction must be created. This is very important 
because he makes a break with his previous position that will he the foundation of his 
physiological philosophy ofhistory. 
2.2.4. Conclusion 
We have now seen that Nietzsche's project, hegun in Human, ail 100 Human, 
of developing a historical philosophy modeled on the English evolutionary historians, 
failed. Although Darwinism offered an alluring perspective on evolutionary history, 
which had first caught his eye in the late 1860s, his reading of Spencer demonstrated 
that this theory maintained moral presuppositions that were antithetical to his 
ambition. It was not, however, only these presuppositions that he rejected, but more 
importantly evolution's absurd pretension to truth. This can be drawn from a reductio 
argument he made in Beyond Good and Evil. The argument goes as follows: if our 
body is understood as part of the world by virtue of its materiality, then our sense 
organs as parts of the body and through which we know the world, would also he 
parts of the world. These organs would therefore he their own cause. And, if we reject 
the notion of causa sui, we must also reject the idea that the organs cause the world. 
Therefore, these organs cannot serve as the foundation for our understanding of the 
world in the idealist sense because they themselves are subject to the same conditions 
as our knowledge of the world.241 AlI that we "know" is the product of the sense's 
interpretation of external stimuli. 
240 Alexander, Nehamas. "The Genealogy of Genealogy: Interpretation in Nietzsche's Second Untimely 
Meditation and in On the Genealogy of Marals." in Nietzsche, Genea/ogy, Morality: Essays on 
Nietzsche's Genealogy of MoraIs. Richard Schacht ed. (Berkeley: University ofCalifomia Press, 1994), 
pp. 275, 282. 
241 BGE, §15. 
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Now, in the perspective we have been examining, the same argument applies 
to the theory of evolution. If all moral evaluations are the product of evolution, and if, 
as 1 have read Nietzsche, English evolutionary theory is a moral evaluation, then this 
theory of evolution is the product of evolution. This is obviously the same circular 
argument as above, and therefore we can conclude that the theory of evolution is, 
according to Nietzsche, incapable of fully accounting for the development of the 
world. We may, however, draw a further conclusion from this: there is no all-
encompassing theory of history that can completely account for every phenomenon. 
This is the sense that Michel Foucault gave to Nietzsche's philosophy of history in 
Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.242 In it, he argued that the tension in Nietzsche's 
discussion of history between Human, ail too Human and On the Genealogy of 
MoraIs stems from his progressive rejection ofa "meta-historical deployment ofideal 
significations and indefinite teleologies, "243 which eventually led him to the rejection 
of the "se arch for 'origins '. "244 The existence of origins had been a tempting prospect 
because they would have allowed reducing particular phenomena to their original 
manifestation, thus dispelling metaphysics' inflated esteem of itself. However, what 
Nietzsche discovered in his reading of Spencer was that there are no unequivocal 
origins, but rather a disparity that is transformed into an origin through the 
interpretation of this disparity.245 The search for origins is always historically 
conditioned and cannot serve as the basis for a historical philosophy nor for a 
philosophy ofhistory. 
242 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in Nietzsche: Critical Assessments vol. III. On 
Morality and the Order of Rank. ed. Daniel W. Conway and Peter S. Groff. (New York: Routledge, 
1998), pp. 61-78. 
243 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," p. 61. 
244 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," p. 61. 
245 Foucault, ''Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," p. 63. 
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We may therefore conc1ude from this that Nietzsche was not Darwinian. As l 
have shown in this chapter, his reading of Rée and Spencer led him to renounce the 
English type of moral history. However, this was not done because it had any 
particular logical or scientific flaw, which he attempted to remedy with his own 
theory of evolution as sorne have suggested.246 Nietzsche's reading of Spencer led him 
to develop a physiological philosophy of history that did not pretend to describe 
anything about the nature of organic evolution or make a metaphysical comment 
about the past. As l will show in the next chapter, the importance of the historical 
disparity that Foucault mentioned, and the absence of any historical facts, led him to 
interpret history through the body and develop a physiological philosophy ofhistory. 
246 See for example John Richardson, Nietzsche New Darwinism. (Oxford: Oxford Universty Press, 
2004), pp. 64-65. 
Chapter Three: Physiology and History 
Part 1: Physiology 
3.1.1 Inner Processes and the Milieu 
ln the two previous chapters, we have followed the graduaI development of 
Nietzsche's philosophy of history, which was associated to his exposure and reading 
of the nascent evolutionary sciences. In the tirst chapter, we saw how F. A. Lange 
influenced Nietzsche's dysteleological understanding of the world that was integrated 
into bis formaI discussion of history, and which allowed him to detine history, in 
opposition to science, as a creative retrospection. In the second chapter, we saw that 
Nietzsche's exposure to Darwinism through Paul Rée and Herbert Spencer led him to 
argue that Darwinian evolutionary history was a moral interpretation of the natural 
world and 1 deduced from this that Nietzsche did not favor an understanding of 
history that left any room for all-encompassing explanations and relegated historical 
facts to a secondary role. 1 will now explicate the development of Nietzsche's 
physiological interpretation of history through his reading of the German biologist 
Wilhelm Roux. 
During the late 1 880s, Nietzsche wrote a series of notes criticizing the 
Darwinian explanation for human and animal evolution.247 In the note entitled 
247 See FP 1886-1887, 7(25] "Against Darwinism"; FP 1888, 14[123] "Anri-Darwin"; FP 1888, 
14(133] "Anti-Darwin" and TI, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man" §14. 
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"Against Darwinism,"248 he contested the importance ~at he thought Darwin and his 
supporters gave to extemal circumstances. 
"Darwin absurdly overestimates the influence of 'external 
circumstances '; the essential thing about the life process is precisely 
the tremendous force which shapes, creates forms from within, which 
utilizes and exploits 'external circumstances' [.]"249 
Stressing the importance of the organism's adaptation to its environment, one 
"overlooks the essential priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form~ 
giving forces that give new interpretations and directions[.]"25o Rather than 
understanding the formation of organisms through a series of selections carried out by 
forces operating on it from the outside, he argued for the preeminence of inner 
processes over extemal circumstances. Yet, "the 'external world' consists in a sum of 
valuations [and] must stand in some kind of relation to the conditions of existence, 
but by no means that of being true, or exact "251 Nietzsche was arguing that an 
organism's environment is not alone in determining its survival: the organism's 
relation with its milieu is itself determined by the former's ability to let the latter 
affect it. Therefore, he did not dispute the validity of ascribing importance to extemal 
248 FP 1886-1887, 7[25]. 
249 FP 1886-1187, 7[25] (WLN). It is worth noting that Barbara Stiegler (Nietzsche et la biologie, p. 
96) argues that it was Haeckel that was targeted in this passage. She traces the confusion between 
Haeckel and Darwin to Nietzsche's reading of Carl von Nigeli who would have misunderstood Darwin 
and equated him with Haeckel (Nietzsche et la biologie, p. 96 nl). However, she also claims that 
Niètzsche never actually read Haeckel, but due to his prominence in the biological and social debates 
of Imperial Germany it is most probable that Nietzsche was weil acquainted with the ideas and 
arguments ofthis important disseminator ofDarwinian ideas. (Nietzsche et la biologie, p. 58). For 
more on Haeckel and Darwinism see Alfred Kelly, The Descent of Darwin: the Popularization of 
Darwinism in Germany, /860-/9/4. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 22-
35; Gregory Moore, Nietzsche Biology and Metaphor, pp. 40-42; Judy Johns Schloegel and Henning 
Schmidgen, "General Physiology, Experimental Psychology, and Evolutionism: Unicellular Organisms 
as objects ofPsychophysiological Research, 1877-1918." in Isis. vol. 93, no. 4 (2002), pp. 622-624; 
Paul Weindling "Theories of the Cell State in Imperial Germany" in Charles Webster ed. Bi%gy, 
Medicine and Society /840-/940, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 99-155. 
250 GM Il, § 12. 
251 FP 1885,34[247]. (WLN) 
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factors, but argued for the primacy of the processes that operate from within the 
organism. 
As 1 will now argue in this chapter, this appreciation of inner processes, or of 
physiological mediation, served as the basis for Nietzsche's physiological philosophy 
of history. This chapter will therefore explicate how, in the mid-I880s, Nietzsche's 
reading of Wilhelm Roux led him to use the body physiological (Leib) as a metaphor 
for the intellect, which 1 will exploit and extend to history. This extension will allow 
me to demonstrate how history mediates the past and allows a determined number of 
events, peoples and places to act on the subject and incite their interpretation. 
However, this assimilation will not be predicated on a passive reception of the past 
but will be shown to be conditional on past interpretations. 1 will understand this as 
meaning that history is not a passive retrospective interpretation, but rather an active 
appropriation of the past, which is the condition of future interpretations. To 
demonstrate history's physiological mediation of the past, 1 will divide this chapter 
into two parts. This tirst part will discuss the preeminent influence on Nietzsche's 
understanding of physiology: the German embryologist Wilhelm Roux. 1 will then put 
his reception of Roux into context and give an account of his reading using his notes. 
In the second part, 1 will argue that the most important effect that Roux had on 
Nietzsche was in the latter's metaphorical understanding of the body, which 1 will use 
to explain why his understanding of history is philosophically determined by 
physiology. 
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3.1.2 Wilhelm Roux's Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus 
It was in the early 1880s that Nietzsche read Wilhelm Roux's (1850-1934) Der 
Kampf der Theile im Organismus (1881).252 In it, Roux argued that the development 
of organic bodies, and their apparent purposefulness, had not been adequately 
explained by Darwin's theory. He argued that Darwin had only stressed the 
importance of organisms' interaction with external conditions through the mechanics 
of inter-individual competition.253 Roux's avowed intention in writing Der Kampf der 
Theile im Organismus was not to replace Darwin's theory, but to supplement the work 
of previous evolutionary scientists by describing the self-formation of the purposeful 
(Selbstgesbltung des Zweckmassigen).254 He sought to explain the development of 
purposeful physiological components of the body without having recourse to any 
form of teleology.255 His theory described the important causal relations between 
cells, organs and tissues, which he came to caU developmental mechanics 
(Entwicklungsmechanik). He defined the mechanics as "the ascertainment of the 
formative forces or energies. "256 The term itself was absent from his first book, Der 
Kampf der Theile im Organismus, but it was in it that he first investigated the 
252 Wilhelm Roux. Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus: ein Beitrag zur Vervollstandigung der 
Mechanischen Zweckmassigkeitslehre. Leipzig: Engelmann (1881). Henceforth referred to Kampf der 
Theile. AlI references to Roux are based on the translation 1 prepared with Bettina Bergo. 
253 Roux, Kampf der Theile, p. 236. 
254 Roux, Kampf der Theile, p. 27, 236. Barbara Stiegler, Nietzsche et la biologie, pp. 49-51. After the 
publication of Kampf der Theile, a copy was sent to Darwin who reacted quite positively to it. "As far 
as 1 can imperfectly judge, it is the most important book on Evolution which has appeared for some 
time." (Charles Darwin, The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, including a biographical chapter, vol. 
3. ed. Francis Darwin (London: John Murray, 1887), p. 244. 
255 Christian J Emden, Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body. (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 2005), p. 139. One should note however that Wolfgang Müller-Lauter describes how one 
Roux's colleagues, Hans Driesch, claimed that Roux's account of the development of the organism was 
teleological. See Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, philosophy of Contradictions and Contradictions ofhis 
Philosophy, pp. 173-174. 
256 Wilhelm Roux. "The Problems, Methods, and Scope ofDevelopmental Mechanics" in Jane 
Maienschen ed. Defining Biology: Lectures from the 1890s. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1986), p. 108. 
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"trophic effects of functional stimuli, ''257 which are the strengthening of a ceIl, tissue, 
or organ through functional excitation that incites an overcompensation of expended 
material and fortifies the organism's capacity to assimilate nutrients. It was these 
effects that were important for Nietzsche's philosophy. 
According to Roux, organic purposefulness is the result of an inner struggle 
between the various parts (Theile) of the body caused, in both the embryonic and 
post-embryonic stages of development, by the continuai appearance of small organic 
variations that struggle for survival against older and already established parts.258 As a 
part grows, it consumes nutrients and occupies space to the detriment of the other 
parts of the organism. It is the parts that can assimilate the most material and 
regenerate the fastest that are victorious and are able to survive and grow. The 
strengthening of one part at the expense of another is the result of its increasing 
capacity to assimilate nourishment. This ultimately leads to one part dominating 
another part and ascribing a function to il, which regulates the organism allowing the 
emergence of purposive behavior. Roux's understanding of organisms therefore 
develops two important characteristics, namely assimilation and self-regulation. 
The first essential property of the organic described by Roux is the 
overcompensatory assimilation of expended material (Uebercompensation des 
Verbrauchen).259 The assimilation of nutrients is provoked by functional excitations 
or stimuli (junctionellen Reiz) exterior to the cell or organ that act as incitements to 
assimilation.26o The excitations' effect is pre-determined by the cell's inner state, 
which amounts to there being no passive feeding.261 It is only once excited that the 
part expends its accumulated energy, which is then replenished by assimilating 
257 Roux, "Development Mechanics", p. 112. 
258 Roux, Kampf der Theile, p. 237. 
259 Roux, Kampf der Theile, p. 238. 
260 Roux, Kampf der Theile, pp. 160-161. 
261 Roux, Kampfder Theile, p. 163. 
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nutrients. However, the assimilation and replacement of expended energy is not 
proportional to the expenditure; a cell, tissue, or organ does not simply compensate 
losses incurred when functionally excited, but assimilates more than required to 
regenerate itself. When a part thus overcompensates its losses, its growth and spatial 
expansion progresses.262 However, functional stimuli are more than the cause of 
assimilation, they also fortify the part's ability to assimilate material.263 An increase in 
functional stimulation is accompanied by an increase in the ability to assimilate. 
Consequently, a highly stimulated part grows faster than a less stimulated part 
because it assimilates (or intussuscepts) more material. Thus, as a part's ability to be 
excited increases, its size increases accordingly. Therefore there is an important 
relation between a part's ability to be affected and its ability to grow. 
The second essential property of the organic is self-regulation 
(Selbstregulation) through the struggle of partS.264 The expansion and strengthening 
of a part leads to a struggle between the various organic components of the body. It is 
this struggle that regulates and organizes the organism. When a part of the organism 
grows by overcompensation it consumes assimilable material at the expense of its 
neighbors and a competition then ensues for what resources are available. Struggle, 
therefore, is the consequence of an inequality between the various parts of the 
organism.265 However, this struggle works not only towards the elimination ofweaker 
elements, but more importantly, to an inner harmony and morphological equilibrium, 
which gives physiological significance to the various parts of the body.266 Essentially, 
self-regulation is the result of a weaker part being transformed into the function of a 
262 Roux, Kampf der Theile, p. 161. See also Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, philosophy of Contradictions 
and Contradictions ofhis Philosophy, p. 169. 
263 Roux, Kampf der Theile, p. 160. 
264 Roux, Kampf der Theile, pp. 239-240. 
265 Roux, Kampf der Theile, p.69. 
266 Roux, Kampfder Theile, p. 237. 
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stronger part,267 which produces struggle-processes (Processen der KampfJ that are 
only then selected in the struggle with external circumstances.268 Thus, Roux's 
counter-intuitive account of the unequal and agonistic relation between parts leads not 
to extinction and destruction, but to harmony and strength by working towards the 
fonnation of the body's purposeful structure. 269 
Roux's supplement to the already existing biological theories of evolution is 
therefore based on the instability of the struggle between the parts of the organism. 
Functional excitation incites the part to assimilate nutrients and overcompensate the 
incurred loss, which fortifies a part's ability to assimilate material and propels its 
growth. Consequently, a highly stimulated part grows faster than a less stimulated 
one. Furthennore, as one part gets stronger, another is weakened and a competition 
between the various organic components of the body for resources and space then 
ensues. Through this struggle, there develops an equilibrium resulting from one part 
subordinating another that structures and determines the organism's morphology. 
Thus, Roux was able to describe without recourse to any extraneous teleology how 
the organism structures and detennines itself through the inequality of its 
components. 
3.1.3 Nietzsche and the Importance of Physiology 
Having now described the essential elements of Roux's theory on the 
development of organic purposefulness, 1 will now turn my attention to Nietzsche's 
267 It is relatively unclear how Roux imagined this consequence of the struggle of parts. Barbara 
Stiegler (Nietzsche et la biologie. [Paris: PUF, 2001], p. 56) argues that the resulting auto-regulation of 
the organism points not to the destruction and negation of the other, but rather to the affirmation of the 
differences within the body. Wolfgang Müller-Lauter (Nietzsche: Ms Philosophy of Contradictions and 
the Contradictions ofhis Philosophy, p. 169) argues that in Roux's accounts of the direct struggle 
"newly appearing qualifies win out over old ones by destroying and assimilating them." Unfortunately, 
neither gives any textual reference to substantiate their claims. 
268 Roux, Kampf der Theile, pp. 237-238. 
269 Roux, Kampf der Theile, pp. 163-164. 
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reading of Roux.27o However, before discussing Nietzsche's reading notes, 1 wish to 
briefly put his reception of these ideas into context. Although he did not read Roux 
until 1881,271 the importance of physiology had already started to dawn on him in 
1880 as he was writing Daybreak. In it, he speculated that the source for moral 
evaluations was only incompletely known. By relating morality to physiology, he was 
able to underline our imperfect knowledge of the human subject. "However far a man 
may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his image of 
the totality of drives which constitute his being. "272 In a note from the same period,273 
Nietzsche argued that moral reason, with which we justify our actions, is the product 
of this incomplete hypothesis and what the subject consciously knows are only 
epiphenomena. The recognition of the possible abysmal depths of human psychology 
led him to question whether "our moral judgments and evaluations [ ... ] are only 
images and fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us, a kind of 
acquired language for designating certain nervous stimuli?''274 Our conSClOUS 
reactions to these drives would be "a more or less fantastic commentary on an 
270 Nietzsche's reading of Roux was most probably tirst done in 1881, and repeated in 1883. Wolfgang 
Müller-Lauter developed a Iist of ail the fragments that can be linked to Roux. See Müller-Lauter, 
Nietzsche, Contradictions ofhis Philosophy and his Philosophy of Contradictions, p. 163 n13 & n14. 
See also Müller-Lauter, Physiologie de la Volonté de Puissance. tr. J. Champoux (paris: Allia, 1998), 
pp. 117-118 n 13 & n 14. However, as already noted in the preceding chapter, the fragments contained 
in notebook Il (M III) of vol. 5 of the French translation ofNietzsche's collective works does not have 
the same fragment numbering as in the KSA. Therefore, 1 will give both the Fragments Posthumes 
numbering and its correspondent numbering in the KSA when necessary. 
One should note that this was not his only reading in biology during this period. Thomas Brobjer 
lists, along with Roux, Michael Foster's A Textbook of Physiology (1877, published in German as 
Lehrbuch der Physiologie, 1881); William Rolph's Biologische Probleme, zugleich ais Versuch zur 
Entwicklung einer rationellen Ethik (1884); Karl von Nageli's Mechanisch-physiologische Theorie der 
Abstammungslehre (1884) and others. See Brobjer, Thomas. ''Nietzsche's Reading and Knowledge of 
Natural Science: an Overview" in T. Brobjer and G. Moore eds. Nietzsche and Science. (Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2004), pp. 38-44. 
271 Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, Contradictions ofhis Philosophy and his Philosophy of Contradictions, 
p. 163 n13. 
272 D, § 119. 
273 FP 1880,6 [365} 
274 D, § 119. 
84 
unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text [.]''275 Self-knowledge, and by extension 
knowledge of human motivations, would therefore always be incomplete because our 
drives essentially do nothing more than "interpret nervous stimuli, "276 which lay 
hidden under the veil of consciousness. "[W]e are accustomed to exclude ail these 
unconscious processes /rom the· accounting and to reflect on the preparation for an 
act only to the extent that it is conscious[.]"277 The possible physiological origin 
al ways lies hidden from our conscious deliberation and is easily ignored or refused. 
These interpretations of nervous stimuli amount to a selection in which one 
drive gains ascendancy over another drive. "[T]his entire procedure of the intellect is 
only the blind instrument of another drive which is a rival of the drive whose 
vehemence is tormenting us [.]"278 The intellect has learned to listen to one drive and 
ignore another and it is only when a drive bas been put into relation with previously 
evaluated drives that it is given value. 
"[I]t acquires [value] as its second nature, only when it enters into 
relations with drives already baptized good or evi/ or is noted as a 
quality of beings the people have already evaluated and determined in 
a moral sense. "279 
It is therefore not through a rational and conscious decision that a drive is given 
meaning. Although it may be that the human subject rationally evaluates the drive, 
this evaluation is nothing other than interpreting it by putting it in context. 
Consequently, the intellect is here described as a superficial phenomenon determined 
by an inner struggle between multiplicities of competing drives. 
It is important to note here that Nietzsche essentially transferred his 
philological language to physiology. His discussion of the relation between the 
275D,§119. 
276 D, § 119. 
277 D, § 129. 
278 D, § 109. 
279 D, § 38. 
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intellect and its affects was here cautiously described as being "ail metaphors."280 
These metaphors rest on the complexity and the indeterminacy of physiological drives 
that are interpreted by the intellect as text.281 The intellect reads its affects as a text 
and attempts to interpret its meaning. However, beneath this reading there is a sub-
text determined by the struggle between the various drives. The reason for discussing 
this passage is to illustrate how Nietzsche already had a vague grasp of an inner 
struggle operating beneath the veil of consciousness and had aIready identified the 
importance and fertility of a physiological description of unknown and unconscious 
processes. But more importantly, he described the relation between the intellect and 
the body as an interpretation. His reading of Roux, to which 1 will now turn, was 
therefore not uniquely directed toward gaining greater knowledge of physiological 
processes.282 The existence of a sub-text on which the intellect's interpretation is 
unknowingly based will return following his reading of Roux and play an important 
role in his physiological philosophy ofhistory. 
3.1.4 Nietzsche and the Inner Struggle 
We have now seen that prior to his reading of Roux, Nietzsche had already 
recognized the possibility that the human subject has an incomplete knowledge of 
itself. 1 will now give an account of his reading of Roux using his notes as a guide, 
which will serve as the basis for my discussion of Roux's effect on his philosophy. 
The purpose of this section is not to repeat what 1 have already mentioned while 
discussing Roux, but to indicate where Nietzsche adopted Roux's ideas and where he 
280 D, § 119. 
281 D, § 119. 
282 Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, Contradictions ofhis Philosophy and his Phi/osophy of Contradictions, 
p. 167; Christian J. Emden, Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness and the Body, p. 87. 
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adapted them. 1 will also include elements pertaining to his developing knowledge of 
physiology crucial for our understanding ofhis metaphoric interpretation of the body. 
Nietzsche began his commentary of Roux's ideas by defming the inner 
struggle as the agonistic relation between the cells, tissues, organs, and organisms.283 
Beginning at the cellular level, which is the most basic physiological level of the 
organism,284 the struggle develops throughout the body in such a way that all parts 
having a sunilar function in the organism are perpetually on guard against those of a 
like kind.285 Cells struggle against cells and tissues against tissues and so on. And, as 
with Roux's account, the inner struggle is primarily for food and space.286 It is orny 
once a part has gained the se resources at the expense of its neighbors that a struggle 
ensues. 
Nietzsche had already recognized the importance of cellular excitation, but 
here in his reading, he discovered its importance for the development of the inner 
organic struggle.287 However, un1ike Roux who narrowly defined it as functional 
excitation, Nietzsche broadly understood it as the reception of something foreign into 
the cell, tissue or organ, which leads the part to assimilate it to itself. Thus, un1ike 
Roux, excitation was not necessarily liked to a part's function within the organism. 
Therefore, ail stimuli act trophically by inciting the assimilation of what is foreign.288 
Nietzsche gave the example of the appearance of a parasite in the body that obliges it 
to grow around it by developing its capillary system. Thus stimulated by the parasite, 
283 FP 1881, 11 [199] = KSA 9, 11[128]. It should be noted that Müller-Lauter misidentifies this 
passage. It is numbered KSA 9, Il [28] when it should be as it is above. 
284 FP 1881, 11[201] = KSA 9, 11[130]. 
285 FP 1881, 11[206] = KSA 9, 11[134]. 
286 FP 1881, 11[204] = KSA 9, 11[132]; 1883,7[86]. 
287 Sec FP 1872-1873, 19[209]; [210]Barbara Stiegler argues that excitation was an important 
development of the nascent cellular theory. Rudolph Virchow and Claude Bernard had aIready 
described the importance of excitation for cellular assimilation. See Stiegler, Nietzsche et la Biologie, 
pp. 30·36; also Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, Contradictions of his Philosophy and his Philosophy of 
Contradictions, p. 177. 
288 FP 1884,25[325]. This note is misidentified by Stiegler, p. 34. 
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the body responds by assimilating it to itself.289 His description of excitation is not 
only important because it generalizes Roux's concept, but also because it implies that 
assimilation is not only limited to food but also to potential dangers. Assimilation, 
therefore, is a defense mechanism that neutralizes potential threats to it organization 
and survival. 
Unlike cellular excitation, overcompensatory assimilation was one of the 
essential elements that Nietzsche discovered in bis reading of Roux.290 Following 
Roux, he understood assimilation as the overcompensation of incurred losses.291 
Here, Nietzsche again extended the tenor of Roux's concept as literally designating 
the process by wbich something foreign is rendered similar to the receiving body.292 
Added to bis generalized version of excitation, assimilation became the attempt to 
overcompensate the presence of something foreign by rendering as much of it as 
possible similar to the receiving body. However, Roux was not alone in bringing 
Nietzsche to the conclusion that assimilation operates by overcompensation. In 1884, 
Nietzsche acquired a book by William Rolph, an obscure Anglo-German zoologist, 
entitled Biologische Probleme (1884).293 As with Roux, Rolph's major idea was that 
life does not seek to compensate for its losses in the struggle of existence, but 
insatiably assimilates more nutrients. Essentially, Rolph's theory was that endosmosis 
predominates over exosmosis.294 The cells' intake of nutriments exceeds the amount it 
expends. Rolph's influence can be perceived in Nietzsche's daim that nourishment is 
"a consequence of insatiable appropriation [.]"295 Cells, and the other parts of the 
289 FP 1883,7[197]. 
290 Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, Contradictions ofhis Philosophy and his Philosophy of Contradictions, 
pp. 163, 169; Gregory Moore, Nietzsche, Bi%gy and Metaphor, p. 37; Stiegler, Nietzsche et /a 
biologie, p. 30. 
291 FP 1881, Il [206] = KSA 9.11[134]. 
292 FP 1883,7[33]; FP 1887, 5[65]; FP 1885,41[11]; FP 1884,26[448). 
293 Moore, Nietzsche, Bi%gy and Metaphor, p.47. 
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organism, assimilate more than what is needed to compensate the losses incurred 
through excitation. As with Roux, this leads to growth and competition for space 
within the organism. 
However, unlike Roux, Rolph extended this insatiable appropriation to 
explain not only cellular growth but also cellular division and conjugation. Cellular 
conjugation is the consequence of scarcity, which leads two cellular organisms to 
form one.296 Cellular division, on the other hand, is the result of the cell's exceedingly 
abundant nourishment that it cannot assimilate properly and must then divide into 
twO.297 Since it is the excitation that provokes an overcompensatory assimilation or 
insatiable appropriation, it is the most strongly excited parts that grow stronger.298 
The less excited parts must then combine with other cells through cellular 
conjugation. Thus the ability to be excited is of paramount importance in the growth 
and development of the organism. 299 The easily excited cells produce more progeny, 
and the less stimulated shrink in number and do not reproduce. 
Cellular conjugation is important for Nietzsche's rendering of the self-
formation of the purposeful. Through overcompensation, which stimulates growth, 
the various parts come into direct contact, which leads to the domination of one part 
over another.300 Nietzsche would later described this as the formation of an 
"aristocracy of cells[.]"301 The weaker part that is unable to secure enough 
nourishment reacts to the growth of the stronger part by conjugating itselfto it. Faced 
with an expanding and strengthening neighbor, a part can either perish or link itselfto 
a stronger one. The weaker part must therefore adapt to the stronger,302 and through 
296 Moore, Nietzsche, Bi%gy and Metaphor, p. 48. 
297 Moore, Nietzsche, Bi%gy and Metaphor, pp. 48-49, Stiegler, Nietzsche et /a biologie, pp. 75-76. 
298 FP 1883, 7[95]. 
299 FP 1883, 7[95][86]. 
300 FP 1883, 7[95]; [93]. 
301 FP 1885,40[42]; 1885-1886,2[76]. (WLN). 
302FP 1881, 11[204]=KSA9, 11[132]. 
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its adaptation, it becomes a function of the stronger and serves it needs.303 But these 
weaker parts must themse1ves dominate other parts because it is only in such a 
relation that the stronger part will allow it to exist as a function.304 The domination of 
one part serves the needs of another.305 Ultimately an "aristocracy" is established 
between the various parts that serves the whole organism. 
Se1f-regulation by domination and coercion is another important element that 
Nietzsche found in Roux.306 Without self-regulation the organism could perish.307 If 
the various parts did not submit to each other according to their strengths, the 
organism would be constantly tom apart by its inner struggle and could therefore not 
exist as a whole. The ''functiona/ auto-structuration of the most appropriate force 
re/ations"308 proceeds from the alliances fonned between the various parts of the 
organism. Through the process of domination, there develop alliances serving the 
various parts' needs.309 According to Nietzsche, a strong part requires the cooperation 
of the weaker part, and vice-versa. 
"In how far obeying a/so invo/ves resisting; the obeyer by no means 
gives up its own power. Likewise, in commanding there is a concession 
that the opponent's abso/ute power has not been vanquished, not 
incorporated, disso/ved. "310 
The hierarchy of the organism's constituent parts requires both the subordination of 
the weaker elements and the stronger parts' recognition that they cannot maintain their 
position without the cooperation of their weaker counterparts.311 Since the weaker 
303 FP 1881, 11[206] = KSA 9,11[134]. 
304 FP 1881, 11[206] = KSA 9, 11[134]. 
305 FP 1881, 11[341] = KSA 9,11[284]. 
306 FP 1884,26[272]. Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, Contradictions ofhis Philosophy and his Philosophy 
of Contradictions, p. 174. Stiegler, Nietzsche et la biologie, p. 50-51. 
307 FP 1883,7[190]. 
308 FP 1883, 7[190]. Author's translation. 
309 FP 1883, 7[94]. 
310 FP 1885,36[21]. (WLN) 
311 FP 1885,25[430]. See also FP 1881, 11[341] = KSA 9, 11[284]. 
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elements are subordinated to the stronger ones and serve as a function of the latter, 
the strong are dependent on their weaker counterparts because they require the 
fonner' s cooperation in order to carry out the function demanded of them by their 
own masters.312 Thus there is a reciprocal relation between qualitatively different 
parts of the organism and a balance of forces is reached within it. The stronger 
domina te the weaker, but the latter is not necessarily vanquished and completely 
assimilated to the stronger; it has only been rendered as similar as possible, which 
does not mean that it has been completely transfonned into a part of its master. There 
is a tension that remains in the organism between the competing parts and acts as the 
possibility of future excitations. This tension can be affected and may result in the 
transfonnation of the organism's hierarchy. 
Ultimately this reciprocal relation between the various parts of the organism is 
related to its extemal environment. Through its interaction with the extemal world a 
part becomes useful in the Darwinian sense. "[F]or the longest time while a quality is 
developing, if does not preserve or prove useful to the organism [ ... ] but in the 
struggle of parts, it won't be long before a new form begins to relate to a partial 
usefulness [.]"313 The utility of an organ, or any other part of the organism, is not 
immediately detennined by its possible use. The organism does not produce new parts 
because it has need of them; rather, because there are new parts that may be used, a 
purpose is assigned to them by a stronger more vigorous part. These newly conjugated 
parts are only then selected by extemal conditions and their utility in the 'struggle for 
existence' is also detennined. 
Thus, Nietzsche's reading notes testify to the importance that he gave to Roux. 
He noted the importance of excitation that leads to overcompensation, which he also 
312 FP 1885,34[123]. 
313 FP 1886-1887, 7[25]. (WLN); GM Il, §12. 
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found in Rolph's writings. The combination of these two biologists allowed him to 
portray the auto-structuration of the organism as the result of the conjugation of 
weaker cells to stronger ones. The aristocracy of cells that is produced structures the 
organism's purposefulness in its relation to its milieu. But there is a further element to 
Nietzsche's understanding of the organic that will be important for his physiological 
philosophy ofhistory. 
Nietzsche's philosophical use of physiology reintroduced memory to his 
discussion of history by way of the organic. He claimed that by following the body as 
a guide it could be possible to gain a better representation of memory.314 
Fundamentally, memory distinguishes the organic from the inorganic.315 The essential 
distinguishing point is that the inorganic has no past.316 "Ali that is organic 
distinguishes itself from what is inorganic inasmuch as it accumulates 
experiences."317 Although inorganic material may be organized in many different 
ways, it does not retain its previous structures as a part of itself. In contradistinction to 
inorganic material, organic life has the capacity to accumulate traces of its past 
organization. However, Nietzsche did not regard this accumulation of experiences as 
necessarily passive. This active accumulation of experiences may in part be due to 
Roux's description of the organism's intussusceptive ability predicated on the ceU's 
inner conditions, which meant that there was no passive feeding. But it was not Roux 
that overtly disputed the passivity of organic memory. In 1886, Nietzsche read Carl 
314 FP 1884,26[374]. 
315 Nietzsche stated that there is no inorganic world (FP 1885,34[247]). The distinction between the 
organic and the inorganic was not particular to Nietzsche. Although Roux does not discuss memol)', 
using memol)' to distinguish the organic from the inorganic was common in nineteenth century bio10gy. 
As Barbara Stiegler argues, this distinction can be brought back at 1east to the work of Ernst Haeckel 
(Nietzsche et la biologie, p. 58ft). 
316 FP 1881, 12[225] = KSA 9, 12[15]. 
317 FP 1883, 12[31]. (Authors's translation). It should be noted that there is a translation error in the 
Fragments posthumes. The flTSt phrase should read: "Tout ce qui est organic se distingue de ce qui est 
inorganique .... " rather than: " ... ce qui est organique .... " The German reads Anorganischen (KSA 10, 
12[31]). 
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von Nageli's Mechanish-phyiologische Theorie der Abstammungsglehre (1884) that 
argued that a cell's ability to feed was conditioned on the idioplasma that regulated the 
cell's assimilation.318 "[T]he plasma assimilates and absorbs into Us forms what it 
continuously appropriates[.]"319 The cell's assimilation of nutrition is dependent on 
its ability 10 shape what it takes in on the forms already present in its plasma Thus, 
even in the organic process of assimilation, Nietzsche perceived the importance of 
memory. Organisms do not passively assimila te what is external to them but force the 
exterior to take on forms that are already contained within it. This will be important 
for Nietzsche's understanding of consciousness. 
We may now better appreciate the importance of Nietzsche's reading of 
Wilhelm Roux's Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus. In it, he discovered a 
description of the organism that he had not seen in any of his previous readings. 
Following his reading of Roux, Nietzsche understood organisms as determined not by 
their milieu, but by their parts' ability 10 he affected by external excitations to which 
these parts responded by an overcompensatory assimilation. Assimilation was 
described as leading to the growth of the parts and eventually to a struggle between 
the unequally developed components of the body. This struggle then led to some parts 
dominating other parts, and resulted in the formation of a self-regulating hierarchy 
within the organism. However, as has been shown, Roux was not the only influence 
on his understanding of the organic, both Rolph and Nageli also contributed to it. 
To the organic capacity for excitation, assimilation and regulation, Nietzsche 
added the ability to retain past forms. These four elements are the basis for 
Nietzsche's physiological understanding of history. 1 will now use this discussion to 
explain how Nietzsche philosophically understood history as physiology. Essentially, 
318 Stiegler, Nietzsche et /a biologie, p. 68-69. For more on Nietzsche and Nageli see Gregory Moore, 
Nietzsche, bi%gy, and Metaphor, p. 31-32. 
319 FP 1886-1887,7[9] (Author's translation). 
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this understanding of history rests on the removal of passivity from the subject's 
relation to its world. Through Roux's account of excitation and Nageli's description of 
assimilation, memory becomes the active production of the forms that are the basis 
for an knowledge of the past. But before reaching the anticipated conclusion, 1 must 
first describe Nietzsche's physiological metaphor. 
Part 2: History 
3.2.1 The Nietzschean Subject 
After having discussed his reading of Roux, 1 will now show that the effect of 
Nietzsche's reading of Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus amounted to more than a 
biological reduction. Nietzsche used his knowledge of the physiological struggle 
between an organism's parts not only to better understand the complexity of the body, 
but also to understand the relationship between the body and the intellect. He makes 
this point in a series ofunpublished notes that argue for the methodological priority of 
the body over consciousness, spirit or SOul.320 According to Barbara Stiegler, it is here 
that Nietzsche made his most fundamental break with the modem philosophical 
tradition. Through his physiological interpretation of the human subject, Nietzsche 
broke with the philosophical tradition that portrayed the human subject as determined 
by its categories of understanding.32I His discussion of the organic basis of memory 
implied that the continuaI restructuration of the body's organization conditioned its 
ability to interpret new experiences. The human subject is therefore an auto-regulating 
320 FP 1884,25[356]; 1884,26[374]; 1884,27[70]; 1885,34[46]; 1885,40[21]; 1885-1886,2[91]; 
1886-1887,5[56]. 
321 Barbara Stiegler, Nietzsche et /a biologie, p. 70-71. 
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structure that actively mediates the continual influx of new experiences.322 The 
reception of stimuli implies their assimilation, which then acts as the pre-condition to 
the reception of additional stimuli by developing tensions that can be affected. 
Whereas the subject had been previously described as an opposition between the 
active process of thinking and the passive reception of experiences, Nietzsche's use of 
the body brought him to define both the reception of stimuli and their assimilation as 
active historical characteristics of the subject.323 Assimilation works towards creating 
the hermeneutic horizon that orients the possibility of any new interpretation. 
Nietzsche's physiological reinterpretation of the human subject developed its 
ultimate form in Beyond Good and Evil. In it, he contested the traditional 
understanding of the soul as the unique psychic center and seat of consciousness. 
Basing himself on the newly discovered physiological processes, he objected to the 
traditional conception of the soul as indestructible, etemal, and indivisible.324 
"[T]he way is open for a new version and refinements of the sou/-
hypothesis; and such conceptions as 'morta/-sou/,' and 'sou/ as 
subjective mu/tiplicity, ' and 'sou/ as social structure of the drives and 
affects' want henceforth to have citizens' rights in science. "325 
But by way of undermining the traditional conception of the individual as a unitary 
soul, Nietzsche appealed to the fertility of physiological study rather than psychology. 
"[F]irst a physi%gica/ investigation and interpretation, rather than a psych%gica/ 
one[.]"326 Nietzsche stated to this effect that nothing good has ever come of the 
contemplation of the soul and it is only once the body is studied that one gains a 
322 Barbara Stiegler, Nietzsche et la biologie, p. 82; See also Barbara Stiegler, "Mettre le corps à la 
place de l'âme, qu'est-ce que cela change? Nietzsche entre Descrates, Kant et la biologie" in 
Philosophie. vol. 82 (2004), pp. 92; and Babara Stiegler, Nietszche et la critique de la chair: Dionysos, 
Ariane, le Christ. (Paris: PUF, 2005), pp. 203-238. 
323 Stiegler, Nietzsche et la biologie, p. 82. 
324 BGE, §12. 
325 BGE, §12. 
326GMI, §17. 
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better understanding of intellectual processes. Psychology cannot overcome the 
understanding of the subject as the Cartesian "1 think" or the Schopenhaurian "1 
will,"327 but physiology, however, reveals the "f' as a conceptual synthesis "whïch 
makes possible both the individual and the whole."328 Moreover, "even if the centre of 
'consciousness' doesn't coïncide with the physiological centre, if would still be 
possible that the physiological centre is also the psychic centre. "329 There is a 
startling similarity between intellectual processes and physiological ones, and the 
latter "may certainly also serve as a metaphor for the ïntellectual[.]"33o By following 
the body as a guide, a better understanding of intellectual processes is possible which 
reveals a complicated synthesis of forces that are only incompletely understood when 
the intellect is examined alone. As we have seen, Nietzsche prefigured this in 
Daybreak where he had cautiously described moral evaluations as the product of 
competing drives interpreted as a text. 
Let us now tum to his comparison between the intellectual processes and 
physiology. According to Nietzsche, the intellect, as the seat of consciousness, is not 
alone in thinking; the whole body thinks. His understanding of the physiological 
interpretation of consciousness began during his first reading of Roux where he 
described the affects as links between the various physiological constituents of the 
body, which intellectualize the physiological struggle of the partS}3! Through the 
affects' translation of the inner struggle, the intellect becomes part of the body. This 
was later refined in 1883 where the affects were described as acting "as if' they were 
organs because they struggle amongst themselves for the attention of the intellect.332 
327 BGE, § 16. 
328 FP 1885, 40[21]; 1885~1886, 1[87]. (WLN). 
329 FP 1886-1887, 5 [56]. (WLN). 
330 FP 1885,40[38]. (WLN). 
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Moreover, they subordinate organs to their needs, which are recompensed for their 
cooperation by increased levels of nourishment. By way of explaining the relation of 
the affects to the body, Nietzsche described them as telegraphic links between two 
actual organs like the connection between a pianist's hands and his brain.333 The 
instinctual movement of the hands that follows the reading of the partition without 
necessarily consciously willing each movement characterizes the action of the affects. 
The command that coordinates the various parts of the body when playing music must 
be broken down into its smallest constituent parts. The movement starts from these 
smallest parts then percolates upward following the body's hierarchy.334 "We 
presuppose here that the whole organism thinks, that ail the organie parts have their 
part in thought, in feeling, and willing -consequently the brain is but a great 
eentralizing apparatus. "335 The intellect is not the only part of the body that thinks, 
feels and wills. AlI the parts of the body think, the intellect is simply the organ that 
coordinates all the se distinct and competing affects. Thus, Nietzsche c1early thought 
that the body thinks inasmuch as its operations are not fully determined by the brain. 1 
will now explain how he thought this was possible. 
It is through the sensations of pleasure and pain that the intellect coordinates 
its affects and that the body can be said to think. This coordination is made possible 
by "the posterior effeets of long eonserved evaluations that now aet instinetively as a 
system of pleasure and pain judgments. "336 Through these sensations, the intellect is 
capable of knowing what is happening to the body. However, these sensations are not 
the causes of the body's reaction. Pain is only a sign that something has upset the 
333 FP 1883,7[211]. 
334 FP 1884,27[19]. 
335 FP 1884,27[19]. (Author's translation). 
336 FP 1884.25[460]. (Author's translation). For more on Nietzsche's treatment on pain and pleasure 
albeit in the context of modern neurology see Abraham Olivier. ''Nietzsche and Neurology" in 
Nietzsche-Studien, vol. 32 (2003), pp. 124-141. 
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previously existing balance between the parts, and, as such, it is a judgment that 
precedes any intellectual interpretation of this imbalance.337 But, as Nietzsche 
observed, this signal is sent after the body has reacted to the disturbance.338 One stubs 
one's foot and is stopped from falling by the other leg's reaction and it is only after 
this reaction that the sensation of pain is felt as if to tell the brain that the foot is hurt: 
pain is the recognition of the possible consequences of the disturbance.339 Thus, 
according to Nietzsche, pain is not the cause of the reaction, but an interpretation sent 
to the body's coordinating center: the brain. Pleasure, on the other hand, is composed 
of small pains and resistances that have been overcome and assimilated without a loss 
of internal equilibrium.340 This implies two important elements about his 
understanding of the body's relation to the intellect. First, the various parts of the body 
are able to react without the aid of the intellect, which Nietzsche understood as 
meaning that the intellect is not alone in thinking. Second, if the parts of the body 
think and evaluate they are also able to retain a memory of past evaluations that they 
calI upon in interpreting new affects.J41 The sensations that the intellect evaluates are 
themselves evaluations and therefore the affects act as prior-interpretations of what 
the intellect then interprets. 
However, as 1 will now show, his comparison between the body and the 
intellect does not only pertain to their cooperation. The intellect was also described in 
similar terms as the body inasmuch as its "needs and capacities are so far the same as 
those which physiologists posit for everything that lives, grows, and multiplies. "342 It 
is in this sense that it "is most similar to a stomach. "343 Like a stomach that must 
337 Didier Franck, Nietzsche et l'ombre de dieu. (Paris: PUF, 1998), p. 205. 
338 FP 1888, 14[173]. 
339 FP 1888, 14[173]. 
340 FP 1888, 14[173]. 
341 FP 1884,25[514]. 
342 BGE, §230. 
343 BGE, §230. 
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break down and digest food before it is assimilated into the bloodstream, the intellect 
also digests its experiences by assimilating the new to the old, by falsifying the 
extemal world and by filing "new things in old files" to suit its purposes.344 Its 
digestion allows it assimilate its experiences without being overcome by their 
differences. But, the digestive metaphor is much more than a description of its 
assimilative capacities. As it was described in the previous part of the chapter, 
assimilation is the consequence of an excitation. Digestion, like cellular assimilation, 
is the result of the appearance of something foreign: digestion requires that food first 
enter the stomach. Just as Roux had made aIl assimilation conditional on functional 
excitation, which is essentially a pre-selection of stimuli, there must also be a similar 
pre-selection of digestible material when "eating." Before eating one always chooses 
what food will be inserted into the mouth and swallowed. When comparing the 
intellect to the stomach, Nietzsche described this as a "spiritual fatum"345 or a 
''predetermined decision and answer to predetermined seZected questions. "346 There 
are a determinate number of intellectual stimuli that can excite the intellect's 
assimilatory capacity beyond that the intellect cannot assimilate any more. The 
intellect may therefore be compared to the body insofar as its assimilation of 
experiences, and information, is always pre-determined by what experiences may 
affect it. 
We have now seen how his knowledge of physiology was related to his later 
reinterpretation of the intellect. The subject now exists as whole only through the 
competition of its affects that divide and interpret its relation to the body and the 
outside world. It also acts like a body insofar as it digests and assimilates experiences 
. according to a pre-selection of digestible material. However, despite the intricate 
344 BGE, §230. 
345 BGE, §231. 
346 BGE, §231. 
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relation between the intellect and the body through the affects, what Nietzsche was 
arguing was not a reduction of mental activities to physiological processes. The body 
is his metaphor for understanding mental phenomena and, by extension, history. 
3.2.2 The Body as Metaphor 
Now, Nietzsche's use of the body pertains much more to his understanding of 
the world than to a biological rendering of intellectual phenomena. The body, as 
Nietzsche described it, is an interrelation of competing forces rather than a unitary 
phenomenon.347 As the representation of our subjective unity,348 it should not be 
thought of as a being, but rather as an event or becoming.349 The constant struggle 
that animates it does not allow for a permanent equilibrium. The appearance of new 
elements, or the strengthening of others, may upset this balance, which must then be 
reestablished. Through its constant reequilibration, the body is the prime example of 
how something can be said to be whole without actually being one. Because it is a 
composite of a diversity of parts competing and forming alliances, it exemplifies the 
articulation of the world. The world, as Nietzsche understood it, is chaotically devoid 
of any intrinsic properties and attributes; it exists as a whole insofar as it is able to 
affect the subject through the body. Thus, it is through the body that we understand 
and organize our world.350 It is the basis of our relation to the world inasmuch as it is 
able to receive something foreign into itself.351 It is this capacity of being affected 
frOID the inside by something other, which marks the body as methodologically 
347 Andrea Rehberg, "The Overcoming ofPhysiology" in Journal of Nietzsche Studies, vol. 23 (2003), 
p.41. 
348 FP 1885, 40[21]; Stiegler, Nietzsche et la biologie, p, 42. 
349 Didier Franck, Nietzsche et l'ombre de dieu, p. 183. 
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important.352 It IS its intussusceptive capacity that marks the body as a fertile 
metaphor. 
Therefore, the body is the link between the world and our consciousness. It is 
through the body that the world may affect the intellect.353 It receives stimuli from the 
outside, which are then translated into a text that the intellect can interpret. The 
sensory apparatus that the body has deve10ped is the means by which the body pre-
interprets and determÏnes the nervous signals that are allowed to act on the intellect as 
a ''pre-texf' to its interpretive assimilation.354 The body's interaction with the world is 
such that it pluralizes the chaos of the world through its ability to pre-interpret its 
excitations.355 As a composite of parts each having the ability of being affected in 
certain ways, the body pre-determines how the world appears to the intellect. The 
intellect then receives this plurality and through its assimilation of it, simplifies and 
falsifies the world by interpreting the pre-text given to it by its affects .. Thus, the 
body, through the affects, establishes the pre-text for conscious interpretation of the 
world. 
Now, Nietzsche's physiological metaphor reflects his reading of Roux but also 
extends beyond his reworking of the intellect. In Beyond Good and Evi!, he asked 
whether there is any "other 'reality' besides the reality of our drives[?]"356 If the only 
knowledge of the world we have is necessarily mediated by our body and our affects, 
would it not be permitted to omit the material existence of the world? Would it not be 
preferable to base our knowledge on the only reality we know: our affects? With this 
352 Stiegler, Nietzsche et la critique de la chair, p, 31. 
353 Eric Blondel, Nietzsche, le corps et la culture: la philosophie comme généalogie philologique. 
(Paris: PUF, 1986), p. 282. 
354 Sarah Kofinan Nietzsche et la métaphore. (paris: Éditions Galilée, 1983), p. 198. 
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"one would have gained the right to determine all efficient forces univocallyas -will 
to power."357 It is in thls sense that Nietzsche argued that "[t]his world is the will to 
power and nothing besides r'358 This passage, and others, need not be read as 
irnplying an ontological argument about the world, as sorne have suggested.359 The 
will to power could simply be his hypothesis about our reality inspired by his reading 
and knowledge of physiological processes.360 This expression is generally understood 
in the context of the evolutionary sciences as his response to Darwinian biology,361 
but if it is interpreted according to my reading of Nietzsche's discussion of 
physiology, the will to power is the essence of the world only insofar as it is modeled 
on how we experience and construe our reality. It is the "world viewed from the 
357 BGE, §36. 
358 FP 1885,38[12]. (WLN). The will to power is a complicated and much discussed part of 
Nietzsche's writings. There are several competing interpretations of the will to power; since it has been 
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Éditions de l'éclat, 1996), pp. 119-160. See also Mazzino Montinari "Interprétations nazies" in La 
volontés de puissance n'existe pas, pp. 28-70. 
359 Martin Heidegger, for example, reads the will to power to be the "basic character of ail beings." 
(Heidegger, Martin. Nietzsche vo/.I. tr. David Farrell KIel) [San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979J p. 3). 
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inside, the world defined and determined by its "intelligible character'[.]"362 The will 
to power rather than describe a metaphysical essence of reality, encompasses all 
interpretive organizations of the world that give it meaning.363 As the essence of the 
world, the will to power should therefore be understood as determining the text of the 
world and consequently its possible interpretations. 
My purpose in raising this issue is to underline the importance that Nietzsche 
gave to the body rather than discussing the will to power itself. This importance was 
not restricted to the understanding of mental phenomena, but through the will to 
power, it was applied to the rest of the world. What we know is only the pre-text that 
our affects give us. Our entire modern scientific edifice has been built on the idea that 
there exists matter that can be quantified. But, retorts Nietzsche,364 if this is only the 
way that the world is given to us, and that it affects us, then why not extend this 
understanding to the world itself? 
The body is therefore Nietzsche's paradigm for understanding the world, not 
because he was advocating a physiological reduction of our knowledge, but rather 
because of its status as an interpreting synthesis of forces.365 If we look out onto the 
world, aIl we see is the will to power conditioning every experience; all we see is the 
world as a bundle of forces that have come to be represented in a certain manner that 
we then interpret. The body is therefore the most important lens that we can use to 
362 BOE, §36. 
363 This is Wolfgang Müller-Lauter's interpretation (Physiologie de la volonté de puissance, pp. 46-
72). He argues against Heidegger and explains that the will to power is not metaphysical because 
Nietzsche speaks ofwills to power. This, he argues, indicates that the expression signifies that it should 
he read as an expression of the interpretive organization of the world. On the contradiction between 
wiIls to power and will to power, see Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, his Philosophy of 
Contradictions and the Contradictions ofhis Philosophy. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999), pp. 23-40. 
364 BOE, §36. 
365 Eric Blondel, Nietzsche, le corps et la culture: la philosophie comme généalogie philologique, 
p.297; Partick Wotling, Nietzsche et le problème de la civilisation. (Paris: PUF, 1995), p. 88; Sarah 
Kofinan, Nietzsche et la métaphore, p. 199; Kisten Brown, Nietzsche and Embodiment: Discerning 
Bodies and non-dualism, p. 142. 
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understand our world and ourselves. This has led to a list of four distinct ways that 
Nietzsche understood the body as a metaphor, which 1 have already integrated into 
this chapter.366 First, the psychological metaphor that uses the body to describe the 
intellect and negates the soul-hypothesis by making the entire body think. Second, the 
gastroenterological metaphor that exploits the way that the body intussuscepts its 
environment. Third, the political metaphor that utilizes the body's hierarchical 
organization produced through their struggle. Finally there is the philological 
metaphor that emphasizes the interpretative activity of the body, both within itself and 
in relation to the world. There is a fifth metaphor that one may draw from Nietzsche's 
discussion of the body, and my comments on the will to power: the body as history. 
3.2.3 History as Physiology 
Having now discussed the tenor of Nietzsche's physiological metaphor and 
seen that it can he extended to encompass the whole world, 1 will finish by explaining 
why his philosophy of history should be called physiological. The body is a historical 
phenomenon. As an evolved aggregate of organs, the body has a history and can be 
interpreted historically. But this implies that the epistemological ground for 
understanding the world is conditioned by the evolution of our sensory organs. Even 
knowledge of our evolution is conditioned on our evolution, as 1 have discussed at the 
end of the last chapter. However, Nietzsche did not endorse a c1eavage between our 
evolved faculty to know and a "real" world. Empirical knowledge is a heuristic 
princip le that describes the world "as-if' it was such and such.367 Nietzsche was aided 
in no small part by his reading of Roux, which gave him a perspective on 
evolutionary history that was not based on factors extrinsic to the object studied. The 
366 Partick Wotling, Nietzsche et le problème de la civilisation, p. 97. 
367 BGE § 15. See Nadeem J.Z. Hussain, "Reading Nietzsche through Ernst Mach" in Nietzsche and 
Science. G. Moore and T. Brodjer eds. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 121-126. 
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assimilation of the nutrients was predicated on the cell's ability to be atIected from 
without, which was determined not by external factors, but by the cell's 
intussusceptive ability. Similarly, the world that the subject inhabits and interprets is a 
consequence of human evolutionary history that developed certain perspectives that 
orient the subject's interpretation. This explained how the chaos of the world is 
translated into a conscious phenomenon and given a unitary denomination. The body 
pluralizes the world, which is bereft of any intrinsically determined qualities without 
implying a "real" world that is only partially revealed. 
History is physiological because it has the interpretive qualities of the body. 
Like the body, history pluralizes the chaos of the past, which is then simplified by the 
historian's interpretation. History acts like the body inasmuch as it is the mediation of 
the chaos of past events. History translates this chaos into past peoples, places, events, 
and objects, as a pre-text to our interpretations, which we customarily cali "facts.". 
The historian, therefore, acts as the consciousness to history's body inasmuch as it 
simplifies the pre-text given to it by history. This implies that history is not passively 
constituted through an addition of experiences. The pre-text donated to the historian 
is composed of pre-interpretations produced by preceding generations of historians. 
The appearance of new experiences, or information, is conditional on history's pre-
text, which is the basis for any new interpretations. It is in this sense that Nietzsche's 
discussion of memory's capability for retroactive action takes on all its significance. 
History, as a sum ofalready existing interpretations of the past, acts as a "backbone to 
which everything attaches itself."368 Ali new information about the past is brought 
back to other existing interpretations. History acts as the basis for an assimilation of 
new experiences, and therefore any new interpretation developed by a historian 
becomes a pre-text to new assimilation. 
368 FP 18885,39[12]. 
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Nevertheless, history is not an addition of interpretations produced by 
succeeding generations of historians. As has already been described when discussing 
cellular conjugation, the process of assimilation, or falsification and simplification, 
inherent to interpretation, is not without its resistances. In the reception and 
assimilation of something new, there is always a counter-movement that resists this 
assimilation.369 This counter-movement means that the new part is not fully 
assimilated and dissolved into the previous historical body, but remains as an 
incitement to further assimilation.37o Although this new element is put into relation 
with the other elements present in history, it is not necessarily fully integrated to the 
already existing structure. The overall cohesiveness of history is weakened because 
there is an element that has not been fully assimilated and constitutes the weakest part 
of the interpretation.371 This has an impact on further assimilations because this weak 
element acts as an unanswered question. Memory is therefore active. However, to try 
and limit this weak part's ability to affect history would lead to prohibiting the effect 
of new experiences and information. This would ultimately lead to arrested 
development. "[A] reversion, a turning back in any sense and to any degree is quite 
impossible. We physiologists at least know that. "372 Because the past is able to affect 
us, it remains present despite attempts to excise parts of it from history. Through 
these incomplete assimilations, history gains new ways of affecting the subject, which 
Nietzsche describes as woundS.373 The struggle that is implied in the process of 
369 FP 1885,36[21]; MUller-Lauter, Nietzsche, his Philosophy of Contradictions and the 
Contradictions of his Philosophy, p. 177; Stiegler, Nietzsche et la biologie, p. 69. 
370 Stiegler, Nietzsche et la biologie, pp. 72-73. 
371 An example ofthis would be the English evolutionists stubbom attempts at explaining the existence 
of "evil" in a world they had aIready determined to the product of an evolutionary process that worked 
towards the betterment ofhumanity and its general progress and well-being. This, of course, is the case 
for Spencer's evolutionary history, a fact that Nietzsche was fully conscious of and was exposed in the 
previous chapter. 
372 TI, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man" §43. 
373 See FP 1883, 7[86][95]. 
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assimilation, which leads to some elements being less fully assimilated than others, 
opens "wounds," which are new possibilities ofbeing affected. 
Understood in relation to history, these "wounds" are experienced as 
something that must be interpreted and integrated. Like the body that restructures 
itself in response to the apparition of a foreign object, likewise history also 
reequilibrates its internal force relations. This can be understood through Nietzsche's 
distinction between two aspects that interact within the historians work. There is the 
enduring aspect, which consists in the "custom, the act, the 'drama', a certain strict 
sequence of procedures," and the fluid aspect that consists in "the meaning, the 
purpose, the expectation associated with the performance of such procedures. "374 The 
enduring aspect is accordingly older than the fluid aspect that is grafted upon it. It is 
the enduring aspect that is the wound that impels further interpretation. The fluid 
aspect is the meaning that is given to something that is contained within history, 
which beckons an interpretation. A historian then responds to a question that is 
contained with a historical horizon and invites an answer,375 A question is always the 
sense and direction demanded of the interpretation.376 This question is a pre-text that 
orients the exegesis. Thus, the enduring aspect acts as the hermeneutic horizon, and 
because it has pluralized the chaos of the past and presented it as a pre-text, it always 
asks a question oriented in a certain direction. It is therefore a perspective offered by 
history unto the pasto 
As oriented questions, these "wounds" are the historical perspectives that are 
the preconditions to any interpretation,377 Understood in relation to history, these 
perspectives constitute history's affectivity. Perspectivally construed, the past does not 
374 GM II, § 13. 
375 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. tr. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: 
Corssroad, 1975), p. 333. 
376 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 326. 
377 Christian Emden, Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness and the Body, pp. 141-142. 
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exist as an unconditioned object that the subject must reveal. As part of the subject 
the past is contained within its perspectives from which the subject cannot free 
itse1f.378 There are many possible perspectives, which may cohabitate within the 
subject. 
"There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective 'knowing'; and 
the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, 
different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will 
our 'concept' of this thing, our 'objectivity', be. [T]o suspend each 
and every ajJèct, supposing we were capable of this what would that 
mean but to castrate the intellect?-"379 
Knowledge of the past is therefore dependent on the available perspectives and the 
arresting of knowledge through the affmnation of one single perspective weakens 
history's affectivity and its "objectivity." If history is only the interpretation of the 
past taken as a stable and unconditioned object, it would become the sum of these and 
disregard the fact that the past acts as an irruption that incites a reaction. The past 
incites us to assimilate it and it is these incitations or excitations that are the source of 
our interpretations. The past presents itself to us in such and such a manner through 
history. Each interpretation acts as a perspective because it is one response to a way 
that the past can affect the human subject, but it also implies the existence of other 
possible interpretations. Thus, history is never fully known because it is constantly 
rebui1t and reinterpreted. 
3.2.4 Conclusion 
We have now completed our tour of Nietzsche's physiological philosophy of 
history. We have seen that his reading of Roux introduced him to the idea that the 
body is an artificial whole that can be devolved into a series of struggling parts. These 
378 Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, his Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions ofhis 
Philosophy, p. 38 
379 GM III, §12. 
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parts are able to he excited and they overcompensate their losses. In so doing, a 
struggle ensues that produces a semblance of a structure we caU the body. We then 
saw Nietzsche extend this understanding of physiology to the human subject that 
allowed me to daim that he developed a physiological metaphor. l then understood 
this metaphor through the enigmatic will to power, which l adopted as justifying the 
extension of his metaphor to all phenomena. 
Thus, history may he understood as a body. Like a body, history may he 
affected in multiple ways. The past therefore is transformed from a undifferentiated 
chaos of events, peoples and places, into a series of objects that affect the historian as 
a pre-text for further interpretations. These historical affects are then assimilated and 
related to the existing history by which they are simplified and given meaning. Thus 
the past as chaos is pluralized by history understood as body into a series of 
perspectives. However, the interpretation of the past Îs never complete, there always 
remains a series of "wounds" that act as oriented questions offering a new perspective 
in the hermeneutic horizon. Thus, history actively produces the ways that the past 
may affect it though its incitation to interpretation that produces new questions and 
perspectives. 
Nietzsche's philosophy of history is therefore physiological. This, as we have 
seen, is in contradistinction to anatomy. Whereas anatomy privileges an 
understanding of the body that is predicated on the dissection and separating of its 
various components, physiology implies a vivisection that conserves the relations that 
the various parts have with one another. Therefore, physiologically construed, 
Nietzsche's philosophy of history endeavors to perceive how the various 
interpretations of the past operate together. These interpretations were therefore 
understood as themselves incitements to further interpretations, thus disabling any 
attempt to seize history as a unique object hetter known as the historian accumulates 
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greater amounts of information. History is never fully determined. As a body, it is 
continually restructuring itself because of the transformation of its various 
components, and because of its constant solicitation by the possibility of new 
perspectives and questions. 
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Conclusion 
We have now surveyed Nietzsche's writings from his aborted Ph. D. 
dissertation to biS the last notes he wrote before the end of his career. We can 
conclude from this survey that there is indeed a philosophy of history hidden within 
his works. As 1 noted in the introduction, his philosophy of history is neither a 
methodological reflection nor an ontological statement about the nature of the pasto 
Nietzsche's philosophy of history is physiological because it is derived from his 
understanding of the philosophical importance of the body. Let me now summarize 
what has been said in the preceding three chapters as to make this point clear and 
distinct. 
In the first chapter, we saw Nietzsche develop an understanding of history 
through his early writings on organic purposes and the evolution of language. These 
early writings showed how his developing knowledge of Darwinian evolutionary 
science mediated by F-A. Lange and Empedocles had an early effect on his 
understanding of history. These writings were read as meaning that Nietzsche thought 
that historical purposes were the consequence of the human subject's physiological 
structure that had evolved a distinct relation to the world. We then saw, in his Second 
Untimely Meditation, that this preliminary appreciation of history was developed into 
a thorough analysis. Here history was shown to be state determined by creative 
retrospection. This was taken to mean that Nietzsche did not think that the past had 
any existence outside of history. It was then linked to the human subject through his 
identification of a plastic power shaped by historical, unhistorical and suprahistorical 
powers. The historical and unhistorical powers combine to produce a historical 
horizon populated with past events, peoples and places. These elements were then 
shown to be purposeful only through the suprahistorical power, which ascribes 
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meaning to them independently from any particular temporal perspective. Thus, the 
parts of this first chapter are interrelated insofar as they both portray the use of history 
as dependent on the distance that separates the subject from the historical object; 
history is not concerned with discovering anything about the past, but rather 
developing a past that can serve the future. History was descrihed as astate dependent 
on its relation with the human subject conceived physiologically and artistically. 
However, since history was shown to be inextricably bound to the subject that is itself 
historical, then histories change as life changes. 
ln the second chapter, we saw Nietzsche embark on a historical criticism of all 
supposedly unconditioned values. This project led him to further his knowledge of 
Darwinism because he initially thought that their use of history could he exploited to 
advance his project. Through his reaction to his reading of Paul Rée and Herbert 
Spencer, 1 showed that this critical project eventually rejected their potential 
contribution. Nietzsche rejected their ideas not hecause he had overcome his 
"positivist" phase, but because he had developed a greater knowledge of their work, 
which heretofore had been lacking. The reason for this rejection was that these moral 
historians were unable to distance themselves from their moral presuppositions and 
had produced a distincdy moral interpretation of evolutionary history. Although his 
readings of these historians culminated in a disappointment, they remain important 
for Nietzsche's philosophy of history. The reason for their importance is that they 
demonstrated how history, in addition to heing linked to the subject, is conditioned on 
the manner that it has already been interpreted. Thus, history as a state of the past was 
further understood as astate that had become, and is not given meaning outside of any 
temporality. Therefore, this chapter added the importance of previous interpretations 
to any historical inquiry; every attempt at circumscribing the past is necessarily 
mediated by previous interpretations that present the past in such and such a way. 
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This important conclusion led us into the third coopter. In it, we saw 
Nietzsche read Wilhelm Roux's Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus. The 
importance of this reading lay in the way it influenced his understanding of 
physiology. Although he had already recognized the philosophical importance of 
physiology, in his reading of Roux, Nietzsche discovered a novel understanding of the 
body. Roux had described the fonnation of organic purposefulness without having 
recourse to factors extrinsic to the body.' Roux understood the body as a synthetic 
who le composed of parts agonistically interrelated. The struggle of parts therefore 
implied that the present configuration of the body was the byproduct of an aimless 
and unceasing contlict between it components. Furthennore, in arguing that the body 
was unstable structure he also gave an account of the cellular intussusceptive ability 
that had an important consequence for Nietzsche's philosophy. Rather than 
understand a cell's intake of nutrients as passive, Roux described it as dependent on 
the cell's inner structure. Thus, the celI's inner state was the pre-condition to any 
assimilation. The inner state became the mediation of the ceU' s environment, rather 
the product of forces acting on it from outside. 1 then showed how Nietzsche used the 
ideas of the body as a synthesis of forces and the celI' s intussusceptive ability to 
develop his physiological metaphor. He applied this metaphor to the human subject, 
thus fracturing what had previously been the only stable entity on which he had 
developed his philosophy ofhistory. The subject's intellect was shown to have similar 
properties as the body, namely the ability to mediate the extemal world through its 
competing affects. Human knowledge of the world was then described as the 
interpretation of what the affects had aIready pre-interpreted an offered to the 
intellect. The affects that had come to dominate some parts of the body were able to 
transmit a pre-text to the mind, which it then interpreted. 1 then applied this metaphor 
to history. The justification for this extension was found in Nietzsche's nebulous will 
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to power. This allowed me to argue that history is most similar to a body. As the body 
mediates the world, likewise history mediates the pasto As the body has developed a 
certain ways that the world can affect it, likewise previous interpretations have pre-
determined the way the past is affective. More importantly, the body is an unstable 
structure that can easily be upset by the influx of new elements. These incomplete 
assimilations become the preconditions to future relations with its environment, 
which amounts to it actively deterrnining its structure and relation to the world. 
Similarly history's previous interpretive structure may be upset by new interpretations 
that result in unanswered questions. These questions act as the orientation and sense 
of future interpretations, which may also be called perspectives. Thus, history actively 
determines future interpretations through these oriented questions and this amounts to 
history being an active appropriation of the past. 
Therefore, Nietzsche's philosophical discussion of history is much more than 
a methodological analysis of the historian's vocation. It is also more than the 
philosophical explication ofhistorical development. Nietzsche's philosophy ofhistory 
is necessarily physiological because it adopts the ideas of contemporary science that 
fractured the body into competing yet synthetically interrelated parts. Likewise history 
is also a momentary configuration that changes along with its interpreters. This 
implies that history does not have a stable essence that can be discussed 
metaphysically, nor that there is a proper method of historical inquiry. Thus history is 
a transitory state and not a being. 
There is one last consideration that must be raised before closing this 
discussion. Throughout this thesis l have linked the development of Nietzsche's 
philosophy of history with his readings of evolutionary sciences. Although l maintain 
that this is a fruitful way of interrogating his philosophy, there are sorne unfortunate 
implications that accompany this interpretive strategy. First, it portrays the 
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development of bis pbilosophy in a bistoricist manner. It is as if Nietzsche was 
determined by the scientific environment of bis time. Second, it sets bis readings 
between the interpreter and bis text as if bis readings added something to bis writings 
that were not already there. However, this implies an interesting interpretive problem: 
is there ever a text that can speak: on its own? Or is it always necessary that there be 
an intermediary between the reader and the text? Thus implying that there is no 
Nietzschean text to read and interpret but oniy particular readings. But this would not 
answer the question because there would be a further question: what is read? 
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